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1. Translated as "Socialism or Death," this is Fidel Castro's revolutionary slogan.
SeeJuAN CtARY, Mrro Y REAuDAD, TESTiMONIOS DE UN PUEBLO 539 (2d ed. 1992) [here-
inafter Mrro].
2. Translated as "Cronyism/Buddy-system or Death," this play on Castro's slogan
derives from the word "socio," meaning "buddy" or "friend." It is commonly used by
the Cuban people to describe the informal system in place in time of shortages to re-
solver, or make do. It refers to a "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" system. For
example, a shopkeeper might "trade" some food that is scarce but in high demand,
such as meat, to someone to fix an appliance on his or her own time. In their eyes,
both parties win. The technician gets food by doing "private" work which is illegal in
Cuba. The shopkeeper gets the appliance fixed without having to wait for several
months until the government worker appears. Of course, this gives an advantage to
those who work in tradeable commodities. People with nothing to trade, therefore,
lose access to the illegal trade in food and services. See Mrro, supra note 1, at 284-85,
288, 293, 295-96, 452, 452 n.25, 478.
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INTRODUCTION
The status of Cuba, the sole Soviet-sphere socialist survivor
in the so-called post-Cold War era, has generated great interest 8
3. Throughout this work, the Author refers to the present climate as the "so-
called" post-Cold War period for two reasons. First, as the second part of this Article
posits, the Cold War is far from over with respect to Cuba. Second, recent events raise
questions over whether one may conclusively state that the Cold War has ended and the
Cold War-mentality has been shed. For example, North Korea recently withdrew from
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Citing Caution, South
Korea Puts Troops on Alert, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, § 1, at 6. But see Alan Riding, U.S.
and North Korea Agree to Build on NucearAccord, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1994, at Al (discuss-
ing U.S.-North Korea accord, in which North Korea pledged to rejoin Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty). In Russia, there has been a revival of communist opposition to
democratic rule. See, e.g., Serle Schmemann, Yeltsin, AskingAid, Talks of Communist Revi-
val, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 17, 1993, at A6; Serle Schmemann, Crisis in Moscow; Hard-Liners
Plan a Court Challenge to Yeltsin's Move, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,1993, at Al; Reed et al., Now,
the Hardliners Are Zeroing in on Yeltsin's Foreign Policy, Bus. Wy-, Jan. 18, 1993, at 48
("hardliners are, [calling for] anti-American policies, including barriers on American
investment and a return to Cold War military policies"); Michael R. Gordon, U.S. and
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Depending on political leanings, the Cuban situation is charac-
terized either as a magnificently successful or a completely failed
experiment. Economists, human rights activists, and sociologists
alike, often using unsubstantiated data, take sides and sing the
praises and foibles of the system.
Task forces have been formed to create a "Blueprint for Re-
construction"4 in anticipation of the imminent fall of Fidel Cas-
tro, who came to power in 1959,' and whose fall has been seen as
"imminent" for over thirty years. Articles about Cuba and its
economic and human rights conditions appear daily in the ma-
jor papers. These conditions range from a portrait of a thriving
tourist industry to a landscape of epidemics caused by malnutri-
don and ox-driven plowing due to lack of fuel; from cutting-edge
medical treatment centers to a country where persons are not
free to speak, travel, or vote.
While all agree that the global recession has hit Cuba force-
fully, a major debate now flourishes with respect to the U.S. em-
bargo waged against its neighboring Caribbean island.6 Propo-
Russian Subs in Collision In Arctic Ocean Near Murmansk, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1993, at A13
(U.S. attack submarine collides with Russian missile-carrying submarine in Arctic Ocean
as U.S. sub was shadowing Russian sub). Finally, China raised military spending despite
a budget deficit. See Nicholas D. Kristof, China Raises Militay Budget Despite Dficit, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1993, at A9.
4. See THE CUBAN ECONoMY. BLUEPRINT FOR RECONSTRUCTION (Manuel CereiJo
ed., 1992); ANTONIO JORGE, A RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGY FOR POST-CASTRO CUBA
(1991).
5. MARIFELi P9REZ-STABLE, THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 3-5 (1993) [hereinafter P9RFZ-
STABLE, CUBAN REvOLUTION].
6. In 1962, President Kennedy pronounced Cuba to be a hostile nation and, dur-
ing peacetime, instituted a complete embargo on the island. This was possible under
the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 ("TWEA"), 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1988), which
allowed the President to act during peacetime and wartime emergencies. In 1977, the
act was narrowed to apply only in wartime. Act of December 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
223, tit. I, §§ 101(a), 102, 103(b), 91 Stat. 1625, 1626 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 5(b)). However, the amendment acted prospectively, and provided that any emer-
gency declared prior to the enactment of the amendment could be extended year by
year, thus permitting the grandparenting of the Cuban embargo. Id.; see Tagle v. Re-
gan, 643 F.2d 1058, 1059-60 (5th Cir. 1981). Every year since the passing of the amend-
ment, Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton have extended the embargo in the
national interest. Presidential Determinations No. 88-22, Sept. 8, 1988, 53 Fed. Reg.
35,289; No. 89-25, Aug. 28, 1989, 54 Fed. Reg. 37,089; No. 90-38, Sept. 5, 1990, 55 Fed.
Reg. 37, 309; No. 91-52, Sept. 13, 1991, 56 Fed. Reg. 48,415; No. 92-45, Avg. 28, 1992,
57 Fed. Reg. 43,125; No. 93-38, Sept. 13, 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,209; Memoranda of the
President, Sept. 8, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 40,449 (1978); Sept. 12, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 53,153
(1979); Sept. 8, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,549 (1980); Sept. 10, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,321
(1981); Sept. 8, 1982, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,797 (1982); Sept. 7, 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,695
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nents of sustaining the embargo argue that it has nearly
achieved its purpose by strangling Cuba's asthmatic economy.
Conversely, opponents of the embargo point to the critical eco-
nomic condition of the island, which has rendered Cuba unable
to feed its hungry or treat its sick. The opponents further argue
that the embargo is a Cold War relic that has outlived its useful-
ness to the Western world, while providing Castro with an excuse
to blame the "yankee imperialists" for the economic ills of Cuba.
Significantly, the Cuban exile community, whose tendency it has
been to be politically united regarding assisting friends and fam-
ily who are in Cuba, is sharply divided on the embargo issue with
acrimonious exchanges taking place between the two sides.
Given Cuba's new prominence as the sole Soviet/Eastem
bloc socialist state to outlive perestroika and glasnost, this Article
explores the so-called post-Cold War environment in Cuba.
Some unanticipated and challenging aspects of this project are
noteworthy. First, there is no easy linear way to learn about the
Cuban situation; the theme of a post-Cold War Cuba is mul-
tifaceted and complex. Second, doing research on Cuba has
been most challenging: the lack of empirical data is astounding.
Finally, the data that exists is largely unreliable.7 A researcher
quickly discovers that the accuracy of the existing data, particu-
larly on the post-Castro revolution, is easily contestable. More-
over, available analysis of the information is inevitably imbued
with political spin reflecting the bipolar bias of the authors. For
example, history books openly condemn the regime for its al-
leged failures without a balanced counter-story pertaining to its
possible successes. Similarly, economic analyses praise the pro-
gresses without giving consideration to possible shortcomings.
To maintain the author's commitment to fair, even-handed anal-
ysis and lack of predispositions in evaluating the present situa-
tion in Cuba, reliance is placed whenever possible on what can
be deemed "neutral," i.e., non-ideologically-based data that is
gathered by and available from the United Nations.'
This Article studies the Cuban situation in four parts. First,
(1983); Sept. 11, 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 35,927 (1984); Sept. 5, 1985, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,563
(1985); Aug. 20, 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,201 (1986); Aug. 27, 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 33,397
(1987).
7. See, e.g., Mrro, supra note 1, at 263, 275.
8. The Author realizes that the neutrality of such data is subject to challenge be-
cause the source of this data is the country itself, which can hardly be labelled an ideo-
[Vol. 18:15
CUBA'S POST-COLD WAR STRTKEOUT
it reviews whether Cuba actually fits basic expectations of "Third
World country" status. As discussed in Part I, the figures of so-
cial and human development indicators, as well as economic de-
velopment figures, reveal that Cuba does not match the defini-
tion neatly. Its health, education, and welfare figures rival those
of industrial states. Economic development figures, however,
paint a completely different picture. Economic considerations
certainly permit labelling the island as a "developing country,"
particularly since the onset of the 1986 recession, as exacerbated
by the demise of communism and Cuba's consequent loss of So-
viet-bloc aid and subsidies.9
In Part II, this Article explores whether the Cold War has
ended with respect to Cuba. Looking generally at political, mili-
tary, and economic developments since the mid-1980's, and spe-
cifically at the Cuban Democracy Act of 199210 ("CDA" or "Tor-
ricelli Law"), and the Russia-Cuba Trade Agreement of Novem-
ber 3, 1992,11 it appears fair to conclude that for Cuba the Cold
War is far from over. Notwithstanding a "new world order,"
Cuba's static political situation preserves the bi-polarity that was
present during the former dealings between the superpower
foes. Finally, this Article evaluates and details the impact of the
so-called post-Cold War environment on Cuba economically, in
Part III, and socially and politically, in Part IV.
In evaluating Cuba's post-Cold War status, this Article neces-
sarily reviews the island's stance with respect to human rights.
Cuba is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights ("Universal Declaration"),12 a document that is globally
accepted as the articulation of the basic rights of human be-
ings. 3 Not surprisingly, similar to the evaluation of Cuba's
logically neutral source. However, in using the raw data, at least the political spin is
avoided.
9. Mrro, supra note 1, at 123 n.21 (citations omitted). In 1979 Soviet subsidies
were estimated at US$7 million per day, and in 1988, at US$16.5 million per day. Id
10. Cuban Democracy Act, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575 (1992) (to be codi-
fied in 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010).
11. See Havana, Moscow Initial Trade Accord, FIN. TIMmS, Nov. 4, 1992, at 7 [hereinaf-
ter Havana-Moscow Trade Accord].
12. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
13. The principles contained in the Universal Declaration, while originally deemed
merely aspirational, have come to be accepted as binding customary norms of interna-
tional law. See Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Custom is a primary
19941
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achievements, the human rights situation is both laudable and
contemptible, depending on the perspective taken when review-
ing the data.
If one considers only civil and political rights, also known as
first generation human rights,' 4 Which are sacrosanct at least in
Western ideology, Cuba's record is deplorable, as is detailed in
Part IV. In essence, the Cuban govemment denies its citizens
the exercise of basic rights and freedoms deemed fundamental
by a large number of nations, such as freedoms of expression
and assembly, the right to political participation, including the
right to vote, the right to privacy, and even freedom of thought.
However, such a limited inquiry would be at best incom-
plete, at worst disingenuous. Rather, an evaluation of a coun-
try's compliance with human rights standards must also include
a review of the country's compliance with social' and economic
rights, the second generation of human rights." In fact, surveys
of human rights increasingly recognize the indivisibility of these
different generations of human rights."6 Part II details that, in-
sofar as the rights to health, education, welfare, and work are
concerned, Cuba has achieved, magnificent and praiseworthy
successes. These successes must be recognized, but unfortu-
nately have been largely ignored in the planning of an effective
"Blueprint for Reconstruction."
In concluding, a "wide-angle" perspective suggests that
source of international law. Statute of the International Court ofJustice,June 26, 1945,
art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 933, 3 Bevans 1179.
14. In addition to the Universal Declaration, these rights are contained in the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 there-
inafter ICCPR], as well as myriad regional instruments. Cuba has not ratified the
ICCPR, but is bound to obey the civil and political rights enumerated in the Universal
Declaration, which it has signed.
15. These human rights are enumerated and recognized in the Universal Declara-
tion, supra note 12, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (entered into force onJanu-
ary 3, 1976). Cuba has not ratified the ICESCR, which was adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly. However, as a signatory to the Universal Declaration, Cuba is bound by the
economic, social, and cultural rights articulated therein.
16. For a discussion on the concept of indivisibility of rights, a concept with which
this author agrees, see Rhonda Copelon, Integrating the Three Generations in an Indi-
visible Framework for the Protection of Reproductive and Sexual Health as Human
Rights (available from Author). Professor Copelon, of the City University of New York
School of Law, identifies the third generation of rights as involving "solidarity rights:
the right to equitable and sustainable development, respect for self-determination, the
protection of the environment, security, and peace."
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these post-Cold War global changes are a call to focus on the
legitimacy of the existing totalitarian regime. On the one hand,
the human rights successes achieved with respect to social,
health, education, and welfare, must be zealously guarded. On
the other hand, the government's deplorable record with regard
to civil and political rights must be corrected. Cuba's failings,
such as its failure to follow the "rule of law," as evidenced by the
absence of an independent judiciary and the lack of independ-
ent legal representation, and to secure and ensure individual
rights, such as personal security, freedom of expression, public
participation in government, and equality of opportunity, are re-
gressive relics eschewed by the aspirational new world model.
Changes that will bring Cuba in accord with the democratization
of the world community are imperative. In effecting these
changes, however, the will of the Cuban people, with respect to
what reforms are needed, as well as the methodology for their
implementation, must be of primary concern.
I. CUBA: A THIRD WOPJ-D COUNTRY?
Existing literature does not render the task of ascertaining
whether Cuba is an underdeveloped country an easy one. The
debate as to Cuba's "Third World" status dates to the beginning
of the Castro revolution. For example, noted Cuban historians
Carlos and Manuel Mdrquez Sterling cite 1959 statistics to show
that Cuba was not, even then, a Third World state. These figures
placed Cuba second or third in the Americas in terms of num-
bers of radios, television sets, cars, telephones, refrigerators,
daily newspapers and magazines, and doctors and dentists per
capita, as well as ranking it high in industrial salaries, fiscal stabil-
ity, meat consumption, and literacy rates. 17 In addition, Cuba
17. CARLOS MARQUEZ STERLING & MANUEL MARQUEZ STERLING, HISTORLA DE LA ISLA
DE CUBA (1975) [hereinafter MARQuEz STERLING]. Specifically, the authors provide the
following figures:
" one radio per 5 inhabitants (2nd place in America)
" one television per 18 inhabitants (2nd place in America)
" one refrigerator for every 19 inhabitants (3rd place in America)
" one automobile for every 27 inhabitants (3rd place in America)
" one telephone for every 28 inhabitants (3rd place in America)
" one doctor for every 980 inhabitants (2nd place in America)
" one dentist for every 2,978 inhabitants (3rd place in America)
* one student for every 273 inhabitants (4th place in America)
" 23 radio stations (3rd place in America)
1994]
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had increasingly high percentages of domestic ownership of im-
portant industries.' 8 It was widely believed that Cuba's post-
World War II socio-economic picture was promising.' 9
* 600 movie houses (2nd place in America)
o 58 daily newspapers and 126 magazines (2nd place in America)
o 42 first class hotels (4th place in America)
o 732,413 subscribers to electric power, using 1,462,782 kilowatts per hour
o Second place in America in consumption of meat per capita
o Average agricultural salaries of US$3 a day (7th place in the world and 2nd
place in America)
* Average industrial salaries of US$6 per day (2nd place in America)
e Fiscal stability (Gold reserves, dollars, commodities) (3rd place in America)
o More prison employee compensation (4th place in the world)
• 82% literacy rate (3rd place in America)
Id. at 312.
18. Id. at 314. For a discussion of Cuba's socioeconomic indicators in the decade
of 1950, just prior to Castro's revolution, see Mrro, supra note 1, at 24-29. Professor
Clark, of Miami-Dade Community College, recognizes that this period reflects both pos-
itive and negative conditions, but praises Cuba's development and diversification, even
in light of the prevailing single-product economy. He notes the increased domestic
ownership of industry and consequent control of production, increased capitalization, a
strong infrastructure, high socioeconomic indicators for the population, progress in
education and culture, and progress in health. Professor Clark recognizes as negatives
the rural-urban imbalances in health, education, and welfare, which are the very items
that showed progress overall. I; see Rafil Moncarz, Cuban Dynamics, in RESEARCH INSTI-
TUTE FOR CUBAN STUDIES, CUBA IN CHANGING WORLD 53 (AntonioJorge et al. eds., 1991)
[hereinafter CHANGING WORLD].
[U] ntil 1958 every Cuban president since World War II could boast a national
average annual growth rate of 4 percent or better, along with a number of
innovations to diversify the economy, such as rice, tourism and minerals.
Since 1961 . . . the economy has actually contracted; industrial growth has
stopped, and the average wage earner's purchasing power has fallen.
Id. While others give different figures, the projection trend is consistent. See, eg.,
Antonio Jorge, Cuba's Economic Model(s) and Economic Rationality [hereinafter Jorge,
Cuba's Economic Model], in THE CUBAN ECONOMY- DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 22-
27 (AntonioJorge &Jaime Suchlicki eds., 1989) [hereinafter CUBAN ECONOMY]. Profes-
sorJorge, of Florida International University, provides that from 1945 to 1951 the aver-
age annual increase in Cuba's per capita national income was 9%, and the annual aver-
age growth of income for the period 1951 to 1958 was about 4.6%. Id. at 25. On the
other hand, the growth rate between 1960 and 1978 was less than 1% per year. Id. at
27.
19. Jorge, Cuba's Economic Model, supra note 18, at 22-27. Professor Jorge notes
that:
Cuba had many considerable advantages in [its] quest for development...
among them were ... the island population's modernizing attitudes towards
economic activity and life; the people's familiarity and historical involvement
with international trade, greatly facilitated by the country's geographical loca-
tion; the degree of political participation and social awareness of a large ma-
jority of the country's inhabitants; the prevalence and diffusion of mass com-
munication media; the remarkably favorable indicators of longevity, infant
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For the same period, however, the time at the outset of his
revolution, Castro labelled Cuba as an underdeveloped coun-
try.20 In support of this evaluation, he cited the following
figures: 1960 unemployment rates rivaling those existing in the
United States during the great depression, lack of electricity and
housing with sanitary facilities by almost 50% of the population,
37.5% illiteracy rate, high infant mortality and low life expec-
tancy, and large foreign ownership of public services and indus-
try.2 1 Castro claims that his revolution is responsible for the
socio-economic progress enjoyed by Cubans over the last thirty
years.
Such disparate, ideologically-bound interpretations con-
ceming the status of Cuba as a Third World state simply reveal
the underlying truth: Cuba defies standard definitions. Cuba's
health, education, and welfare figures rival those of industrial
states, 22 while its economic profile, however, corresponds to that
of a Third World nation.
mortality and literacy, compared to Third World countries and even to other
Latin American ones; the firmly entrenched tradition of small entrepreneur-
ship and petty trading; the large middle sectors and their degree of urbaniza-
tion; the participation in society at large, as well as in the civil service, of an
extensive professional and technical population segment; the unobtrusive to-
pography of the country, and the fairly high geographical mobility and distrib-
utive capabilities afforded by the transportation network and services; and, last
but not least, the long and many-sided relations between the United States
and Cuba, and the pervasive influence of the former's ethos and life-style on
the latter's ambience and social atmosphere.
Id. at 23.
20. Fidel Castro, The Case of Cuba is the Case of All Underdeveloped Countries,
Address to U.N. General Assembly 31, 39 (Sept. 26,1960) [hereinafter Case of Cuba], in
To SPEAK THE TRUTH: WHY WASHINGTON'S 'CoLD WAR' AGAINST CUBA DOESN'T END
(Mary-Alice Waters ed., 1992) [hereinafter To SPEAK THE TRUTH]. But see MARQUEZ
STERLING, supra note 17, at 314 (indicating that in 1952 only 48 sugar refineries were
foreign-owned, with 41 of these in hands of U.S. nationals, and 113 Cuban-owned, con-
trasted with 1939 figures, when 118 sugar refineries were foreign owned, with 66 of
these in hands of U.S. nationals, and only 56 Cuban-owned).
21. Case of Cuba, supra note 20, at 39.
22. TRANSFORMATION AND STRUGGLE: CUBA FACES THE 1990'S (Sandor Halebsky &
John M. Kirk eds., 1990) [hereinafter STRUGcLE]. Some commentators have suggested
that "Cuba is a developed nation yet Cuba is an underdeveloped nation." Id. at xxiv.
Pointing to its developed nation status are its accomplishments in health, education,
and sports. Id. at xxv. Some of its problems, such as racism, sexism, and underemploy-
ment, also are typical of first world states. Id.
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A. Health, Education, and Welfare
1. General Population
In light of the varied evaluations of Cuba's socio-economic
status, a review of raw data is germane. As is detailed below, the
health, education, and welfare figures reveal praiseworthy
achievements in compliance with second generation human
rights. The present economic crisis, however, is presenting a
grave threat to these impressive accomplishments.
The 1994 United Nations Human Development Report, a
study of social and human development indicators, classifies
Cuba, a state with an estimated 1992 population of 10.7 mil-
lion,28 as a developing country24 with middle income 25 and me-
dium human development indicators. 26 These figures are based
in large part upon health, welfare, and education factors dis-
cussed below.
Cuban residents have a life expectancy at birth of 75.6
years, 27 slightly higher than the 74.5 average for industrial coun-
tries, the same as the United States, and almost thirteen years
23. UNITED NATIONS HuMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT RE-
PORT 174 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 UNHDR].
24. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 225. Countries in this category include Argen-
tina, Mexico, and Venezuela. This shows no change from the 1993, 1992 or the 1990
reports. See UNITED NATIONS HuMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 229 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 UNHDR]; UNITED NATIONS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 213 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 UNHDR];
UNITED NATIONS HuMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAm, HuMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 188
(1990) [hereinafter 1990 UNHDR].
25. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 224-25. Middle income is defined as GNP per
capita of US$651 to US$6000. Other states in this category at this time included Argen-
tina, Czechoslovakia (classified as industrial state), Hungary (classified as industrial
state), Mexico, Poland (classified as industrial state), Romania (classified as industrial
state), Russian Federation (classified as industrial state), Thailand, and Venezuela. This
shows no change from the 1993 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 228; 1992 UNHDR, supra
note 24, at 212; or the 1990 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 187. See THE WORLD BANK
SOCIAL INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT 1993, 390-91 [hereinafter WORLD BANK REPORT]
(classifying Cuba as lower middle-income state, meaning US$693 to US$2555 in 1991
GNP per capita figures).
26. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 223. Other countries in this medium develop-
ment category include China, Iran, Iraq, and Romania. This reflects no change from
the 1993 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 227; or 1992 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 211. How-
ever, it is noteworthy that these later figures reflect a downward change from the 1990
UNHDR, supra note 24, at 185, where Cuba was categorized as a high development
state. Other countries included in the high development category are Argentina,
France, Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico, Switzerland, and the United States.
27. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 130, 136.
[Vol. 18:15
1994] CUBA'S POST-COLD WAR STRTKEOUT
higher than the average of 63.0 years in all developing coun-
tries." Similarly, the infant mortality rate per 1000 live births is
14,29 far superior to the average of 69 for all developing coun-
tries, and almost identical to the figure of 13 for industrialized
countries.3 0 Nevertheless, this figure shows an increase in infant
mortality from 1990, when the rate in Cuba was 11, lower than
the rate of 13 for industrialized states at that time.3 '
In Cuba, 95% of all one-year-olds are immunized,32 as com-
pared to 80% of one-year-olds in developing countries.3 3 Polio,
malaria, and diphtheria have been eradicated as *causes of death
and other diseases prevalent in underdeveloped countries have
disappeared.3 4 One hundred percent of the population has ac-
cess to health services.35 This compares favorably to the figure
for developing countries, in which 81% of the population, on
average, has access to health services.3 6
Public health expenditures in Cuba for the 1988-90 period
were 3.4% of Gross National Product ("GNP"), an increase over
the 1960 figure of 3.0% of GNP.3 7 This figure is similar to,
28. Id., supra note 23, at 184. The figures are for 1992. The figures for Cuba
reflect an improved trend. In 1960, the life expectancy was 63.8, while in the United
States it was 69.9, and the average in all developing countries was 46.2. Id. at 136-37,
187. In 1975, the figure for Cuba was 72, the same as the United States and much
better than the average for the developing countries, which was 57. 1990 UNHDR,
supra note 24, at 134.
29. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 150. The infant mortality figures are for 1992.
30. Id. at 207; 1990 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 147 (setting 1987 figure for United
States at 10).
31. 1992 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 148.
32. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 150. The immunization figures are for 1992.
33. Id. at 151. This shows improvement from the figure for the period 1988-90,
which was 79%. 1992 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 177. The figures for industrial coun-
tries are not given. However, in 1988 the figure for industrial countries was 76%, and
for the United Statesit was 48%. 1990 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 147.
34. Eugenio i Balari, The Supply of Consumer Goods in Cuba, in STRUGGLE, supra
note 22, at 157, 160.
35. Id. at 132. The figures are for 1985-91.
36. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 133. The figures are for 1987-90.
37. 1993 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 158. Gross national product ("GNP") is de-
fined as "[t]he total domestic and foreign value added claimed by residents, calculated
without making deductions for depreciation." 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 220.
GNP comprises gross domestic product, which is defined as "[t]he total output of goods
and services for final use produced by an economy, by both residents and non-resi-
dents, regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims," plus "net factor
income from abroad, which is the income residents receive from abroad for factor serv-
ices (labor and capital), less similar payments made to non-residents who contribute to
the domestic economy." Id. Cuba's health expenditures for 1987 were reported as 3%
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although slightly lower than, the 3.7% figure for all developing
countries"8 and to the 6% figure for industrialized countries
(4.5% for the United States) .9
The personnel employed for delivery of medical services in
Cuba is impressive. The small island boasts that in the 1989-
1991 period its population, both urban and rural, had 100% ac-
cess to health services. The health practitioners who deliver serv-
ices comprise one doctor for every 270 persons, one nurse per
160 persons, and 1.7 nurses per doctor.40 On the other hand, in
developing states there are 6,670 persons per doctor, more than
twenty times the figure for Cuba, 3,390 persons per nurse, and
2.0 nurses per doctor; while in the industrial states the figure is
390 persons per doctor.4
Although such health statistics are certainly impressive, the
recent economic crisis threatens these advances. For example,
an unidentified epidemic threatening eyesight, which some
of GNP. 1992 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 160. The 1994 UNHDR reports the 1990
public health expenditures as 3.4% of GDP. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 152.
38. 1993 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 159. This figure for the 1988-90 period shows
a large increase from the 1.4% figure reported for 1987, 1992 UNHDR, supra note 24,
at 151, 178, and from the 1960 figure of 1%. 1993 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 159, 215.
The 1994 Report provides 1990 figures for health expenditures for all developing coun-
tries as 2.2% of GDP, placing Cuba above the average. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at
152-53.
39. 1990 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 149. These figures are for 1986. The 1992,
1993 and 1994 Reports do not provide comparable GNP figures for industrial states.
Rather, these states' data is given as a factor of gross domestic product ("GDP"). Indus-
trialized states' health expenditures, on the average, were 9.4% of GDP in 1991 as com-
pared to 4.3% in 1960. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 191. The figures for the United
States were 13.3% and 5.3%, respectively. Id. Significantly, in the 1989-1991 period the
U.S. private health expenditure was 56.1% of the total health expenditure. Id. The
real GDP per capita in industrial states is US$14,440, while in all developing countries it
is US$2170. 1993 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 213. The U.N. estimated Cuba's GDP per
capita to be US$2000. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 130.
40. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 148, 152. The figures are for 1990 for doctors
and nurses and for the 1985-91 period for access to health services. These figures are a
dramatic improvement over the ones provided by the 1993 UNHDR for the 1987-90
period, which provided that 100% of the population had access to health services, 1993
UNHDR, supra note 24, at 154, but these services were delivered by practitioners who
comprised one doctor for every 530 persons and one nurse per 290 persons. Id. at 158.
Another source reports that in Cuba, there are "over 25.1 doctors, 5.6 dentists, and 47.4
nurses and paramedics for each 10,000 inhabitants." Balari, supra note 34, at 160.
41. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 153. These figures are for the 1990 period.
The 1994 UNHDR does not provide figures for persons per nurse or nurse per doctor
for industrial states, but the 1993 UNHDR gave those figures for the 1984-89 period as
150 persons per nurse and 3.1 nurses per doctor. 1993 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 159.
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blame on poor nutrition, has stricken over 43,000 Cuban citi-
zens.42 There is general agreement that the economic ills
threaten the system of universal health care43 that is one of the
indisputable successes of the revolution.44 Some reports note
that lack of sanitation together with malnutrition are resulting in
outbreaks of illnesses that had been virtually abolished, such as
42. Lawrence K. Altman, Mystery illness Slows in Cuba, but Cause Still Eludes Experts,
N.Y. TIMEsJuly 4, 1993, § 1, at 12; Howard W. French, 43,412 Stricken Cubans, and Not a
Single Answer, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1993, at A4; Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. Scientists Baf-
fled by a Cuban Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1993, § 1, at 17; Lawrence K. Altman,
Experts Ponder Cuban Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1993, at C3; Alfredo Semprum,
Cuarenta Mil VCitimas de la 'Colza' de Castro, ABC (Madrid),June 20, 1993, at 76-79 (not-
ing that epidemic is evidence of crisis of Castro's regime). Most recently, Cuba is being
threatened by an epidemic affecting rabbits. Epidemia en Conejos Alarma a Cuba, NuEvo
HERALD, Sept. 2, 1993, at 4A. There is also an epidemic insect that affects the citrus
crop. Cientificos de FL Estudian Peligroso Insecto en Cuba, NuEvo HERALD, Sept. 2, 1993, at
4B.
43. Howard W. French, Cuba's Ills Encroach On Health, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1993, at
A3.
44. See, e.g., Rafil Moncarz, The Economics of Labor in Cuba: Factors Affecting Labor
Productivity, in CuBAN ECONOMY, supra note 18, at 47, 48 [hereinafter Labor in Cuba]
(recognizing Cuba's "notable social progress, especially in area of public health and
education" since 1959). The claims of progress under Castro are not disputed. But see
IRVING Louis HoRowrrz, THE CONSCIENCE OF WORMS AND THE COWARDICE OF LIONS 68-
70 (1992) [hereinafter CONSCIENCE]. Professor Horowitz, of Rutgers University, notes
that even "hardened opponents to the regime" have accepted Castro's successes in
health, welfare and education. Id. at 68. However, he challenges the true success in
these areas, suggesting that if "one examines the actual content of medicine and educa-
tion in present-day Cuba, one finds a near-calamitous condition." Id. at 69. He reports
that-
Recent data on the quality of medical services indicate a near-crisis: Necessary
drugs are absent; equipment is poor, training of surgeons for serious health
emergencies is inadequate. Indeed, if there is one area in which the myth of
the Castro regime has been punctured, it is certainly in the area of medicine
and health. Castro responds with claims that the U.S. embargo has put a
crimp in Cuban medicine. But even were that so, which is hard to sustain
since Cuba manages to buy around in many other areas of strategic impor-
tance, the growing charges of stratification of services for political elites as
opposed to the rest of the country cannot be blamed on external embargoes.
In the educational sphere, the issues are slightly different. They do not per-
tain to universal education or the absence of illiteracy, since pre-revolutionary
Cuba scored well in these areas. Rather the issue is content of the educational
process. From the outset, Castro recognized the importance of propaganda,
and hence, educational curricula were filled with paeans of praise to the re-
gime, its leadership, and its purposes.... From the outset, the higher culture
was harnessed to the regime's needs: Novels, films, television, even science
and criticism were harnessed to the requirements of the State.
Id. (citations omitted). In the course of a week, two friends of the Author told of rela-
tives in Cuba who had to bring their own lightbulb to the operating room so that surgi-
cal procedures could be performed.
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beriberi, plague, tuberculosis, and leptospirosis. 45 Not unex-
pectedly, these conditions have taken a heavy toll on the elderly,
whose death rates are reportedly climbing.46
Moreover, Cuba's method of dealing with some health is-
sues is under attack because, although they might comport with
Castro's totalitarian government, they appear to contravene
other human rights concerns, such as the first generation right
to personal liberty. For example, to combat the AIDS epidemic,
Cuba subjects its citizens to mandatory testing, and then isolates
those found to be carrying the HIV virus.47 In response to the
international condemnation of such encroachment on human
rights, Cuba has begun to change its policy.48
Another great claim of the Castro revolution is in the field
of education. In 1992, the adult literacy rate was 95%, only
slightly lower than the estimated 99% rate for the United
States,49 which compared favorably to the 69% average figure for
all developing countries.50
Cuba's educational profile shows a net primary enrollment
ratio of 94 for the total population, compared to 86 for all devel-
oping countries;5' gross secondary enrollment ratio of 90, com-
45. Pablo Alfonso, Se agudiza crui de higieney desnutrici6n, NuEvo HERALD, June 22,
1993, at 3A.
46. See Tim Johnson, Cuba's Safety Net in Tatters, MitMi HERALD, July 12, 1993, at 1A
(describing how food and medicine shortages have reportedly increased mortality rates
among elderly).
47. U.S. DmW'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1993:
REPORT SUBMrFrED TO THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE SENATE COMM.
ON FORmGN RELATIONS, 103D CONG., 2D SESS. 408,413 (Jt. Comm. Print 1994) [hereinaf-
ter 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS] (noting that HIV positive persons in Cuba are restricted to
sanatorium communities); Ronald Bayer, Cuba's H.V Quarantine Takes Toll in Liberty,
N.Y. TiMEs, July 30, 1993, at A26.
48. See Laurie Garrett, Cuba Institutes a Freer AlIS Policy, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Aug. 3,
1993, at 53, 59 (reporting on Cuba's newly-announced policy of releasing AIDS patients
deemed trustworthy by government officials after six months of quarantine, combined
with political education).
49. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23 at 134-35. The figures are for 1992. The 1990
UNHDR, supra note 24 at 131, using 1985 figures, placed the U.S. literacy rate at 94%,
the same as Cuba's today. In 1953 the literacy rate was 76.4%. Jost R. ALVAREZ DAZ,
UN ESTUDIO SOBRM CUBA 803 (1963) (citing Censo de la Repciblica de 1953). Signifi-
cantly, all education is free. See 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 415.
50. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 133.
51. Id. at 156-57. The figures are for 1990. The net enrollment ratio is "the
number of students enrolled in a level of education who belong in the relevant age
group, as a percentage of the population in that age group." Id. at 219. The gross
enrollment ratio is defined as "the number of students enrolled in a level of education,
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pared to 41 for all developing countries;5 2 and a gross tertiary
enrollment ratio of 20.8, compared to 6.8 for all developing
countries.53 Cuba's total expenditure on education is 6.6% of its
GNP, up from 5.0% in 1960.5 4 12.8% of the country's total pub-
lic expenditures is on education.55 These figures on health, edu-
cation, and welfare show accomplishments that far surpass those
of Third World states and are basically on par with the achieve-
ments of industrialized states. Given the overall excellence of
these statistics, it is not surprising that sub-groups in Cuba,
whose profiles are less favorable than the general population,
often do well.
whether or not they belong in the relevant age group for that level, as a percentage of
the population in the relevant age group for that level." I&L Primary education is de-
fined as "[e]ducation at the first level (International Standard Classification of Educa-
tion [ISCED] Level 1), the main function of which is to provide the basic elements of
education, such as elementary schools and primary schools." I. at 221. The available
figures for industrial countries are gross primary enrollment figures of 103 for males
and 103 for females, while the U.S. figures are 101 and 100, respectively. 1990 UNHDt,
supra note 24, at 154.
52. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 156-57. The figures are for 1990. The net
secondary enrollment rates for Cuba in 1990 was 70. Id at 156. These figures compare
unfavorably to those for net secondary enrollment for 1988-89 in the United States (88
for total population, 90 for females), and in industrial countries (85 total, 96 for fe-
males). 1992 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 193. Secondary education is defined as
"[e]ducation at the, second level (ISCED levels 2 and 3), based upon at least four years
previous instruction at the first level, and providing general or specialized instruction
or both, such as middle schools, secondary schools, high schools, teacher training
schools at this level and vocational or technical schools." 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23,
at 222.
53. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 156-57. These figures are for 1990. The
figures in the 1988-89 period for the United States are 63 for the total population and
64 for females, while for industrial countries the figures are 37 total and 35 for females.
1992 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 193. It is noteworthy that for developing countries the
figure dropped in the 1988-90 period to 7 for the total population, and remained at 5
for females. 1993 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 151, 163. Tertiary education is defined as
"[e]ducation at the third level (ISCED levels 5, 6 and 7), such as universities, teachers
colleges and higher professional schools - requiring as a minimum condition of admis-
sion the successful completion of education at the second level or evidence of the at-
tainment of an equivalent level of knowledge." 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 222.
54. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 158. The 6.6% figure is for 1990. The average
for developing countries is 3.9% of GNP, up from 2.2% in 1960. 1& at 159. For indus-
trial states, the figure in 1986 was 5.9% of.GDP (including private expenditure). 1992
UNHDR, supra note 24, at 193. In 1988 the U.S. figure was 5.7% of GDP. 1993
UNHDR. supra note 24, at 198.
55. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 158. This 1990 figure is slightly lower than the
14.2% figure for all developing countries. I. at 159.
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2. Women in Cuba
A view of a sub-group within a society may be instructive in
providing a different perspective on the nation's development.
Health and education figures for Cuban women reflect the gen-
eral view that Cuba, as a society, defies exact categorization.
Such analysis shows how programs instituted during Castro's
rule have benefitted this segment of the population.
The 1993 United Nations Human Development Report la-
beled women as a "non-participating majority" because while
they are "a majority of the world's population [they] receive only
a small share of developmental opportunities. They are often
excluded from the education or from the betterjobs, from polit-
ical systems or from adequate health care."5 ' The 1994 Report
concedes that "[m]en generally fare better than women on al-
most every socio-economic indicator." 7 In fact, in adjusting the
human development indicators ("HDI") for gender disparity the
United Nations calculated a "female-male income ratio [that
while] paint[ing] only a partial picture... reveal[s] a remarkable
pattern of discrimination."5 8 Moreover, the report notes that in
all countries, women fare worse than men.59
Further, this U.N. report found that in developing countries
gender discrimination is broadly based, occurring in employ-
ment, nutritional support, health care, and in education where
"women are likely to lose out" in educational achievement, with
"literacy levels and years of schooling much lower than men' S."160
In industrial countries, on the other hand, "gender discrimina-
tion shows up in the HDI mainly in employment and wages, with
women often getting less than two-thirds of the employment op-
portunities and about half the earnings of men. 6 1
Such male-female gaps are not the case for women in Cuba.
First, the education figures show that females are on par with, if
not ahead of, males. For the period from 1980 to 1989, the liter-
acy rate for women in the 15 to 24 year-old age group was 99%.62
56. 1993 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 25.
57. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 96.
58. Id. at 97.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 138.
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This compares favorably with the 67% figure for females in all
developing countries, the 81% average for medium human de-
velopment states,63 and even the 93% figure for high human de-
velopment countries.64
In 1991, Cuba's net primary enrollment ratio for females
was 94,65 essentially the same as the total Cuban population,
whose net and gross primary enrollment ratios were 94 and 100,
respectively.66 These figures were superior to the 81 and 90
figures, respectively, for females in all developing countries.67
The secondary level gross enrollment ratio for females in Cuba
was 97,r better than the 90 ratio for the total Cuban popula-
tion,6 9 and far above the average ratio of 34 for females in all
developing countries.7 0 Similarly, at the tertiary level, Cuban fe-
males continue to compare favorably: the female gross enroll-
ment ratio in 1990 was 24.5,'7 1 as opposed to 20.8 for the total
Cuban population,72 and only 4.3 for females in all developing
countries.7"
Women's health figures are just as impressive as these edu-
cation figures. For example, according to 1992 data, while the
life expectancy of women at birth in all developing countries was
64.5 years, the figure for Cuba was 77.4 years, which was nearly
identical to 78 years for industrial states and only slightly lower
than the U.S. figure of 79.1 years.7 4 In 1988, the maternal mor-
63. Id. at 144-45. If China is excluded, the medium human development coun-
tries' average becomes 80%.
64. Id. at 144-45.
65. Id. at 144.
66, Id. at 156.
67. Id. at 145. The available figures for industrial countries are gross primary en-
rollment figures of 103 for females, the same as males, while the U.S. figures are 100 for
females and 101 for males. 1990 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 154.
68. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 144.
69. Id. at 162.
70. Id. at 145. This figures compares favorably to the figure for net secondary
enrollment for the United States, which in 1988-89 figures is 90 for females, and to the
figure for industrial countries, which is 96 for females. 1992 UNHDR, supra note 24, at
193.
71. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 144.
72. Id. at 156.
73. Id. at 144. The figure in the 1988-89 period for the United States is 64 for
females. 1992 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 193. For industrial countries, the figure for
females is 35. Id.
74. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 144, 145, 189.
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tality rate per 100,000 live births in Cuba was 54,75 compared to
24 for the industrial countries and 420 for developing coun-
tries. 6
In the 1990 to 1992 period, women comprised 32% of the
labor force, slightly below the 35% average for all developing
countries, and below the 43% figure for industrial states.77 In
1992, however, the percentage of parliamentary seats occupied
by women in Cuba was 23%, almost twice the 11% figure for all
developing countries, the 10% figure for industrial states, and
the 10% figure for the United States. 78
These health, education, and welfare figures, both for the
general population and for women, place Cuba virtually on par
with the data accumulated for the industrial states. From this
isolated perspective, it is impossible to typecast Cuba as a Third
World country. However, as will be briefly described below, the
Cuban economic picture reflects a radically different situation.
B. The Economic Picture in Cuba79
Cuba's economy is a single-product economy, largely depen-
75. Id. at 150.
76. Id. at 151. The figure for the United States was 13. Id. at 189.
77. Id. at 162, 163. See Women in the Workforce, CuRANEws, Jan. 1994, at 10 (report-
ing that "[wiomen comprise 38 percent of Cuba's work force, up substantially from 17.1
percent at the time of the revolution").
78. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 144, 145, 189. This figure does not necessarily
represent the attainment by women of powerful positions in government. Leadership
positions in the government always have been dominated by white men, with only three
women on the 25-member Politburo, and with the first female provincial party secretary
not being chosen until 1993. 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 414. Moreover,
after Castro's April 1994 restructuring of the Cuban government, only one woman,
Rosa Elena Sime6n Negrn, who was named Minister of Science, Technology and Envi-
ronment, held a significant official post. Cuba's New Lineup, CuBANmws, June 1994, at
12. It is worth noting that even before the restructuring women were not the govern-
ment's movers and shakers; only 14.6% of the Central Committee were women and
only three of the 25 members of the Politburo were women. Women in the Workforce,
supra note 77, at 10. Thus, the 22.7% who are women are present only at the National
Assembly level. Id.
79. This section provides only a brief glimpse of Cuba's economy. It is significant,
however, that pursuant to the Cuban Constitution the economy is wholly controlled by
the state. See CoNsrrruc6N DE LA REPOBLICA DE CUBA [CONSTTUTrON OF THE REPUBLIC
OF CuBAJ arts. 14, 16-18, in Gaceta Oficial de la Repfiblica de Cuba, Feb. 24, 1976,
translated in 11 GANMA [Official Organ of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Cuba], Mar. 7, 1976, No. 10, at 2-11, amended by Law on Constitutional Reform,
June 28, 1978, revised translation in THE CONSrrrtLroNs OF THE CoMMumsr WORLD 100,
105-06 (William B. Simons ed., 1980) [hereinafter CUBAN CoNsT.]. The Cuban
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dent on the production and exportation of sugar,"° which repre-
sents 80% of the value of Cuban exports."' Cuba's agriculture
and industry lack diversification, using equipment that is techno-
logically obsolete and economically inefficient.
8 2
Throughout its history, Cuba has been dependent upon a
"superpower" for economic assistance, as well as for subsidiza-
tion of sugar and other products. Cuba, since its independence
from Spain and up until 1959, was dependent upon the United
States for protection. Subsequently, Until the recent global
changes, the former Soviet Union occupied the protective role. 3
In the 1990 to 1991 post-Cold War period, Cuba's military
expenditure was 12.5% of GDP, s4 up from the 1989 figure of
11.3% of GDP"5 and more than double the 1960 level of 5.1%.86
This 12.5% figure is more than three-fold the 3.5% figure
(which was down from 4.2% in 1960) for all developing coun-
tries,8 7 and is more than triple the 3.4% spent by the industrial
countries, whose military expenditures went down from 6.3% in
Constitution provides that the State defines, organizes, manages, and regulates all
economic activity. Id. art. 16, in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE CoMMUNIST WORLD, supra,
at 105-06. The various activities are carried out by state enterprises specifically created
to carry out defined functions, id. art. 17, in THE CONSTTUTONS OF THE COMMUNIST
WORLD, supra, at 106, including foreign trade, id. art. 18, in THE CONSTrrTIONS OF THE
COMMUNIST WORLD, supra, at 106. For a concise discussion of Cuban laws respecting
trade, see Foreign Investment Legislation in Cuba and Mexico, BAKER & McKEziz LATIN AM.
LEGAL Dzv. BuLt., Vol. 2, No. 3 (July 1994) [hereinafter Foreign Investment Legislation in
Cuba].
80. Rolando H. Castafieda, Cuba: An Option forLiberty, Development and Social Peace,
in CUBA IN TRANSITION: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY 257, 264 (1991) [hereinafter CUBA
IN TRANSITION]; see 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 409 (noting economy re-
mains highly centralized).
81. Alvarez & Alvarez, Commoditylinked Transactions And Recapitalization Needs For
Privatizing The Economy In A Democratic Cuba: The Case Of Sugar, in CUBA IN TRASION,
supra note 80, at 143, 144. About 85% of the seven million metric tons exported annu-
ally go to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. Id. at 147.
82. Castafieda, supra note 80, at 271.
83. Jaime Suchlicki, Myths and Realities in U.S.-Cuban Relations, 35J. INTERAMERICAN
STUDIES & WoRD AFF. 103 (1993); Sergio G. Roca, Cubas International Economic Rela-
tions in the 1980s [hereinafter Economic Relations], in CUBAN ECONOMY, supra note 18, at
73; Fact Sheet: Cuba, 4 DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH 102, 103 (1993); 1993 COUNTRY RE-
PORTS, supra note 47, at 409 (noting high levels of Soviet aid).
84. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 170.
85. 1992 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 166.
86. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 170.
87. Id. at 171.
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1960.88 In fact, Cuba's military expenditures are 125% of the
combined health and education expenditures, up from 41% in
1977.9 This contrasts with the military expenditure figure for
the United States, 46% for the same period, and only 32% in
1990, both down from 54% in 1977.90
Cuba's "communications profile" reveals the economic situ-
ation of the island. Prior to Castro's revolution, Cuba's commu-
nication profile placed it second or third in the Americas.9 1 This
position has suffered under Castro's rule. In 1990, there were 35
radios and 20.7 televisions per 100 persons in Cuba,9 2 compared
to 18 radios and 5.5 televisions per 100 persons in the develop-
ing countries, and 113 radios and 54.4 televisions per 100 per-
sons in the industrial countries.98 Cuba's daily newspaper circu-
lation per 100 persons was 12.4,94 which was higher than the
world-wide average of 9.2 newspapers per 100 persons, and
much higher than the 4.4 figure for all developing countries,
although below the 30.3 figure for industrial states.95 Cuba,
however, only has 5.7 telephones per 100 persons, or one per
17.5 persons. 96 This figure, though better than the raw figure of
one phone per 28 persons in 1959,91 reflects a decline in rank-
ing.. In 1959, Cuba ranked third in the Americas in number of
telephones.9" The 1990 figures place it behind Argentina, Bra-
zil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Venezuela. 9
The motor vehicle trend parallels the telephone pattern. In
the 1986 to 1988 period, there were 22 motor vehicles per 1000
88. Id. at 199. The figure for the United States is 5.1%, down from the 1960 figure
of 8.8%. As a percentage of combined education and health expenditures, these
figures are as follows: 125% in Cuba, 60% in all developing countries, 33% in all indus-
trial states, and 46% in the United States. Id. at 170, 171, 199.
89. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 170; 1993 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 176.
90. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 199; 1993 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 205.
91. See Marquez Sterling, supra note 17, at 312 (ratio of radio and television receiv-
ers to population).
92. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 160.
93. Id. at 167.
94. Id. at 166. These are 1988-90 figures.
95. Id. at 161.
96. Id. at 160. Compare these 1990-92 figures to 3.1 telephones per 100 persons in
developing countries and 47 per 100 persons in industrial countries. Id. at 161.
97. See MAgQUEZ STmuNO, supra note 17, at 312.
98. Id.
99. 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 160.
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persons in Cuba, or one motor vehicle for every 45 persons. 100
This placed Cuba behind the above-listed countries and below
the average for all developing countries.' 0' Perhaps more alarm-
ing, however, is that this figure is worse than the 1959 figure,
which ranked Cuba third in the Americas with one car per 27
persons.'0
2
The juxtaposition of this economic profile to Cuba's high
human development indicators10 3 confirms that Cuba defies ex-
act classification. Moreover, as Part IV will detail, political free-
doms, which generally run in tandem with human development,
are sorely lacking on the island. This conflation of relatively
high, although declining, human development indicators, a sin-
gle-product economy, and lack of individual liberties results in
the ultimate classification of Cuba as a developing or Third
World state. Considering Cuba's diverse profile, it is not surpris-
ing to learn that its posture vis d vis the Cold War is also unique.
II. HAS THE COLD WAR ENDED? THE CASE OF CUBA
Historians date the declaration of a Cold War to two 1946
speeches. 0 4 In the first speech, Stalin told the Soviet people
that war was unavoidable as long as capitalism existed.'0 5 In the
other, Winston Churchill proclaimed that Soviet ideological and
military expansionism resulted in an iron curtain being drawn
across Europe.' 0 6 Since the onset of the Cold War, Cuba has
100. 1993 UNHDR, supra note 24, at 166.
101. Id.
102. See MARQUEz STERLING, supra note 17, at 312. More current figures might
reflect an even worse reality because, with the fuel shortages, cars are simply not func-
tioning and bicycles have taken over as the primary method of transportation.
103. See, e.g., 1994 UNHDR, supra note 23, at 164, 168. Economic figures for Cuba
are essentially unavailable.
104. Stanley Meisler, Soviet Union's End Deprives Americans of a Top Attraction; Atti-
tudes: The Kremlin's Empire Was Variously a Bugaboo, a Utopia, an Ally and a Terrifying
Enemy, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1992, at A6.
105. Joseph Stalin, New Five-Year Plan for Russia, Election Address (Feb. 9, 1946),
in 12 VrrIa. SPEECHES 300, 300 (1946).
Perhaps the catastrophe of war could have been avoided if the possibility
of periodic redistribution of raw materials and markets between the countries
existed in accordance with their economic needs, in the way of coordinated
and peaceful decisions. But this is impossible under the present capitalist de-
velopment of world economy.
Id.
106. Winston Churchill, Alliance of English-Speaking People, A Shadow Has
Fallen on Europe and Asia (Mar. 5, 1946), in 12 Vrra. SPEECHES 329, 331 (1946)
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been in both the U.S. and Russian spheres of influence.
Cuba's single-product sugar economy, always subsidized by
favorable trade terms, resulted in Cuba's dependence on the ma-
jor powers. In fact, sugar itself has held center stage in the ani-
mosities between the superpowers. For example, on February
13, 1960, Cuba signed its first five-year trade agreement for the
sale of sugar to the Soviet Union. 07 Shortly thereafter, the
United States responded by amending the Sugar Act to permit
the President to reduce Cuba's sugar quota.'0 The same day
the amendment was passed, U.S. President Eisenhower reduced
the quota by 700,000 tons.'09 Cuba, in turn, responded by na-
tionalizing U.S.-owned property and enterprises valued between
US$1.5 to US$2 billion." 0 These events signaled that, with re-
spect to Cuba, the Cold War was under way. Significantly, one of
the most remembered and frightening events of the Cold War,
which brought the bipolar powers to the brink of a hot war, in-
volved Cuba: the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis."'
In this context, it is instructive to explore the relationships
of the United States and Cuba and of Russia and Cuba in this so-
called post-Cold War era. Interestingly, the relationships still re-
flect much of the old bipolar perspectives.
Theoretically, the end of the Cold War arrived with the tear-
("From Stettin in the Baltic to Triest in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended
across the Continent.").
107. See Case of Cuba, supra note 20, at 53 n.24. This agreement was for the sale of
one million tons of sugar per year for the five-year term. Id. The agreement was signed
with Castro by the Vice Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, Anasta Mikoyan, in Havana.
Pursuant to the agreement, the Soviets conceded Cuba a credit of US$100,000,000 and
agreed to buy a million tons of sugar a year for a five-year term, paying in cash for
200,000 tons at market price and receiving the rest in barter for agricultural equipment
and other industrial products. MARQUEZ STERLING, supra note 17, at 275; see Mrro,
supra note 1, at 89. Interestingly, this first agreement provided that the Soviet Union
would pay 2.78 cents per pound of sugar at a time when the market price was 2.9 cents
per pound and the United States was paying 5.11 cents per pound. Id. at 89 n.13.
108. Sugar Act of 1948, 7 U.S.C. § 1100 et seq. (amended July 2, 1960), 1
U.S.C.C.A.N. 385, 86 Cong., 2d Sess. (expired Dec. 31, 1974). "The President shall
determine ... the [sugar] quota for Cuba for the balance of calendar year 1960 and for
the three-month period ending March 31, 1961." Id.
109. Case of Cuba, supra note 20, at 55 n.24; see MiTo, supra note 1, at 89.
110. See Edward D. Re, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission and The Cuban
Claims Program, 1 INT'L LAw. 81 (1966); see also Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 106
(estimating uncompensated expropriation at approximately US$1.8 billion).
111. For a brief description of the Cuban Missile Crisis, see Mrro, supra note 1, at
109-10; MARQUEZ STERLING, supra note 17, at 286-87.
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ing down of the Berlin Wall, the dismantling of the Soviet Union
and the emergence of its former republics as independent sover-
eigns, the unification of Germany with the unified state being a
member of NATO, and the end of Soviet domination of Eastern
Europe with the concomitant departure of Soviet troops from its
former satellite states. Indisputably, these events marked not
only a great moment in history, but also a dramatic change in
the dynamics of international relations. The focus has shifted
from national security, i.e., military force; bipolar ideology, i.e.,
democracy vs. communism; and geopolitical balance of power,
i.e., U.S. and Soviet spheres of influence/domination, to issues
of economics. Economic interest no longer cedes to military or
ideological conflict. One need only consider the U.S. renewal of
China's "most favored nation" trading status, now fully divorced
from human rights considerations, the end of the Vietnam em-
bargo, and the talks with North Korea to see this ideological
shift. Nevertheless, this change in focus has not taken place with
respect to Cuba. Rather, the rhetoric, regulations, and radios
indicate that for this Caribbean island, 90 miles from the U.S.
mainland, the Cold War continues.
A. Rhetoric
While one of the clear markers of the end of the Cold War
was the change in the jargon used to refer to relationships be-
tween and among nations, the exchanges between Cuba and the
United States remain permeated with Cold War rhetoric. The
U.S. condemnation of the Cuban government in January 1992,
after Cubans fired at a family trying to defect to the U.S. Naval
Base at Guantanamo Bay, is one example. The U.S. government
stated that "[w] e deplore.., shooting people as a way of stopping
[citizens] from fleeing their country. It's reminiscent of ugly activi-
ties that took place at the Berlin Wall."" 2 "Body language," i.e., U.S.
112. U.S. Deplores Cuban Shooting of Fleeing Family, Reuters,Jan. 30, 1992, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File (emphasis added). The report also notes that
spokesperson, Joe Snyder, "reminded reporters that two former East German border
guards were convicted of manslaughter earlier this month for shooting dead a defector
at the Berlin Wall, which separated East and West Berlin and became a symbol of Cold
War hostility." Id. The problem of repression, however, is all too real. See 1993 CouN.
TRY REPoRTs, supra note 47, at 413-14 (noting that "government continues to use ag-
gressive, often violent, means to prevent citizens from emigrating without permission"
and giving examples including one where "border guards used hand grenades and rifle
1994]
38 FORDHAM1NTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
actions, are also stuck in the Cold War mode. Evidence exists
that the U.S. Navy continues to carry out maneuvers off the Cu-
ban coast and U.S. Air Force planes continue to fly patterns that
violate Cuba's airspace.'13  Some reports contend that the
United States increased intelligence collection activities after the
Cold War had supposedly ended."14 Most recently, in the midst
of unrest in Cuba, which precipitated an undesirable exodus
from the U.S. perspective, the United States reacted by threaten-
ing a military blockade."- Leon Panetta, the current White
House Chief of Staff, said that "[w]e've got to continue to put
pressure on Castro because the problem here is not the problem
with refugees.... It's the problem with the Castro regime. ' 16
Cuba's jargon is analogous to that used by the United
States. In January 1992, Jorge Risquet, a member of the Com-
munist Party and one of Cuba's representatives to a conference
on the 1962 missile crisis, criticized the continuation and
strengthening of the U.S. economic blockade of Cuba in light of
the supposed end of the Cold War. In addition, Risquet, using
stale language, raised the ongoing threat of direct aggression:
"[S]everal of the excuses [used in Washington] to maintain a
permanent hostility against Cuba have ceased to exist [but] new
obstacles may arise.""' 7
Moreover, Cuba's "body language" also continues an aggres-
sive stance. U.S. intelligence has allegedly discovered missiles in
Cuba that were banned by the 1988 INF Treaty." 8 Reports also
indicate that Cubans have simulated war exercises in order to
prepare for any aggression. 19 Most recently, in the midst of the
fire against unarmed swimmers trying to escape to the U.S. Naval Base at Guanta-
namo").
113. Nelson Vald6s, Commentary: On Escalating Tensions Between U.S. & Cuba,
NotiSur-South American and Caribbean Political Affairs, Jan. 22, 1992, available in
LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
114. Cuba Granma Commentary Criticizes 'Provocative' US 'Build-up' At Guantanamo,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 7, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File.
115. F. Robles et al., U.S. Hints at Blockade: Goal is to Keep Heat on Castro, Mtiai
HERALD, Aug. 22, 1994, at 1A.
116. Id.
117. Cuba Conference On 1962 Missile Crisis Ends In Havana, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Jan. 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
118. Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, U.S. Satellites Discover Banned Missile in Cuba,
S.F. CHRONICLE, May 21, 1991, at A15.
119. Simulacro de Guerra en Cuba, NuEvo HERALD, June 28, 1993, at 3A
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threatened Cuban exodus, Castro blamed the Cuban unrest on
" 'the disgraceful campaign of slander' carried out from abroad
over the July 13 sinking of a tugboat" during an attempt to flee
the island. 2 ' Similarly, Castro has labeled the U.S. accommoda-
tions for the balseros, or rafters, at Guantanamo Bay "a concentra-
tion camp," and the Miami Cubans who oppose his dictatorship,
the "fascist Mafia."'' Thus, a look at the rhetoric provides no
basis to declare that the Cold War has ended with respect to
Cuba. A review of recent laws provides additional support for
this conclusion.
B. Regulations
This section examines two recently enacted sets of rules to
show that the Cold War climate persists for Cuba. First, this sec-
tion reviews the enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992
("Torricelli Law" or "CDA") by the U.S. Congress. 22 Second, it
examines the Russia-Cuba trade pact concluded approximately
one week after former President George Bush signed the Tor-
ricelli Law.123
1. The Torricelli Law
The Cold War has existed between Cuba and the United
States for over thirty years. In 1960, U.S. President Eisenhower
broke relations with Cuba when the enterprises and property of
U.S. citizens were nationalized by the Cuban government. 124 De-
siring to destabilize the Castro regime, the United States, in
120. Exiles Lash Out at Havana 'Blackmail', MIAmi HERALD, Aug. 6, 1994, at Al.
121. Mimi Whitefield & Martin Merzer, Castro Raises Stakes: Cubans are Free to Go,
MIAiM HERALD, Aug. 25, 1994, at Al.
122. Cuban Democracy Act, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575 (1992) (to be
codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-10).
123. Havana-Moscow Trade Accord, supra note 11, at 7. As the text of the Russia-
Cuba agreement has not been made available, this analysis is based upon available pub-
lic reports.
124. These nationalizations were a reaction by Castro to aJuly 6, 1960 amendment
to the Sugar Act of 1948 that permitted the U.S. President to reduce unilaterally the
quota of sugar imported from Cuba. The same day Congress granted President Eisen-
hower the power, he exercised it. Also on that day the Cuban Council of Ministers
adopted Law No. 851, which characterized the U.S. action as "acts of aggression" and
gave the Cuban President and Prime Minister power to nationalize by forced expropria-
tion property or enterprises in which American nationals had an interest. The Cuban
government immediately took such action. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964); see also supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
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1960, imposed an economic embargo on exports to Cuba, in-
cluding exports from foreign subsidiaries, and in 1962, imposed
an embargo on imports.125 Now, more than thirty years later,
the passage of the Torricelli Law marks a heightening of the
Cold War embargo policy. Sections 6001 ("Findings") and 6002
("Statement of Policy") express the U.S. anti-Castro senti-
ments. 26 These sections also articulate the purpose of the CDA:
to end Castro's regime in order to have a democratically elected,
human-rights-abiding, non-military-dominated government.
The fall of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe has strengthened the zeal of the United States to achieve
this end. Interestingly, thirty-three years into Castro's rule, the
United States still used the 1961 nationalizations as justification
for its desire to topple the Cuban dictatorship.'27 Thus, the CDA
aims at promoting democracy in Cuba by forcing the collapse of
the Castro regime via economic strangulation.
The CDA contains broad-reaching provisions to achieve its
stated goal. Pursuant to Section 6003, the U.S. President may
impose sanctions against any country that provides assistance to
Cuba, including rendering the governments of such countries
ineligible for (i) assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of
125. See supra note 6 (discussing President Kennedy's actions pursuant to TWEA).
126. Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-02.
127. Significantly, Castro has recently made overtures regarding a possible willing-
ness to make reparations for these nationalizations. See Castro: Desperate, or... 7, MuAMi
HERALD, June 17, 1993, at 20A (reporting magazine article authored by head of Cuban
State Committee on Economic Cooperation indicating Cuba's willingness to discuss
reparations). Many view such statements with skepticism, some are outright cynical and
wonder what a government that has no hard currency and cannot even feed its people
would use to make such reparations. See id. (noting desperate economic situation in
Cuba, that embargo works, and that Castro's overture is ploy to have U.S. embargo
lifted and US$40 million in claimed losses from embargo paid by United States). One
author suggests that the Cuban "government's conciliatory statements are in part due
to the island's worsening economic crisis, and to its decision to focus its diplomatic
energies on trying to end the U.S. trade embargo," and quotes a member of the U.S.
House of Representatives, Robert Torricelli [D-NJ] as saying that "[ci ompensation from
a man who has no money is a rather hollow offer"). Andres Oppenheimer, Cuban Offer
Seen as Sign of Crisis, Mmmi HERALD, June 16, 1993, at IA. Another House member,
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen [R-FL] said "[t]his is a new indication that Fidel Castro is getting
desperate [and] merely reacting to an internally desperate economic situation." Id. at
16A. Aminda Marques Gonzalez and Manny Garcia, Exiles Call Cuba Offer 'A Sign of
Weakness', MuAMI HERAL,June 16, 1993, at 24A (reporting that Cuban exiles have char-
acterized Cuba's proposal to discuss reparations as desperate act of failing dictator-
ship); Pablo Alfonso and Ana Santiago, EUListo Para Oir Oferta Cubana, NuEvo HERALD,
June 16, 1993, at IA.
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1961 or assistance or sales under the Arms Export Control Act,
and (ii) forgiveness or reduction of debt.128 The CDA also pro-
hibits vessels that enter a port in Cuba from loading or unload-
ing any freight in U.S. ports within 180 days from the departure
from a Cuban port.129 Perhaps the most controversial of the
Torricelli Law's features is the restoration of a provision of the
1962 embargo that had been repealed in 1975: the prohibition
against foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations doing business
with Cuba.'10  Such a provision, if enforced, could have a
debilitating effect on Cuba's already strained economy. For ex-
ample, the European Community ("EC"), which disapproves the
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, has statistics showing
that U.S. companies account each year for US$500 million of the
US$600 million EC-Cuba trade.13 ' Thus, strict enforcement of
the extraterritorial provisions could further weaken the Cuban
economy by depriving it of five-sixths (over 80%) of its EC trade.
Significantly, the international community has reacted adversely
to the embargo in general, and particularly to this provision,
which effectively seeks to give U.S. law extraterritorial applica-
tion.
On October 26, 1994, the U.N. General Assembly passed a
resolution, entitled Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial
and Financial Embargo Imposed by the United States of America Against
Cuba, condemning the U.S. embargo and calling on states "to
refrain from promulgating and applying laws and measures that
128. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 22 U.S.C., 7 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); Arms Export Con-
trol Act, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2341-43 (repealed Oct. 22, 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-629, 82 Stat. 1327).
129. Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6005.
130. Id. Interestingly, the "Findings" portion of the law notes that "[t]he United
States cooperated with its European and other allies to assist the difficult transitions
from Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Therefore, it is appropriate for those
allies to cooperate with United States policy to promote a peaceful transition in Cuba."
22 U.S.C. § 6001. A November 24, 1992 U.N. General Assembly resolution, introduced
by Cuba, demanded that the United States rescind the CDA. G.A. Res. 47/19, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess. (1992). Fifty-nine countries voted in favor of the resolution, includ-
ing Canada and France, two states that historically vote with the United States. Only the
United States, Israel, and Romania voted against the resolution, in which 71 states, in-
cluding Russia, abstained. A similar 1993 resolution received increased support to con-
demn the embargo. G.A. Res. 48/16, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess. (1993).
131. Bush's Signing of Cuba Embargo Law May Trigger GATT" Complaint, EC Warns,
Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Oct. 28, 1992.
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affect the sovereignty of other countries,' 3 2 an indirect but not
particularly well-veiled reference to the CDA. It is interesting
that the U.S. explanation for its "no" vote is replete with Cold
War rhetoric, noting the U.S. sovereign right to maintain "the
embargo in order to keep pressure on the Castro regime to es-
tablish freedom and democracy, because Americans oppose the
repression of their Cuban friends by a dictatorial regime - the
last in the hemisphere," where the human rights situation "re-
mains grim. "133
Based on the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917
("TWEA"), the CDA's enforcement authority lies with the Secre-
tary of the Treasury.13 The penalties for violating the CDA's
terms include a civil penalty of not more than US$50,000. The
imposition of such a penalty effectively constitutes an amend-
ment to the TWEA, which previously did not provide for civil
penalties.
Thus, notwithstanding the changed post-Cold War geo-
political world, the CDA echoes the bipolar pugilism of the past.
Significantly, the CDA has given rise to heated disputes within
the usually-cohesive Cuban exile community, and even among
Cuban human rights activists, some of whom question the effi-
cacy of these measures for terminating the oppressive regime
and, indeed, fear that they will hurt the already-aching Cuban
people." 5 The law is also inconsistent with the post-Cold War
132. G.A. Res. 49/9, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 45th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/49/L.9
(1994).
133. U.S. Mission to the U.N., Press Release No. 151-(94), Oct. 26, 1994, at 1.
134. The TWEA gives the President power to act in emergencies. Although origi-
nally applicable to wartime and peacetime emergencies, it was amended in 1977 to
apply only during the time of war. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1). However, its application
with respect to Cuba is grand-parented. See id. § 5; see also Cuban Democracy Act, 22
U.S.C. § 6009.
135. See Consideration of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: Hearings and Markup Before
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 86-95 (1993). Ram6n Cernuda,
Chair of the Anti-Castro Coordinated Groups of Human Rights Organizations, testified
in Congress on March 25, 1992 against the law because it would starve the Cuban peo-
ple. Id. But see Hearings on Cuba Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (July 29, 1993) [hereinafter Cuba Hearings] (on file with Author) (containing
testimony of various witnesses on wisdom of continuing embargo). Some suggested
that negotiations concerning the lifting of the embargo should be a quid pro quo for
democratization because: a) the embargo was not the cause of Cuba's economic crisis;
and b) lifting the embargo can not, and will not, solve the economic crisis. Cuba Hear-
ings, supra (statement of Anthony P. Maingot, Professor of Sociology, Florida Interna-
tional University). On the other hand, Robert S. Gelbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
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move away from ideology and geo-political balance-of-power fo-
cus towards an economic interest perspective. Nonetheless, after
considerable debate over its desirability, the CDA still remains
firmly in place despite the removal of a 19-year embargo on Viet-
nam1 3 6 and the decision to grant China favorable trade status
despite human rights violations.
Indeed, dire economic circumstances existed in Cuba when
the U.S. Congress discussed the passage of the CDA. In this con-
text, the tightened U.S. embargo provided great hopes for the
final asphyxiation of the gasping Cuban economy. The recent
threat of a massive exodus resulted not only in the reaffirmation
by the Clinton administration of the CDA, 3 7 but also in the use
State for Inter-American Affairs, noted that the best way to deal with Cuba's dire eco-
nomic situation and to "foster an environment for peaceful change in Cuba [is to] con-
tinu[e] to isolate the Cuban government diplomatically, politically and economically
until basic human rights are respected and democratic reforms enacted .... Today, we
believe the embargo plays a critical role in keeping pressure on the Cuban regime to
dismantle its military machine.. . to reform its economy and refrain from the grossest
human rights violations." Cuba Hearings, supra (statement of Robert S. Gelbard, at 3).
Probably the most controversial testimony, which has generated much debate and deep
divisions within the Cuban exile community, was that of Dr. Jorge Domnguez, Profes-
sor of Government at Harvard University. Cuba Hearings, supra (statement of Dr. Jorge
Dominguez). Dr. Dominguez discussed U.S. interests in Cuba, which he posited would
be better served by lifting the embargo, as it has not worked. Id. He suggests that the
United States, instead, threaten Cuba with peace and at least remove the punitive meas-
ures from the CDA that interfere with Cuba's sovereignty. Id. For some of the debate
over the lifting of the embargo, see William Ratliff & Roger Fontaine, Let's Lift the Cuban
Embargo, Mtimi HERALD, July 19, 1993, at 13A (listing reasons for ending embargo);
Octavio R Costa, Frente a un Punzante Dilema: La Familia o Cuba, DIARuo LAS AMERICAS,
Aug. 4, 1993, at 5A; Alfonso Chardy, Castro's Tenacity Creates Split Among Exiles, Mumvi
HERALD, Aug. 14, 1993, at 2B (reporting new willingness among some Cuban exiles to
engage in dialogue with Castro); N~stor Carbonell Cortina, Resi.stiry Esperar I, DLA~o
LAS AMERICAS, Aug. 17, 1993, at 4A; N6stor Carbonell Cortina, Resistiry Esperar, Dvuuo
LAs AMERicAs, Aug. 15, 1993, at 5-A; Al Cardenas, Cuban Exiles Need United Voice to
Counter Expected Efforts to Lift Embargo, MrAMI HERALD, Aug. 15, 1993, at 1C (listing pro-
posals Cuban exiles should advocate in face of growing pressure to lift embargo); Al
Cardenas, No es Moral Comerciar con Fidel Castro, NuEvo HERALD, Aug. 15, 1993, at 21A,
Howard W. French, Cuban Dissident, in the U.S.,, Says Embargo Is a Mistake, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 1993, at A5; Larry Rohter, In Miami, Talk of Talking With Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, June
27, 1993, at 16 (discussing growing willingness among some Cuban exiles to engage in
dialogue with Castro); Aboga Wayne Smith Nuevamente por 'Abrirle Puertas' a Cuba, DIAmuo
LAS AMERICAS, June 11, 1993, at 7-A William Ratliff & Roger Fontaine, Let' Drop Our
Embargo of Cuba, N.Y. NEWSDAY, July 9, 1993, at 51 (listing benefits of ending embargo);
Cracks in the Cuban Permafrost, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1993, at A14 (urging United States to
make offer to relax embargo in return for concessions by Cuba).
136. See U.S. Embargo Unchanged, CUBANEWS, Mar. 1994, at 8.
137. The White House, Office of Communications, Press Conference by the Presi-
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of regulations revoking authorization for cash remittances, gen-
eral authorizations for travel, and "significantly" restricting per-
missible contents of gift parcels for exportation to Cuba.' In
addition, the established policy regarding Cubans illegally arriv-
ing at U.S. shores, who for decades were received with open
arms, has been reversed by disallowing entry or by intercepting
Cuban refugees at sea and taking them to safe havens.5 9
The United States, however, is not alone in preserving the
outdated Cold War mentality toward Cuba. As will be shown be-
low, Russia's recent trade agreements with Cuba, although more
attuned to a post-Cold War market approach, also preserve ves-
tiges of the bipolar animosities of the past.
2. The Cuba-Russia Trade Pacts
The first Cuba-Soviet trade agreement was signed in
1960.140 Heavy subsidies from the former Soviet Union and
favorable trade relationships with other Soviet bloc states offset
much of the impact of the U.S. embargo. Soviet-Cuban relations
were close from 1960 until perestroika. Cuba received not only
economic but also substantial military assistance.' 4 1 These eco-
nomic supports, however, ended with the collapse of the Soviet
bloc and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 4 2 In addition,
with the end of the Cold War, the former Soviet Union under-
took reduction of military forces globally. 4 ' Thus, the highly
dent, Aug. 19, 1994 (1994 WL 446481) (White House) [hereinafter Aug. 19 Press Con-
ference].
138. 59 Fed. Reg. 44,884 (1994) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 515) [hereinafter
Treasury Regulations]; U.S. Sanctions on Cuba, CuBA REP., Aug. 1994, at 1, 2.
139. Aug. 19 Press Conference, supra note 137; The White House, Office of Com-
munications, Reno Briefing on Cuban Immigration Policy, Aug. 19, 1994 (1994 WL
446482) (White House) [hereinafter Reno Briefing]. This change has been seriously
criticized. Paul Anderson & Mimi Whitefield, Move to Act Off Cash, Travel is Criticized,
Mrui HERALD, Aug. 27, 1994, at 21A; M. Ojito, Clinton Move Shatters Image of Refugees,
MIAmi HERALD, Aug. 20, 1994, at 21A.
140. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (describing Cuba's first five-year
trade agreement with Soviet Union).
141. Apparently by the second half of 1960, Cuba had received over 22,000 tons of
Soviet military equipment to arm the recently enlarged army that totalled over 250,000
persons. Mrro, supra note 1, at 90. By April 1961 the military support had risen to
30,000 tons with an estimated value of US$50 million. Id. Total Soviet aid was esti-
mated by some at US$4 to US$5 billion annually. 1993 CouRr, REPORTS, supra note
47, at 409.
142. Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 103.
143. See Brigadistas Rusos seDespiden de Cuba, NuEvo HERALD,June 16, 1993 (report-
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subsidized Cuba-Soviet five-year plans fell into disuse. 44
These developments, together with the 1986 recession,
placed Cuba in a perilous economic situation'45 on which, as
noted above, the United States sought to capitalize by passing
the CDA. Castro's regime, however, was not yet ready to capitu-
late. On November 3, 1992, Cuba and Russia concluded trade,
science, and maritime relations agreements.' 46 These new Rus-
sia-Cuba accords are based upon the post-Cold War model, i.e.,
economics, with all transactions to be based on world market
prices 47 rather than political and ideological alliances.
The then-Vice-Minister of Economic Development for
Cuba, Raul Talarid, noted that the new relationship was to be
based on mutual interest.' 48 The mutuality of interest, however,
is broad-based. Cuba, identified by the World Bank as a severely
indebted state, 49 owes large sums of money to Russia. For exam-
ple, Cuba's debt to the former Socialist bloc is estimated to be
US$30 billion, 5 0 of which the estimated debt to Russia ranges
from US$20 billion' 5' to US$28 billion.152 Because Cuba lacks
ing that last 300 Russian infantry soldiers left Cuba and that the only personnel left are
civil and military personnel at Lourdes facility, whose numbers are not known); see also
Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 103 (noting Soviet demilitarization of Cuba).
144. Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 105.
145. Castafieda, supra note 80, at 260. The economic crisis resulted from Cuba's
increasing economic and political international isolation, the economic over-depen-
dence on sugar, and the end of external commerce and assistance from the Council of
Mutual Economic Cooperation [Comisi6n de Ayuda Mfitua Econ6mica] ("CMEA,"
"CAME," or "COMECON"), which was comprised of the former Soviet Union, East Ger-
many, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Id. at 261. The eco-
nomic shrinkage that took place from 1986 to 1989 was, of course aggravated with the
collapse of the external aid and commerce. The hardships that followed resulted in
Castro's call for nationalistic resolve during what he called in 1990 "a special period in
peace time." Id. at 264. The further tightening led to what Castro called in 1991 "op-
tion zero" in anticipation of no subsidies whatsoever from the former Soviet Union. Id.
146. Havana-Moscow Trade Accord, supra note 11, at 7.
147. See Cuba Reviving Old Trade Ties With Moscow, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 4, 1993, at
C5 (referring to Soviet Union's 1989 termination of multi-billion dollar subsidies to
Cuba).
148. Id.
149. WoRLD BANK REPORT, supra note 25, at 393. "Severely indebted" means either
of two key ratios is above critical levels: present value of debt service to GNP (80%) and
present value of debt service to exports (220%). Id.
150. Cuba Hearings, supra note 135 (Maingot statement, at 14).
151. Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 106.
152. Cuba Hearings, supra note 135 (Maingot statement, at 14).
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hard currency, trade and barter agreements such as these might
be Russia's only hope to recover the debt.
To be sure, the agreements appear to be more in accord
with the so-called post-Cold War climate. For example, at the
end of December 1993, Russia and Cuba signed a trade protocol
for 1994 that significantly increased the countries' bilateral
trade. 15  The protocol is, in essence, a barter agreement to ex-
change one million tons of Cuban sugar for 2.9 million tons of
Russian oil, an increase over the 1993 figure of 2.3 million tons
of oil and 1.5 million tons of sugar.15 4 At current prices, this
exchange appears to be an even trade. 155 Some portions of the
agreements, however, that contemplate supply of arms, as well as
the retention by Russia of an intelligence facility in Cuba, are
reminiscent of the Cold War days.
Two aspects of the earlier agreements appeared to be purely
of commercial interest. First, the agreement increased sugar
and nickel trade in exchange for petroleum.'5 6 The basic
volumes have been stipulated at about two tons of sugar for 3.3
tons of oil and oil products.'57 Second, the agreements contem-
plated the resumption of construction of the nuclear electric
power plant, provided that a third partner with hard cash could
be found.' 8
However, other provisions in the earlier agreements, as well
as in the most recent protocol, bring to mind old animosities.
For example, some provisos require Russia to supply Cuba with
components and spare parts for weapons Cuba already has,
153. Yuri Pavlov & Nicolds Rivero, A New Cuba-Russia Tie, CUBANEWS, Feb. 1994, at
9 [hereinafter Cuba-Russia Tie].
154. Id. The protocol also covers other commodities. Id. One potentially explo-
sive issue is whether the barter exchanges in the protocol represent subsidized trade. It
has been reported that the U.S. government has warned Russia that any trade it under-
takes with Cuba must be at world prices, or Russia will risk losing U.S. assistance. Subsi-
dized Trade?, CuBANEws, Feb. 1994, at 9. Significantly, other Cuba-Russia oil talks are
ongoing. More Triangle Oil Talk, CUBANEws, June 1994, at 3.
155. Subsidized Trade?, supra note 154, at 9; Mario Rodriguez, Ahora Castro Tiene que
Pagarle a Rusia los Suministros que Reciba, DLAIUo LAS AMERICAS, Jan. 8, 1994, at 8-A.
156. Cuba-Russia Tie, supra note 153, at 9.
157. Russian and Cuban Ministers Satisfied with Military-Economic Cooperation Accords,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File [hereinafter Military-Economic Cooperation Accords].
158. Douglas Farah, Improving Trade With Russia Bolsters Cuba's Economic Outlook,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 26, 1992, at A25.
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although Russia is not to provide new types of weapons. 159 More-
over, diplomats said that the agreement calls for the Russian mil-
itary to pay rent for use of the Lourdes facility, Russia's largest
electronic listening station in the Western Hemisphere during
the Cold War.' 60 Aleksandr Shokhin, Deputy Premier of the
Russian government, described the agreement in tones still reso-
nant of the Cold War climate, noting that although the Lourdes
"[i] ntelligence functions will be minimized as far as possible... it
is clear that our military's interest cannot be confined to relaying
telephone conversations."'
6
'
Not surprisingly, the United States reacted to this agree-
ment adversely, directly questioning the need for the Russians to
maintain the facility and expressing hopes that military person-
nel be withdrawn immediately. 162 Nevertheless, in 1994, Russia
still retains the intelligence facility as well the submarine base,
and both constitute sources of income, in rental payments, to
Cuba.163
These actions and reactions certainly reflect the bipolar
world of the past. It appears that as far as the Russia-U.S.-Cuba
triangle is concerned, the Cold War is far from over.
C. Radios: Lines of Communication
One last Cold War "icon" that survives with regard to Cuba
is Radio and TV Mart;, Spanish outlets broadcasting to Cuba in
the vein of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.'64 Signifi-
cantly, President Clinton's plan to trim the U.S. budget deficit
includes plans to eliminate both Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty, two radio stations that were begun during the Cold War
with U.S. funds for the purpose of broadcasting local news in
twenty-four languages to the Eastern bloc and the former Soviet
Union.165 The budget cuts, however, leave Radio and TV Marti
159. Cuba-Russia Tie, supra note 153, at 9.
160. Cuba Says Diplomat's E pulsion Is U.S. Propaganda Ploy, Reuters, Nov. 11, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Propaganda Ploy].
161. Militay-Economic Cooperation Accords, supra note 157.
162. Propaganda Ploy, supra note 160.
163. See Ariel Remos, Resulta Obsoleta la Base de Fspionaje de Lourdes en Cuba, DLamo
hAs AmEAucAs, Jan. 27, 1994, at 1-A; Subsidized Trade?, supra note 154, at 2, 9.
164. The Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act of 1983, 22 U.S.C. § 1465a (1988).
165. See Steven A. Holmes, A Cold War Icon Comes Under Siege, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 21,
1993, § 1, at 13 (recounting history and imminent demise of Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty). In 1951, Radio Free Europe began broadcasting to Eastern Europe
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untouched, reflecting the persisting Cold War mentality. 66
The stated purpose of Radio Mart; is to afford Cuban citi-
zens the fundamental right to access to information, such as
world events, news, and other activities, that is unavailable to
them because of Cuba's official prohibition against the dissemi-
nation of "unauthorized information."1 67 Radio Marti- went on
the air from Washington, D.C., in 1985. In fact, when the U.S.
Congress was discussing the CDA's purpose to send to "Fidel
Castro and his communist dictatorship a strong message" that
"the United States stands firmly in support of the Cuban people
in their intense desire for freedom," it specifically noted that Ra-
dio Mart; "has played.., an indispensable role in the fight for
freedom and democracy in Cuba."168 Indeed, Radio Marti has
emphasized the need "to promote the cause of freedom in
with the exception of former Yugoslavia. Id, In 1953, Radio Liberty started broadcast-
ing to the former Soviet Republics and Afghanistan. Id. Acting to carry out President
Clinton's plan to merge the government's international operations, Radio Free Europe
announced that it would terminate most of its foreign language transmissions, which
were no longer necessary due to the fall of communism. Id. Broadcasts to Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the Baltic States will be ended, although
broadcasts in Bulgarian and Romanian will continue. Radio Free Europe WillDrop 7 Lan-
guages, N.Y. TiMs, June 23, 1993, at A13.
166. Christopher Marquis, TV/Radio Marti Funded; Review Mandated, MIAMIr HER-
ALD, Oct. 14, 1993, at 18A (reporting U.S. Congressional decision to approve US$21
million for Radio and TV Marti, but to withhold one-third of funds pending review of
viability of broadcasts to Cuba); Christopher Marquis, Merger Won't Affect U.S. Broadcasts
to Cuba, MIAMI HERALD, June 16, 1993, at 24A (discussing U.S. commitment to contin-
ued operation of Radio and TV Marti); Aprueba Subcomiti del Senado $28 Millones para
Radioy TVMarti, DIARIo LAs AMERICAS,July 1, 1993, at 1A Christopher Marquis, Radioy
TVMarti sin Cambios a la Vista, NuEvo HERA.D, June 16, 1993, at Al; Mimi Whitefield,
Cuba, U.S. Resume Battle for Airwaves, Mmmis HERALD, Aug. 7, 1993, at 22A (reporting
resumption of TV Marti's broadcast after six-month hiatus and renewed Cuban efforts
to interfere with signal). Cubans in exile believe these means of bringing free-world
information to Cuba is critical in the effort to oust Castro. See Frank Calzon, ElPotencial
Politico de TVMarti, NuEvo HERALDJune 28, 1993, at 9A; Aumenta Radio Marti Programas
Noticiosos, DAIuio LAs AmERICAS, July 7, 1993, at 10-A. However, given some recent dis-
agreements over Cuban issues, such as the U.S. embargo, there have been escalating
tensions within the Cuban community as to what approach these communications
should take. See, e.g., Christopher Marquis, Crecen Tensiones en Radio Marti Ante la Ex-
pectativa de Cambios, NuEvo HERALD, June 22, 1993, at 1A.
167. Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Part 1: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 531, 537 (1982).
168. 138 Cong. Rec. E3118, (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1992) (statement of Rep. Burton).
In a brief address to the House of Representatives, Mr. Burton of Indiana "share [d] with
[his] colleaues an excellent article from the Miami Herald by Tony Navarro ... about
Radio Marti." Antonio Navarro, Radio Mart: Vita4 Revitalized, MIAMsi HERALD, Sept. 23,
1992, at 17A [hereinafter Radio Marti]. The article focused on the Cuban government's
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Cuba." To achieve that end, it has targeted programming to key
sectors of the population, including youth, women, laborers,
and, most recently, the military.' 69 Ironically, during the recent
exodus, the United States increased radio broadcasts to Cuba to
advise Cubans not to leave the island.
170
Castro has charged that the Radio Marti transmissions are
violative of international law.' 7' Cuba's sovereignty is violated by
invading radio waves and by U.S. attempts to incite internal un-
rest by disseminating subversive propaganda. 72 On the other
hand, backers of Radio Marti cite Article 19 of the Universal
Declaration, 7 which guarantees the freedom of opinion and ex-
pression and the right to "seek, receive, and impart information
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontier."74
In any event, the importance of promoting this line of com-
munication, when such lines are deemed unnecessary in the for-
mer Soviet sphere, shows that the Cold War mentality still exists
with respect to Cuba. Radio Marti is a weapon to pierce the
neighboring wall of communist repression, as Radio Free Eu-
rope and Radio Liberty were used to pierce the Iron Curtain.
75
In sum, as shown above, rhetoric, regulations, and radios show
that Cuba is stuck in a Cold War time warp. The following sec-
tion will detail the effect of this enduring Cold War on the is-
land.
move to restrict communications between the United States and Cuba in order to si-
lence voices of dissent and to block the free flow of information. Id.
169. Radio Mart, supra note 168, at 17A.
170. Paul Anderson et al., A New Punch, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 21, 1994, at IA (re-
porting President Clinton's announcement that United States would increase radio
broadcasts to Cuba to advise Cubans not to risk crossing Straits of Florida).
171. See, e.g., International Telecommunication Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, 28
U.S.T. 2495, 1209 U.N.T.S. 32, containing Agreement between the United Nations and
the International Telecommunication Union, Apr. 26, 1949, 28 U.S.T. 2646, 63 Stat.
1441. These conventions were updated by the International Telecommunication Con-
vention, Nov. 6, 1982, - U.S.T. - See also International Telecommunication Conven-
tion, Dec. 21, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 1761, TIAS 4892; International Radio Regulations Con-
vention, Dec. 21, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 2377, TIAS 4893.
172. Radio Marti, supra note 168, at 17A, 1993 CounrNTv REPoRTs, supra note 47, at
412. A recent article reports that Castro blamed the radio transmissions for inspiring
the recent rash of attempted departures from the island. See Protesters Battle Police in
Havana; Castro Warns U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1994, at 2 [hereinafter Castro Warns U.S.].
173. Universal Declaration, supra note 12, art. 19, at 74-75.
174. Id.
175. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Cold WarAnd Its Aftermath, 71 FoREIGN AFF. 31, 31
(1992).
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III. CUBA: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE END OF THE
COLD WAR
A. General Overview of the Post-Cold War Global Economic Climate
Cuba, though impeded by the continuing attitudes and
rhetoric of the Cold War, is still affected by global events. The
milestones that have led to a proclamation of the termination of
the Cold War have had, both directly and indirectly, a profound
effect on Cuba economically, socially, and politically.
After his election in 1980, U.S. President Reagan described
the Soviet Union as "an evil empire," which escalated the Cold
War tension 176 and supported his US$2.2 trillion military spend-
ing plans. 77 At the other end of the spectrum, Reagan's walk
through the Kremlin grounds and around Red Square where, in
front of Lenin's tomb, he put his arm around Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev, signaled the beginning of the end of the
Cold War.171
In December of 1991, U.S. President Bush stated that "for
over forty years, the United States led the West in the struggle
against communism and the threat it posed to our more pre-
cious values .... That confrontation is over."' 79 One month
later, his language was bolder. He claimed that the United
States had "won the Cold War."' Ten months after that, how-
ever, President Bush signed the Torricelli Law, continuing the
war that he allegedly had won.
This so-called proclamation of the end of the Cold War sig-
nalled the shift from ideology and geopolitics driving economics
(democracy versus communism) to economics driving policy
(capitalism versus communism). Because the events of 1989 that
signalled the end to the Cold War were unanticipated, the global
blueprint for international relations in the wake of change was
far from ready. In fact, many quickly expressed fears of the im-
pact of these global changes on the Third World. As one writer
noted, the "Cold War provided a security blanket which sup-
176. Meisler, supra note 104, at A6.
177. T.N. Naylor, The Beginning of Cold War End Game; Reagan, Gorbachev in Red
Square Signal Step Toward Coexistence, WORLDPAPER, Apr. 1989, at 7.
178. Id.; Meisler, supra note 104, at A6.
179. MICHAEL R. BESCHLOSS & STROBE TALBorr, AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS 464
(1993).
180. Id.
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pressed potential conflicts and hostility on issues other than se-
curity, including the suppression of economic issues."181
Some labelled the fear about the effect of the end of the
Cold War on the Third World the "neglect effect," the concern
that limited amounts of western capital and attention would go
to the newly open and attractive countries of Central and East-
ern Europe and the Third World states would be ignored.
18 2
This "neglect effect" would then exacerbate the economic hard-
ship that Third World states suffered in the 80's, such as the
mounting foreign debt.8 " With the end of the Cold War came
the end of the false and artificial stability it created, as the raison
d'etre for the attention the superpowers paid to poor countries
no longer existed.
This shift is certain to take a heavy toll on Third World
countries that, without their Cold War era geopolitical value,
might find themselves losing economic assistance. This is quite
realistic, given the industrial world's preoccupation with the do-
mestic financial crises and political instability in the former east-
181. .C. Fred Bergsten, The World Economy After the Cold War, 34 CALF. McmT. REV.
51, 54 (1992).
182. Albert 0. Hirschman, Good News Is Not Bad News, N.Y. RMEW OF BooKs, Oct.
11, 1990, at 20-21. Hirschman believes, however, that this view is myopic and is based
upon the zero-sum model of the social world, which reasons that anything good must
have a bad equivalent. He contends that the "neglect effect" might be like that of the
imperial English power with respect to the American colonies, which contributed posi-
tively to the colonies' political, social, and economic development. He states:
During the forty-five years of the cold war, the United States has been in-
tensely, almost obsessively, concerned that social and political policies and ex-
periments in Latin America might cause this or that country to 'fall' into the
expansionist Soviet orbit. The consequences of this fear were displayed in a
variety of places .... With the end of the cold war, with the disintegration of
the Soviet "bloc;" and the failure of whatever appeal it had, the North Ameri-
can propensity to intervene should be considerably reduced and Latin
America should enjoy correspondingly more room for maneuver for social ex-
periments.
Id. He further believes that the evaporation of the threat of a socialist alternative
should permit political development as politics are no longer so polarized. Id.
183. Id. at 20. For example, it is well known that in the 1980's Brazil paid to its
creditors an amount greater than the total principle of its external debt, yet at the end
of that decade, Brazil owed its creditors almost twice what it originally owed. Further-
more, in the 1980's the Brazilian economy was marked by serious recessions. This is an
example of how a state, by allocating more money to servicing its external debt, has less
money to use for development.
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em bloc and the former Soviet Union.' The recourse for the
smaller nations, then, is to appeal to companies with their cheap
labor, consumer items, and transactions financed by high inter-
est loans. However, as the price of their commodities have
plummeted, these measures are likely to further the gap between
the industrial and the developing states.185 In addition, cheap
labor is unlikely to help either the Third World states or their
citizens to improve their standards of living.
Thus, the end result might well be the continuation of the
old world order rather than the creation of a new world order.
The Cold War terror will shift from nuclear holocaust to starva-
tion, as free market economies' fiscal interests trump both first
and second generation human rights concerns. The indepen-
dence and rights of the smaller states will still be restricted by
their larger neighbors in the latter's own interests. Rather than
military force, the larger states will use economic means to fur-
ther their interests.' 86
B. Cuba's Economic Crisis
Cuba's economy is in shambles.' 8 7 A recent article review-
ing the Cuban economy reported that the current crisis could
184. W. Michael Reisman, International Law After the Cold War, 84 AM.J. INT. L. 859,
861 (1990).
185. See Hirschman, supra note 182, at 20.
186. See Louise Lief et al., A Shrinking American Role in the World, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REPORT, Nov. 13, 1989, at 24.
187. Antonio Jorge, The Political Economy of the Cuban Revolution: Why the System
Failed, Why Piecemeal Reform Will Not Succeed, in CHANGING WORLD, supra note 18, at 69,
79. ProfessorJorge, a renowned Cuban economist, has noted that "the Cuban economy
is even more structurally fragile and unstable than that of the East European socialist
countries. Monoculture, and a high degree of foreign trade orientation and depen-
dence and, therefore, a weak production matrix, constitute its distinguishing traits." Id.
at 79. He further notes that the "excessively open and dependent nature of the Cuban
economy, its inherent instability and proneness to frequent external shocks and the
absence of sufficient integration in its domestic productive structure preclude the effec-
tive application of the customary planning techniques of nonmarket economies." Id. at
80. Thus, the monoculture, the need for structural change and diversification, the
planning needs for trading with the CMEA and the Soviet Union, and the reliance on
subsidies and aid forced centralized planning. Id. at 81. This planning created the
precariousness of the Cuban economy. ProfessorJorge argues that the "Cuban socio-
economic model of the 1970s," what he calls a "de-marketization [model] ... to denote
the replacement of the market system by central planning," does not promote eco-
nomic rationality or efficiency. Jorge, Cuba's Economic Model, supra note 18.
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result in a total breakdown and general chaos.18 8  Sadly, pub-
lished reports view the economic future of the island to be
"bleak," with change unlikely before the next century, regardless
of Castro's attempt to reform.8 9 In this context, the most recent
restrictions, instituted in response to the threat of a massive exo-
dus, will only aggravate the fiscal crisis of the island and its citi-
zens.
190
During the Cold War era, Cuba's trade with the Soviet
Union steadily grew, representing 75% of its trade in 1990, with
almost 90% of its trade being with socialist countries.' 91 Soviet
economic aid was estimated between US$3 billion per year (So-
viet estimates) and US$6 billion per year (U.S. estimates); mili-
tary aid was placed approximately at US$1.2 billion annually. 92
In fact, estimates of Soviet aid ranged from 16% to 29% of
Cuba's GNP' 3 to 26% to 37% of GNP.194 These patterns have
been dislocated with the changes in the Soviet Union and East-
ern Europe. 195 It is estimated that by 1992, Cuba's trade with the
former communist bloc had shrunk to 7% of its former value.' 96
Foreign analysts approximate that with these post-Cold War
188. Alberto Miguel, Informe Sobre la Economia Cubana, DIARIo LAS AMERICAS, Jan.
12, 1994, at IA (statement of Mr. Carlos Solchaga, Spain's former Minister of the Econ-
omy). For a broad report on Cuba's economy in crisis, see generally id.
189. See Mimi Whitefield, Study: Cuba's Future Grim, Regardless of Leadership, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 16, 1993, at IA (reporting conclusion of U.S. State Department-commis-
sioned study that Cuba's immediate economic future is bleak, whether or not Castro
remains in power).
190. Mood Grows Gloomier With Cutoff of Dollars, MrAMi HERALD, Sept. 7, 1994, at
15A.
191. See RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR CUBAN STUDIES, POST-CASTRO CUBA AND ITS PO-
TENTIAL IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES 15 (1991) [hereinafter PosT-CAnRo CUBA]. Dif-
ferent sources provide slightly varying figures. One source states that in 1988 trade with
socialist states accounted for 87% of Cuban trade, 69% with the USSR and 83% with
COMECON, which Cuba had joined in 1972. Id.
192. Susan K. Purcell, Cuba's Cloudy Future, 69 FOREIGN Ass. 113, 114 (1990). Fur-
ther, in 1979, Cuba was receiving Soviet subsidies totalling US$7 million daily. ALBERTO
RECARTE, CUBA: ECONOMiA Y PODER 153 (1980); Mrro, supra note 1, at 123 n.21 (citing
RECARTE, supra). By 1988, Soviet subsidies were estimated at US$16.5 million daily. Id.
The subsidies came in many forms, ranging from personnel assistance, Mrro, supra, at
123, to above market prices for the purchases of sugar. See 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS,
supra note 47, at 409 (noting US$4 to US$5 billion in annual Soviet aid).
193. Stryker McGuire, The Revolution at 30, NEwswEEK, Jan. 9, 1989, at 37.
194. Castafieda, supra note 80, at 265.
195. PosT-CAsTRo CUBA, supra note 191, at 15.
196. Tim Golden, Cuba's Economy, Cast Adrift, Grasps At Capitalist Solutions, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1993, at Al, A6 [hereinafter Cast Adrift].
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changes the economy had shrunk by as much as 40% between
1989 and 1992,17 and over 50% in the last two years.198
Between 1990 and 1992, this new and diminished economic
relationship with the former Soviet bloc resulted in Cuba's im-
ports falling from US$8.1 billion in 1989 to US$4 billion in 1991,
to US$2.2 billion'99 in 1992, to a projected US$1.7 billion in
1993.200 Oil imports plummeted from 13 million tons in 1989 to
approximately 5 million tons in 1992,201 mostly due to the col-
lapse of and consequent fall in trade with the Soviet Union.20 2
In 1993 it received still less oil: 2.3 million tons. This amount
will increase slightly in 1994, to 2.5 million tons, based on the
new 1994 Russia-Cuba trade protocol. 20 3
This diminished Soviet oil supply has seriously hurt Cuba by
cutting into Cuba's access to the hard currencies obtained from
market-price resale of the excess supply of subsidized Soviet
oil.204 Cuba had used the hard currencies so obtained to trade
197. Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 105; Cast Adrift, supra note 196, at A6; Cuba
Hearings, supra note 135 (Statement of Brian Latell, National Intelligence Officer for
Latin America, at 1).
198. Cuba Hearings, supra note 135 (statement of Robert S. Gelbard, Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, at 1); id. (statement of Brian Latell,
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America, at 1).
199. Cuba Hearings, supra note 135 (testimony ofJos6 S. Sorzano, U.S. Deputy Per-
manent Representative to the United Nations, at 1). The estimates are that imports
declined by approximately 75% between 1989 and 1992 and are projected to decline by
another 20% to 25% in 1993. Cuba Hearings, supra (statement of Brian Latell, National
Intelligence Officer for Latin America, at 2).
200. Cuba Hearings, supra note 135 (Sorzano statement, at 1).
201. See Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 106 ("Cuban oil imports from the for-
mer Soviet Union of an estimated 13 million tons in 1989 have fallen to about 5 million
tons in 1992 from all sources.").
202. Mimi Whitefield, Blackouts Increase Miseiy for Cubans, MLAMI HERALD, Aug. 11,
1993, at 1A, 6A (noting that before collapse of Soviet Union, Cuba was importing over
13 million tons of Soviet oil annually and by 1992 it received less than half that amount,
about six million tons).
203. Russia Trade Accord, CuBANEws, Feb. 1994, at 1; Michael Lasaga, The Benefits of
Russian Trade, CuBANEws, Feb. 1994, at 2; Cuba-Russia Tie, supra note 153, at 9. Further-
more, in 1994 the oil shortage might be alleviated pursuant to an agreement with Co-
lumbia for 61,000 tons of oil per month beginning in June or July. Oil Supply Deal,
CuBANEws, Mar. 1994, at 1; Colombian Oil Sales Agreement, CUBANEWS, Mar. 1994, at 3.
204. Jorge F. Phrez-L6pez, Cuba's Transition To Market-Based Energy Crisis, in CUBA
IN TmasrrioN, supra note 80, at 201, 232 [hereinafter P&ez-L6pez, Cuba's Transition];
seeJorge F. Prez-L6pez,'Cuba: An Oil Exporter, in CUBAN ECONOMY, supra note 18, at 85
(noting that, based on Cuban National Bank figures, for 1983-1985 period "reexports
of oil and oil products were Cuba's most significant hard currency earners... account-
ing for 40 percent of such earnings... [while] sugar exports contributed 21 percent to
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in international markets.2"5 With the decreased Soviet oil sup-
ply, however, proceeds from surplus oil sales declined from
US$621 million in 1985 to US$189 million in 1988,206 thus virtu-
ally paralyzing Cuba's ability to engage in international trade.
The result of these events was that in 1993, the Caribbean
island found itself trying to function on 70% less resources than
it had in 1989.2o7 With the end of the bipolar world order, Cuba
had lost its strategic importance and, consequently, generous So-
viet and other socialist-bloc subsidies, as it was no longer either
an ideological colleague or geographic trump card.208 Cuba's
great dependence on its former allies, however, affected its abil-
ity to manage the post-Cold War shift in economic relations.2 9
Its integration with the Council of Mutual Economic Coopera-
tion ("COMECON," "CMEA," or "CAME") economies did not
allow for economic adjustment following these former socialist
hard currency export earnings [and] tobacco, fish and shellfish, nickel, manufactured
goods, and all other exports taken together contributed about 39 percent").
205. Prez-L6pez, Cuba's Transition, supra note 204, at 201, 232; Cast Adrift, supra
note 196, at Al, A6.
206. Purcell, supra note 192, at 121.
207. See Cuba Hearings, supra note 135 (Maingot statement, at 3) ("The nature of
the challenge in 1993 is simply monumental: making the socialist system work with
70% less [sic] resources than they [sic] had in 1989.").
208. Economic Relations, supra note 83, at 73-74. After the revolution, Cuba shifted
from having the U.S. as its primary trading partner to having the Soviet Union and to
the CMEA socialist states as its primary trading partners. One economist notes that
[t]he socialist share in Cuban total trade has increased from about two-thirds
in the 1959-1968 interval to over four-fifths in the most recent years (1981-
1984).... The especially sharp increment in socialist imports (to 85 percent
now from 68 percent in 1969-1980) is a reflection of Cuba's actual weakened
self-sustenance, propped up by CAME's privileged treatment. In fact, within
CAME, it is the Soviet Union which has accounted for the bulk (about 80
percent) of Cuba's total trade over the socialist years.... The Soviet share in
Cuba total trade has increased steadily from about 50 percent in 1970 to 60
percent in 1980 and then to 70 percent in 1983-84. Despite concerted efforts,
the share of Cuban total trade with non-socialist countries has remained
rather constant since 1959. Trade with European market economies has ab-
sorbed on average about 15 percent of Cuban commercial exchange, while
African and Asian markets have accounted for less than 10 percent of total
trade (it was only 6.8 percent in 1983).
Id.; see Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 106 (reporting that during 1980's more than
80% of Cuba's trade was with Soviet bloc, with Soviet Union's share being approxi-
mately 70%, and Soviet Union alone importing 80% of Cuban sugar and 40% of Cuban
citrus).
209. SeeJorge, Cuba's Economi Model, supra note 18, at 6.
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states' switch to market economies. °
Aside from dramatic changes in the global order, however,
Cuba had other serious problems. In 1986, even before the so-
called end of the Cold War, but driven by the world-wide reces-
sion, Cuba was going in the opposite direction of perestroika. It
called for "rectification" of errors (the errors being some limited
experiments with free market concepts that Castro had allowed
in the late 1970s and early 1980s) and a reinstitution of a Marxist
economy.2 1 ' Rectification has been described as the "closing of
what little space existed for Cubans to express their en-
trepreneurial tendencies."212  For example, farmers' markets,
where home-grown produce was sold at uncontrolled prices,
were terminated.218
Rectification also called for Cubans to make more sacrifices
for the common good. The additional sacrifices included going
to rural areas to work on agricultural projects (which are suffer-
ing from fuel shortages) or participating in construction micro-
brigades for no pay, but simply the hope of governmental recog-
nition and getting bonus points that might buy them a "reward,"
such as a vacation. 4 With the end of the Cold War, Cuba's situ-
210. See id. ProfessorJorge notes that Cuba's dependency on CMEA countries for
raw materials, as well as industrial goods and capital equipment, left it no choice but to
plan in tandem with these economies. Id.
211. See, e.g, Max Azicri, The Cuban Rectification: Safeguarding the Revolution While
Building the Future, in STRUGGLE, supra note 22, at 3, 8-12; see also Carollee Bengelsdorf,
The Matter of Democracy in Cuba: Snapshots of Free Moments, in STRUGGLE, supra note 22, at
35, 45-51 (noting that rectification campaign, introduced at approximately same time
as glasnost and perestroika, is not clearly defined and is seen by some as readjustments
within government's management of planning system and by some as political and eco-
nomic measures required by decrease of foreign exchange earnings); Mrro, supra note
1, at 241; Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 106-07 (noting rectification policy "empha-
sizes centralized direction over market forces and moral and ideological as opposed to
material, incentives to spur productivity [by] call[ing] upon Cubans to make greater sac-
rifices to further the collective good").
212. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Keynote Address Before the "Cuba in a Changing World"
Conference 3 (Feb. 22-24, 1990) in CHANGING WORLD, supra note 18, at 1, 3 [hereinafter
Kirkpatrick Address].
213. Mrro, supra note 1, at 304-05; Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 107. Castro,
faced with severe food shortages, has again allowed for free farmers' markets, where
farmers are allowed to sell any surplus they have, at whatever price obtainable, after
meeting the state's quota. Tim Golden, Cubans Get a Taste of Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1994, at 8A.
214. Peter T. White, Cuba At The Crossroads, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Aug. 1991, at 93,
105 [hereinafter Crossroads]. In 1991, Castro called for 120 hours of voluntary work
from everyone. Id.; see Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 107 (noting Castro govern-
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ation became more grave.
Further aggravating Cuba's post-Cold War economic woes is
the fact that Cuba's tenuous relations with its former Soviet-bloc
partners will be on market economy terms.215 The Soviets no
longer buy Cuban sugar at manifold the world rate,216 while sell-
ing to Cuba commodities, such as oil and gas, at artificially low
prices.21 7
In the meantime, Cuba's debt situation is critical. Its in-
debtedness to the former Soviet Union is placed at approxi-
mately US$25 billion.218 Aside from the U.S. embargo, Cuba's
Western trade is limited by its inability to service its US$6.8 bil-
lion debt to Western governments since 1986. Thus Cuba is un-
able to get credit to purchase goods in Western markets. 219
ment's encouragement of voluntary labor); Bengelsdorf, supra note 211, at 49 (austerity
measures are reinforced by Castro's "evocation of a renewed emphasis on moral incen-
tives."); Labor in Cuba, supra note 44, at 52-53 (noting failure of moral incentives which
date to the 1965-70 period when such were tested under Che Guevara); see also 1993
CouNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 416 (explaining that the "ILO's Committee of Ex-
perts criticized Cuba for violating ILO Convention 29 (Forced Labor) based on allega-
tions in report by International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) that 'vol-
untary labor is, in practice, forced labor under the terms of the Convention, since re-
fusal to do such labor results in the loss of certain rights, benefits, and privileges'")
215. See supra notes 145, 147, 154-55 and accompanying text (discussing new Cuba-
Russia agreements on market terms).
216. Purcell, supra note 192, at 114 (noting that Soviets paid three to five times
market price for Cuban sugar).
217. PNrez-L6pez, Cuba's Transition, supra note 204, at 220, 221. When Cuba
started buying Soviet oil, its price was below market by about 33%. This relationship
with the Soviets protected Cuba (as well as other socialist countries) from the four-fold
increase in world oil prices during the 1973 embargo on oil sales by OPEC. A 1975
Soviet pricing policy adjustment, aimed at closing the gap between world price and its
export price to socialist countries, was tailored so that Cuba continued to enjoy below
world-market prices until the sharp drop in oil prices in 1986. Id. at 226-27. This drop
also affected Cuba's convertible currency earning from the resale of Soviet oil. Id. at
232; see Economic Relations, supra note 83, at 75-76 (stating that "substantial socialist,
essentially Soviet, economic assistance has flowed to Cuba ... by financing bilateral
trade deficits, subsidizing sugar and nickel export prices and oil import prices, provid-
ing military grants, extending credits for economic development, and supplying con-
vertible currency to finance trade with capitalist countries ... with Soviet cumulative
economic aid to the island probably amount[ing] to over 25 billion pesos during the
period 1960-1985").
218. Purcell, supra note 192, at 116-17.
219. Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 106; see Jose Luis Rodriguez, The Cuban
Economy: A Current Assessment, in STRucG.EL, supra note 22, at 85-99 (noting that Cuban
economy has shrunk based on fall in oil prices, lack of currency from re-exporting of
Soviet oil, devaluation of dollar, and adverse weather conditions, all of which resulted
in rescheduling of Cuba's foreign debt).
58 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
Although limited to 15% of its total trade, trade with Western
markets is of growing importance to Cuba, which must find raw
materials and equipment that are not available elsewhere.220
Contemporaneous with the global changes, Cuba's sugar
and nickel industries have suffered from drops in market prices
due to the global recession. Sugar price reductions alone cost
Cuba US$2.5 billion in 1992.221 The sugar crop had two addi-
tional problems, which exacerbated the economic situation.
First, the sugar crop has become dependent on the use of fertil-
izers.2 22 In 1989 Cuba imported 1.3 million tons of fertilizers
and bought US$80 million worth of herbicides but by 1992 those
figures were down to 300,000 tons and US$30 million, respec-
tively.22 3 Second, Cuba's sugar milling equipment is fuel-driven,
and consequently has been severely affected by the oil
shortage. 224 These factors resulted in a 1992-93 sugar harvest of
a mere 4.2 million tons, the smallest in fifty years. 225 The projec-
tions are that the 1994 harvest will be no larger than that.2 26 It is
mainly due to this decline in sugar production that Cuba's ex-
port revenues were projected to fall to US$1.6 billion in 1993.27
These developments required that in 1990 the "rectifica-
tion" belt-tightening be increased. Castro declared "a special pe-
riod in time of peace:" with the economy in crisis, the state
would operate as if in time of war.228 Goods, including food,
220. POST-CAsTRO CUBA, supra note 191, at 15-16. Spain is first among western
states trading with Cuba. Id. at 16.
221. John Paul Rathbone, Cuba: Current Economic Situations And Short Term
Prospects, Abstract of Main Presentation of 1992 Annual Meeting of the Association for
the Study of the Cuban Economy (1992), reprinted in Newsletter of the Association for
the Study of the Cuban Economy, Dec. 19, 1992.
222. Cuba Hearings, supra note 135 (Maingot statement, at 7).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. This dramatic decline is due, in part, to a major storm that hurt the crop
and forced Cuba to argue force majeure in suspending sales on some contracts with cli-
ents that would have given it some necessary hard currency. Id.; see Cuba Hearings, supra
note 135 (Latell statement, at 1) (noting sugar harvest is smallest in thirty years); How-
ard W. French, Harvest of Headaches: Cuba's Sugar Crop Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1994,
at 7 (noting that Cuba's 1993 harvest was only 4.28 million metric tons, worst in 30
years).
226. Sugar: Harvest May Be Worst Yet, CUBANEwS, June 1994, at 5.
227. Cuba Hearings, supra note 135 (Latell statement, at 1).
228. See Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 107 (noting that "total Cuban imports in
1992 are expected to be less than 60% of the 1989 total [and] economic production may
have decreased by more than 40% from 1989 to 1992"); 1993 CouNTRY REPORTS, supra
[Vol. 18:15
CUBA'S POST-COLD WAR STRIKEOUT
consumer goods and energy, most of which came from the So-
viet Union and other eastern European countries, 229 are now
greedily rationed. 3 °
Moreover, the rest of Cuba's industrial sector has suffered
from a lack of spare parts, components and, in some cases, raw
materials.2 3' Its oil refineries have been operating below capac-
ity and the lack of fuel has brought public transport to a virtual
standstill.23 2 In August 1990, with the declaration of the "special
period," the Cuban government imposed mandatory energy con-
servation that included reducing daily gasoline and fuel oil deliv-
eries to the state sector by 50%, and to others by 30%; cutting
back hours of operation of cement and construction material
plants; shutting down of a nickel production plant; halting the
start of a recently built oil refinery; cutting household electric
consumption by 10%; and implementing a nationwide project to
replace agricultural tractors and combines with draft animals.23
The second half of the year saw further austerity measures: bi-
cycles imported from China replaced cars and public transport
in urban areas, the horse and buggy replaced buses in urban
areas, and the ministry of light and industry cut back operation
of 321 plants from 40 to 24 hours a week. 4
In 1991, the austerity measures were called zero option: no
Soviet subsidies at all.2 35 This zero option forced "the populace
to accept economic retreat and a variety of hardships in the
name of communism."2 6 Such conditions effectively translate to
note 47, at 401 (stating that austerity measures called for "draconian efforts toward self-
sufficiency").
229. ANDRES OPPENHEIMER, CASTRO'S FINAL HOUR 227 (1992). It is estimated that
40% of Cuba's food came from the Soviet bloc, including 63% of its powdered milk,
with the same dependency being evidenced regarding raw materials, fertilizers, indus-
trial equipment, and spare parts. Id. Consumer goods were mostly from the Soviet
Union. Id.
230. Castafieda, supra note 83, at 263. In 1989, the ration quotas of meat, beans,
rice, coffee, sugar, and milk were less than the quotas in 1962 when rationing was insti-
tuted. Id.; see Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 107 (noting that Castro announced
rationing of certain goods in "special period in time of peace" in which economy would
function as if in state of war).
231. Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 107; Castafieda, supra note 80, at 263.
232. Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 107; Castafieda, supra note 80, at 263.
233. P rez-L6pez, Cuba's Transition, supra note 204, at 238.
234. Id. at 238-39; Fact sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 106.
235. Castafieda, supra note 80, at 264.
236. CONSCIENCE, supra note 44, at 7. Professor Horowitz posits that this zero op-
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a return to pre-industrial society that will further isolate Cuba
from the rest of the world. 3 7
On July 26, 1993, Castro marked the 40th anniversary of the
revolution by telling Cubans that the economic crisis required
continued belt-tightening.238 In his televised speech, he detailed
that sugar earnings would be US$450 million below what was ex-
pected, in part because energy shortages had reduced the capac-
ity to refine sugar.239 Further, Castro revealed a dramatic de-
cline in imports. 0
With the global changes, Cuba can no longer depend on its
former trading partners. Cuba has few internal resources with
no means of production, a lack of supplies, no hard currency to
pay its debts, and cannot rely on international actors to solve its
shortage problems. In an attempt to deal with this severe crisis,
Castro announced some changes, including permitting (indeed,
encouraging) visits by Cuban exiles, allowing Cubans freedom to
travel overseas, making Cuba more open to foreign investment,
and encouraging tourism.241 More recently, travel restrictions
tion is a "mechanism for Castro's survival [by] reduc[ing] Cuba's threat abroad and
increas ing] repression at home." Id.
237. Douglas W. Payne, La Problemdtica de las Democracias del Caribe, Dxmuo LAS
AMERICAS, June 11, 1993, at 4-A.
238. Castro: It's Real Bad, N.Y. NEwsDAY, July 27, 1993, at 16.
239. Id.; Andres Oppenheimer & Mimi Whitefield, Castro Bids to Shore Up Revolu-
tion, MuAiI HERALD, July 27, 1993, at IA, 16A; Jos6 de C6rdoba, Survival Tactics, WALL
ST. J., July 19, 1993 at Al, A12.
240. Castro: It's Real Bad, supra note 238, at 16. Castro estimated imports for 1993
would be about US$1.7 billion, down from US$2.2 billion in 1992, and far below the
US$8.1 billion figure for 1989. Id.; see supra notes 223, 228-34 (discussing reduction in
imports and impact on Cuban economy).
241. Castro: It's Real Bad, supra note 238, at 16; Jane Bussey, Castro Opens Cuba's
Door to Capitalism a Crack, MrAMi HERALD, Aug. 1, 1993, at 1K, 3K (discussing Castro's
tolerance of limited moves toward free-market economy); Howard W. French, Even
Castro Sees the Possibilities of Enterprise in Cuba, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1993, § 4, at 4 (discuss-
ing Castro's increasing encouragement of economic free enterprise); Larry Luxner,
Castro Seeks Foreign Investors to Make Havana Club Rum, MIAMi HERALD, Aug. 4, 1993, at
6A (reporting Castro's efforts to revive sales of Havana Club rum in order to earn hard
currency). Decree-Law No. 50 (February 15, 1982) is Cuba's foreign investment legisla-
tion. Cuban citizens do not enjoy the same rights as foreign investors. However, for-
eign investors are subject to significant regulation. Foreign Investment Legislation in Cuba,
supra note 79, at 2-3. Significantly, even Cuban exiles, formerly derided by Castro as
worms, could invest in Cuba, although the U.S. embargo would prohibit nationalized
Cubans from making such investments. Ana Santiago, Cuba Abre sus Puertas a Inversidn
de Exilados, Nuavo HERALD, July 16, 1993, at IA, 6A. It is noteworthy, however, that
investments in Cuba, which are allowed up to a 49% ownership interest, are considered
risky because the government's lack of liquidity may prevent it from keeping its end of
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were further lifted, even allowing Cuban exiles to visit the island
and stay with family. 42 Indeed, it appears that the implemented
changes may have the desired result, and that 1994 might show
some increase in Western trade and investment in Cuba 243 that
could help its economic situation.2" However, the recent exo-
dus and the related revocation of cash remittances and travel
authorizations will have an adverse impact.2 4 5 Additional assist-
ance may come in the form of foreign aid. For example, Canada
recently announced that, after 16 years, it was resuming aid to
Cuba.246 Nevertheless, that the situation presently remains at
crisis levels is reflected in Castro's recent concession that when
his revolution triumphed Cuba owed nothing; but today its debt
the bargain. In addition, there is a lack of clear title in many properties that were
nationalized, and the investor only receives a right to use property for a certain period
or, in some cases, the usufruct. Ariel Remos, Peligro Para Invertir en Cuba, DrARio LAS
AMERICAS, July 3, 1993, at 1-A, 1 I-A.
242. Mimi Whitefield, New Rules Are Expected to Boost Cuba Travel, MiAMI HERALD,
Apr. 27, 1994, at 14A. The new rules for travel include the creation of a special depart-
ment, the Foreign Ministry, to deal with exiles; the elimination of a five-year waiting
period for Cubans who have left the island legally and wish to visit; allowing a limited
number of Cuban students who live abroad to study certain courses at Cuban universi-
ties; elimination of the requirement that exiles visiting family buy a hotel package; start-
ing a government publication for informing Cubans of developments and laws that
affect them; and permitting Cubans living abroad to invest in Cuba on the same terms
as foreigners. Id. The exile community has had various reactions to these changes. See
Frances Robles, Exiles Lack Enthusiasm for Cuba's New Policy, MIAMi HERALD, Apr. 25,
1994, at lB.
243. More Foreign Offices in Cuba, CUBA REP., Feb. 1994, at 1. There were 291 For-
eign Registered offices in Cuba in 1993. Id.; see Cuba Report, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
Oct. 1993, at 8 (reporting that number of foreign firms in Cuba has tripled in four
years).
244. See Cuban Bike Exports, CuBAEws, June 1994, at 4 (describing Jamaica's im-
porting Cuban-made bicycles); Trade & Commerce, CUBANEWS, Mar. 1994, at 3 (describ-
ing airport expansion for tourist access; German hotel chain; Jamaica-Cuba accord);
Trade & Commerce, CUBANEWS,Jan. 1994, at 3 (describing British investments); Trade and
Commerce, CUBANEws, Sept. 1993, at 3, 4 (describing agreements with Brazil, Spain,
Chile, Canada, and France; discussion of Law-Decree No. 50, which permits foreign
investment). For a discussion regarding recent foreign investments in Cuba, see Pablo
Alfonso, Banco Holandis Abrird Sucursal en La Habana, NuEvo HERALD, Apr. 13, 1994, at
IA; Mexico Procesard Crudo en Refinerza Cubana, DLAduo LAS AMERICAS, Apr. 3, 1994, at 1-A;
Susan Benesch, Colombian Envoy: Oil Deal With Cuba is Simply Business, MIAMI HERALD,
Feb. 28, 1994, at 4-A; EFE, Impulsardn el Comercio con Cuba importantes Empresas de Rusia,
Drxmo LAS AMERICAS, Jan. 30, 1994, at 1-A.
245. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing Treasury Regulations).
246. After 16 Years, Canada ResumingAid to Cuba, REc. (BERGEN, NJ),June 21,1994.
Interestingly, the United States is down-playing this decision, although it runs counter
to the U.S. efforts to maintain Cuba's isolation. U.S. Quiet on Canada's Decision to Aid
Cuba, REc. (BERGEN, NJ.), June 22, 1994, at A-17.
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is rising quickly, and at present is approximately US$300 bil-
lion.247
In his 40th anniversary speech, Castro also announced the
"dollarization" of the economy, decriminalizing the possession
of foreign currency.248 Significantly, these measures and their
implementation, like the easing of travel restrictions, have not
been wholly embraced by the exile community. Indeed, some
changes have caused deep divisions among those in the Cuban-
American community who, on the one hand, want to help family
and friends and, on the other hand, do not want to assist what is
viewed as an ailing "evil" government, and who see this as its
time to die.249
247. Admite Castro que Cuba No Debia Nada en 1959 y que Ahora Debe $300 Mil Mil-
liones, DiAmo LAS AMERICAS, Feb. 1, 1994, at 1-A (noting also that Castro blamed debt
situation on decline in value of export products due to world order and priorities im-
posed by imperialism).
248. Manuel Lasaga, Dollarization: Scrambling for Foreign Exchange, CuatEws, Sept.
1993, at 2. In his July 26, 1993 speech, Castro announced the dollarization of the econ-
omy and later, on August 14, formalized the announcement by publishing Law 140 in
Granma, the official Communist Party newspaper, revoking the two clauses in the penal
code that prohibited Cubans from possessing hard currency. See id (noting change in
law and explaining that under new policy Cubans may now hold and spend German
marks, French francs, Spanish pesetas, British pounds, Canadian dollars, and U.S. dol-
lars); Ley Permite a Cubanos Tener Divisas y Abrir Cuentas en Moneda Convertible, NuEvo
HERALD, Aug. 15, 1993, at 2A; Pablo Alfonso and Cynthia Corzo, Castro Confirma 'Do-
larizacin', NuEvo HERALD, July 27, 1993, at IA, 10A (reporting on Castro's speech,
where he announced that Cubans could legally hold foreign currency, more exiled
Cubans would be allowed to visit island, state would undertake more hard-currency
generating activities and focus on maximizing tourist facilities, state would not confis-
cate foreign currency but would try to recapture currency in commercial activity, there
was large amount of hard currency circulating clandestinely since tourism increased
and foreign investment was allowed, and that government was studying yet further
measures regarding economy); see also Castro: It's Real Bad, supra note 238, at 16. Sig-
nificantly, this move would permit Cuban exiles to send money home, so long as they
comply with the limitations of the CDA that limit money sent to Cuba to US$300 every
three months. See Ana Santiago, Volarizaci6n' de Cuba Domina Cita Sobre Economia de la
Isla, NuEvo HERALD,July 16, 1993 at 6A (reporting that Cuban officials participating in
conference on Cuban economy announced that holding dollars by Cubans would be
legalized and noting embargo limitations on amounts families in the United States
could send to Cuba); Alfonso Chardy, Firms Set to Take Dollars to Cuba, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 12, 1993 at IB, 4B (noting embargo limit).
249. See, e.g., Ariel Remos, Opuestos Dentro de Cuba a que les Envien Ddlares, DiAso
LAS AMERICAS, Aug. 10, 1993, at 1-A, 11-A (reporting that Cubans in Cuba do not want to
be sent dollars for fear that such move would help keep Castro in power); Cynthia
Corzo, Oferta de Cuba No Tienta a Exlados, NuEvo HERALD, July 17, 1993, at 1B, 2B
(reporting that many Cubans will refuse to invest in Cuba because they do not want to
do something that will help Castro, noting that naturalized U.S. citizens cannot invest
because of embargo).
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These measures, although perhaps politically risky for Cas-
tro, are necessary for his survival.250 The food shortages are se-
vere, with rumors that Cubans are eating cats251 and that farmers
are given traps to catch "jutias," rat-like rodents that grow up to
two feet and weigh up to twenty pounds, and raise them for
food.25 2 One month's food ration now includes five pounds of
rice, one pound of beans, four pounds of sugar, four eggs per
week,253 thirty bread rolls, and one roll of toilet paper per per-
son.254  Oil and lard, meat and vegetables in cans, frozen
250. See Marisol Marin, Solucidn Castrista: Vengan los D61ares y Viva el Socialismo ...
DLAjuo LAs AMERICAS, July 28, 1993, at 1-A, 11-A (reporting that Castro recognizes dol-
larization's political and social cost, as it will create privileges, but that measures are
necessary to obtain hard currency, and concessions were necessary to save socialism);
Andres Oppenheimer, iEmbarcado Castro en Peligroso Camino Sin Retorno?, NuEvo HER-
Am,July 28, 1993, at 1A, 18A; Andres Oppenheimer & Mimi Whitefield, Cuba's Stopgap
Steps May Open Capitalist Floodgates, MAMI HERALD, July 28, 1993, at IA, 18A. Dollariza-
tion and other changes announced by Castro mark steps toward capitalism. Id. These
steps could generate social, economic and political momentum thatwould loosen Cas-
tro's strangle-hold on Cuba, by creating a group of self-sufficient Cubans who might
increase demands and pressure for reforms, and who might quit their US$3 per month
jobs. Id. These steps could also foster the emergence of independent sectors of society,
which do not depend on the government for support, and thus result in Castro's inabil-
ity to control people or force them to perform voluntary work. Id. Finally, these steps
could create a privileged class, cause Castro to lose credibility, and allow "political con-
tamination" with increasing numbers of exiles visiting the island and providing first-
hand information from abroad. Id.; Teo A. Babun Jr., Havana Takes a Big Risk in Legal-
izing the Dollar, MIAmi HERALD, Aug. 1, 1993, at 4C (discussing dangers Castro faces in
legalizing use of U.S. dollars). Babun suggests that dollarization may cause social and
political changes such as
the creation of an economically affluent and independent social class with ties
to their families living in exile instead of to the government [and] the mass
exodus of workers from vital Cuban factories in search of dollar opportunities
- or the next letter containing dollars from relatives abroad.... There is also a
potential serious backlash from thrifty Cubans who will see their savings of 11
billion pesos held in Cuban banks dwindle in value and buying power...
Dollar rich Cuba may also experience an unexpected backlash from its favor-
ite trading partners, who may suddenly end all future barter arrangements in
favor of getting paid in hard currency.
Id.
251. Tim Golden, Castro's People Tried To Absorb 'Terrible Blows', N.Y. TIMEs,Jan. 11,
1993, at Al [hereinafter Blows]; see Rathbone, supra note 221, at 7.
252. Crossroads, supra note 214, at 108.
253. Blows, supra note 251, at A6. Other sources give somewhat varying ration
figures. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Craft, Changing Lifestyles; "We Have Nothing, Only Fidel Fidel";
After Two Years of Deprivation, Cubans Now Hold a Much Harsher VIrew of Castro, LA. TImm,
June 30, 1992, at 4 (monthly rations listed as four eggs, one ounce of coffee, 2-1/2
pounds of rice, 1/2 pound of beans, and 2-1/2 pounds of sugar).
254. Craft, supra note 253, at 4; see Rathbone, supra note 221, at 8 (citing Craft,
supra). Another source gives the monthly ration figures of some products as 6 pounds
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chicken, grains, cereal, cheese, and antibiotics such as penicillin
are among the goods once obtained from Eastern Europe and
now unavailable.2 -- "Grapefruit steaks," seasoned, breaded and
fried grapefruit rinds, are recommended as a beef substitute.256
Milk, along with chalk and paper, are scarce in schools. 257 This
lack of food and supplies has affected the economic changes
made by Castro, who once again has given cooperative farms an
opportunity to exist and will also allow some private Cuban citi-
zens to farm unused state land.258
Many items, particularly those imported from the Soviet
Union or the eastern bloc, have disappeared. Medicines, neces-
sary to maintain one of the crown jewels of the revolution, its
health care system, are in short supply if available at all, and in
some hospitals, medicines are being replaced by herbal reme-
dis.259 Recent reports even disclose that household medical
items, such as aspirin, are virtually impossible to find.26 °
Energy shortages cause regular blackout periods that affect
both industry and home life.26 ' In 1992, the monthly ration for
most drivers for gasoline was five gallons, but none was distrib-
uted in December of that year.262 In December 1992, electrical
power blackouts in big cities were extended from four to eight
hours a day.26  Presently, power shutoffs are reported to last be-
of rice per person, 6 pounds of sugar per person, 4 eggs per person, and one 750 ml
bottle of rum per family. Facts and Stats, CUBANEws,Jan. 1994, at 4.
255. Statement of the Honorable Robert G. Torricelli [D-NJ] before the Assembly
of Members of the Cuban-American National Foundation (on file with Author). A wo-
man interviewed for a New York Times article noted that monthly rations of cooking oil
(2 cups), soap (half bar per person), coffee (4 oz.), and Chinese toothpaste, which is
used as a detergent substitute rarely arrive on schedule. Blows, supra note 251, at A6.
256. Id. at Al.
257. Id. at A6.
258. Farm Cooperatives, CUBA REPORT, Nov. 1993, at 8. The cooperative production
units will be able to manage their own bank accounts, their production, and contract
with the government. Id.
259. Blows, supra note 251, at A6. Horror stories are starting to emerge from hos-
pitals, such as reusing of surgical gloves, inability to replace soiled hospital-bed sheets
for lack of detergent, lack of water, shortage of tranquilizers, pain-killers and antibiotics
as well as disinfectants and thread for stitches in emergency rooms. OPPENHEIMER,
supra note 229, at 256; see supra note 44 (patients scheduled to undergo surgery re-
quired to bring their own lightbulbs to hospital operating room).
260. Alfredo Mufioz-Unsain, Drdstica Reducci6n de Venta de Medicinas en Cuba,
DILauo LAs AMERicAs, Apr. 15, 1994, at IA.
261. Crossroads, supra note 214, at 94.
262. Blows, supra note 251, at A6.
263. Id.
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tween ten and sixteen hours daily in the cities, and in the prov-
inces the outages have been as long as twenty hours daily.2 6 Re-
cent reports indicate that many areas in Havana have electricity
only four hours per day, with regular blackouts that last from
twelve to sixteen hours.265 The outages are mainly attributed to
the unavailability, since 1990, of spare parts for the Soviet- and
Czech-built power plants, as well as the shortage of fuel at gener-
ating plants.266 These circumstances have been exacerbated by
the "disastrous" 1992-93 sugar harvest of just 4.2 million tons,
one of the lowest ever, which has further affected Cuba's ability
to obtain oil.2 6 Because of the dramatic shortages, priority is
given to "essential services" like food production centers and
hard currency export production, water distribution, hospitals,
and refrigeration plants where perishable foods are stored., This
priority results in regular work at offices and some government
ministries being "virtually paralyzed. 268
The idling of industry, in part due to the aforementioned
oil shortages, has resulted in chronic underemployment and ad-
mitted unemployment for the first time in years,269 with approxi-
mately 40% of the work force holding only marginal jobs.270
Even the military has been affected. Cuba, with one of the larg-
est and most modem military forces in the world, has had to
264. See Privados de glectricidad los Cubanos Diez Horas Cada Dia, DtARIo LAs AMEiu-
cAs, July 11, 1993, at 1-A (reporting average power outages between six and ten hours);
Mimi Whitefield, Blackouts Increase Misery for Cubans, MIAMI HEA A.n, Aug. 11, 1993 at 1A,
6A (reporting that outages stretched 12 to 16 hours daily in capital and up to 20 hours
daily in provinces); Businesses 'Virtually Paralyzed'by Cuba Outages, MLAMI HERIAs, July 10,
1993 at 18A [hereinafter Virtually Paralyzed] (reporting outages of up to sixteen hours in
Havana).
265. Mimi Whitefield, From Bad to Worse in Cuba as Outages Grow, MIAMi HERALD,
Apr. 14, 1994, at IA (reporting blackouts and noting government blames these in part
on island's Soviet- and Czech-built power plant on which no parts have been installed
since 1990).
266. Id.; see Cuba hit by fuel shortages, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 6, 1993, at 10A (reporting
paralysis at offices and factories); Virtually Paralyzed, supra note 264, at 18A.
267. Virtually Paralyzed, supra note 264, at 18A.
268. Cuba Hit by Fuel Shortages, Mr.iz HERALD, Aug. 6, 1993, at 10A; Virrtually Para-
lyzed, supra note 264, at 18A.
269. Castafieda, supra note 80, at 260; Blows, supra note 251, at A6. The govern-
ment says that of about 3.7 million state workers, approximately 100,000 stay at home
and many have been sent to work in the fields. However, foreign economists estimate
that the real unemployment figures are considerably higher and that there is a large
number of persons who are underemployed. Id.; see OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at
262-63.
270. Cast Adrift, supra note 196, at A6.
19941
66 FORDHAMINTERNTATIONAL LAWJOURNTAL
reduce training and exercises due to the lack of fuel. Moreover,
its equipment, tanks, and planes are short of parts and thus not
functional.
2 71
These critical shortages are having palpable social conse-
quences. Some report the mood of the country as "desperate"
and "hopeless."272 There are claims that the suicide rate has
risen. 73 Increased attempts to leave the country were met with
brutal force by the government. 274 However, perhaps realizing
that allowing a massive exodus could alleviate his domestic
plight, Castro completely reversed his policy of tightly control-
ling travel, and ordered authorities to allow balseros leave Cuba
and head for Florida. 5 Cubans took him up on his offer and
took to the seas in massive numbers, throwing U.S. policymakers,
who insisted that Castro would not be allowed to dictate U.S.
immigration policies, into a tailspin that ended in the reversal by
the United States of its longstanding practice of granting entry
to any Cuban who reached U.S. territory.
276 
•
Moreover, it has been reported that Cubans who are an-
gered by the shortages of food and other goods and services are
taking advantage of the nightly power outages to stage unprece-
dented protests against Castro.277 The protests have included
271. Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 107.
272. Tim Johnson, The Mood Gets Ugly in Cuba as Scarcity Spreads, MIAMui HERALD,
July 11, 1993, at 1A, 14A [hereinafter Ugly Mood].
273. Id.
274. Id. (reporting that border-guards shot at unarmed Cubans swimming towards
speedboat in attempt to escape island); Survival Tactics, supra note 239 at Al; 1993
CoumTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 413-14 (reporting aggressive and violent means
used to prevent citizens from leaving without state permission; giving examples of cases
in which border guards use grenades and rifle fire against swimmers trying to escape);
Castro Warns U.S., supra note 172 (reporting on series of boat hiackings by persons
trying to flee Cuba, and Castro's threat to let Cubans leave without restriction, which
could result in massive exodus to United States).
275. Mimi Whitefield & Martin Merzer, Castro Raises Stakes: Cubans are Free to Go,
MLAMI HERALD, Aug. 25, 1994, at Al.
276. Aug. 19 Press Conference, supra note 137; Reno Briefing, supra note 139.
The crisis was resolved with a Cuba-U.S. agreement whereby the United States agreed to
increase legal immigration and, ironically, Castro agreed to reinstitute tight control
over Cuba's borders, a practice which the United States criticized in the past. See
GroverJoseph Rees, Clinton's Iron Curtain, WALL ST.J., Sept. 14,1994, at A18 (discussing
President Clinton's decision to stop accepting Cuban boat people); L Suro, U.S. Dan-
gles Carrot to Cuba on Immigration, But Will Castro Bite?, WASH. PosT, Sept. 11, 1994, at
30A.
277. Castro Warns U.S., supra note 172, at 2 (reporting that protesters clashed with
police and government supporters when police officers tried to enforce security meas-
[Vol. 18:15
1994] CUBA'S POST-COLD WAR STRIKEOUT
smashing and looting of government shops, throwing rocks at
police cars, clanging pots and pans and painting anti-govern-
ment graffiti on walls.2 78  Crime, particularly "theft, black
marketeering and economic fraud," has reportedly increased. 79
To protect premises that might be at risk, either because they
serve food or because they carry scarce goods, the government
has started to build walls around open food establishments, and
install ironworks and gates on store windows.28 0 Another gov-
ernment response to these protests has been to increase repres-
211sion.
These serious energy shortages have resulted in the flourish-
ing of the black market, which is used by those with the money
to supplement government-set rations or to obtain services that
have become otherwise unavailable. 2  However, black market
prices are greatly inflated, creating a hierarchy whereby those
with less are unable to supplement their rations, while those with
access to goods can supplement their rations and sell or trade
ures to stop people from stealing boats to flee island); Mimi Whitefield & Miriam Was-
serman, Cubans Vent Discontent in Dark of Night, Mies HERas.D, Aug. 18, 1993 at 1A, 5A
(hereinafter Discontent) (reporting looting and rioting by anti-Castro demonstrators
during electricity blackouts); Ariel Remos, Levantan Muros Enrados en Cuba Por Temor a
los Saqueos, DiAmo LAS AMERICAS, Aug. 15, 1993, at 1-A.
278. Mimi Whitefield, From Bad to Worse in Cuba as Outages Grow, MIUNH HALD,
Apr. 14, 1994, at IA (noting that governing energy situation has resulted in protests);
Discontent, supra note 277, at IA (reporting that graffiti includes statements such as
"Down with Fidel" and "We Want Food"; explaining that clanging pots and pans is typi-
cal sign of anti-government protests in Latin America; noting rise of reported anti-gov-
ernment protests, which numbered 20 incidents betweenJuly 5 and August 15); Remos,
supra note 277, at 1-A (noting that power outages are resulting in protests that include
painting walls, often with anti-government slogans); Survival Tactics, supra note 239, at
Al, A12.
279. Crime is Rising Cuban Newspaper Concedes, MiAMI HERALD,June 14, 1993, at 10A
(reporting that theft of property, bicycles, and livestock has increased, for which per-
sons are being sentenced from 10 to 20 years in prison; that crimes related to tourism,
such as bag-snatching, have increased; and that diplomats link increase to Cuba's severe
economic state).
280. Remos, supra note 277, at I-A.
281. See, e.g., Ariel Remos, Condena Castro a 15 Opositores Pacficos en Santiago de
Cuba, DLRio LAs AMERICAS, July 30, 1993 at IA, llA.
282. See, e.g., Mrro, supra note 1, at 286-300 (describing black market in Cuba).
Professor Clark explains that it is an institution absolutely necessary to meet personal
needs, including food, because of the existing shortages and rationing system. Id. Fur-
ther, he notes that Cuba's "clandestine economy" reaches beyond agricultural goods
and illicit manufacture of products to the providing of services with goods illegally di-
verted from the government. Id. at 293-94.
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those goods for other items or services they want or need.283 For
example, the black market price for eggs is US$5 each, com-
pared with the official US$.15 price.284 The black market price
for malanga, a potato-like root that is a common Cuban food,
rose to US$40 from US$10 one year ago.28 5 Pork, a Cuban sta-
ple, is only available in the black market, where one pound,286 or
a US$2.75 chicken, cost almost a week's average wage estimated
between 108287 and 135 pesos.28s The black market exchange
rate for a dollar in 1992 was about 40 pesos, 28 9 compared to a
low of 15 pesos in October 1991,290 and 120 pesos to the dollar
since May 1, 1994. This devaluation partly results from the dol-
larization program, and partly from the National Assembly's ap-
proval, on May 1, 1994, of a package of measures that, among
other things, introduces a new currency and adopts new foreign
exchange regulations. 291
Significantly, economists tend to believe that Castro's recent
move to legalize the possession of foreign currency,292
intended to divert dollars from the black market to the govern-
ment,293 will actually strengthen the black market.294  This
283. See Mrro, supra note 1, at 295-300. In fact, a special black market exists for
high government personnel who, if in charge of distribution, have access to goods
which in turn give them access to goods and services for which they can be traded.
284. Craft, supra note 253, at 4; see Rathbone, supra note 221, at 8 (citing Craft,
supra note 253, at 4).
285. Rathbone, supra note 221, at 8.
286. Blows, supra note 251, at Al.
287. Id. at A6.
288. Rathbone, supra note 221, at 8.
289. Blows, supra note 251, at A6.
290. Damian Fraser, Cuban Revolutionay in an Army Green Business Suit: Castro is
Courting Capital-Not Capitalism, FIN. TiMEsJuly 14, 1992, at 4; see Rathbone, supra note
221, at 8 (citing Fraser, supra).
291. Manuel Lasaga, New Measures, But the Same Old Stoy, CuBaAEws, June 1994, at
2.
292. See Castro Bids to Shore Up Revolution, supra note 239, at 16A. On July 26, 1993,
in his annual speech celebrating the anniversary of the revolution, Castro announced
that Cubans would be allowed to hold and use hard currencies. Id. However, the U.S.
embargo limits the currency that exiles can send to US$300 per family every three
months. Id.
293. Mimi Whitefield, Government of Fdel Castro Trying to Wring U.S. Currency Out of
Island's Black Market, M~mMi HE-RA.D,July 4, 1993, at 1K, 3K [hereinafter Wing Currency];
see Castro Bids to Shore Up Revolution, supra note 239, at IA, 16A (reporting that Castro
will allow Cubans to hold dollars and Cuban exiles to send cash to island); Howard W.
French, Dollar Libre, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1993, § 4, at 2 [hereinafter Dollar Libre] (noting
that Castro announced he would allow Cuban citizens to hold dollars).
294. Mimi Whitefield, Cuba's Black Market May Grow Under New Policy, Experts Say,
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move, which was intended to attract hard currency to Cuba,
might nevertheless backfire.295 As noted above, the rush to buy
dollars in the black market caused a devaluation of the peso.
296
The move also resulted in price increases in hard-currency stores
by 50% to achieve a larger profit margin. 7 In addition, black
market prices could end up being lower than government store
prices, thus encouraging people to go to the underground econ-
omy and keeping the flow of hard currencies away from
the government.298
Many predict that this dollarization of the economy also is
risky, as it may lead to social strife.2 9 9 For example, racial divi-
sions may arise when the largely white Cuban exile population
sends dollars to their relatives who remained in Cuba, thereby
giving white Cubans greater access to dollars than black Cubans,
and consequently greater access to goods and services.300 Fi-
nally, with dollarization, the government might lose the tight
Mr mi HERALD, Aug. 19, 1993, at 2B (reporting on economists' meeting, where it was
noted that dollar is medium of exchange in Cuba, that black market will continue to
compete with official economy, and that black market, while it has served to meet de-
mand, is potentially risky, because its use reduces government control over economy).
295. See Lasaga, supra note 248, at 2 (noting some negative ramifications of dol-
larization).
296. Cuba Raises Prices for Dollar Items, Mimii HERALD, Aug. 10, 1993, at IA [herein-
after Dollar Items]; Wring Currency, supra note 293, at 1K, 3K.
297. Dollar Items, supra note 296, at IA.
298. Id.
299. See, e.g, Andres Oppenheimer, Dissidents Skeptical of Reforms, MLAMI HERALD,
Aug. 2, 1993, at 6A [hereinafter Dissidents Skeptical] (noting that increase in dollar remit-
tances from exiles will make large sectors of population give up their US$3 per month
jobs, thus undermining regime's political control, as persons will no longer depend on
government for their livelihood; measures will reward those whose relatives left and can
send them dollars, possession of which will define new privileged class above "military,
Communist Party cadres and blacks, who either don't have relatives in America or repu-
diated them long ago.... [and who will] be the new pariahs of the revolution"); Survival
Tactics, supra note 239, at A12; Howard W. French, Cuba Will End Restrictions On exiles
Wanting to Visit, N.Y. TiMES, July 29, 1993, at A10 [hereinafter End Restrictions] (noting
that as blacks have emigrated in small numbers, they would not benefit as would whites
from remittances sent by relatives abroad; that party members, who are supposed to be
better off, will have less money than taxi drivers; and that with receipt of dollars from
abroad, few will continue to work at 500-pesos-per-month government jobs).
300. See Survival Tactics, supra note 239, at A12; Dissidents Skeptical, supra note 299,
at 6A (noting that increase in dollar remittances from exiles will create new privileged
class with blacks and others who do not have relatives in America falling behind eco-
nomically); End Restrictions, supra note 299, atA0 (noting that as blacks have emigrated
in small numbers, they would not benefit from remittances sent by relatives abroad and
thus would not have access to dollars).
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control it had over individuals' conduct when the citizenry de-
pended on the government for goods and services. As persons
obtain more money from remittances sent by relatives, rather
than from working at their government jobs, the need to work
for the government and to comply with government regulations
disappears.3 0 1
In tandem with Castro's recent announcements regarding
the "liberalization" of the economy as described above, however,
Castro has taken measures to ensure control of the economy.
For example, the government counter-balanced liberalization
programs with a crackdown against economic crimes, including
black market activities.3 "2 The bottom line, however, is that de-
spite the implemented economic changes, Cuban officials ex-
pect that the island's economy will continue its decline until
1994, at which point the recently announced measures should
permit the start of a recovery.303 As noted above, economists are
not so optimistic.
IV. THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY
Aside from economic shifts, the end of the Cold War has
also signified the end of an ironically stabilizing force in the in-
ternational arena. Without the external reasons for cohesion,
i.e., fear of a hot war, new tensions have arisen, as evidenced by
political instability of democracy itself in Russia, secessionary
forces in Georgia, the ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia,
the unilateral withdrawal from a nuclear containment treaty by
North Korea, the brutal military regime that deposed Aristide in
Haiti, the massacres in Rwanda, and the resurgence of national-
301. See Survival Tactics, supra note 239, at A12; Dissidents Skeptical, supra note 299,
at 6A (noting that increase in dollar remittances from exiles will make large sectors of
population give up their US$3 per month jobs, undermining regime's political control
as persons will no longer depend on government for their livelihood); End Restrictions,
supra note 299, at A10 (noting that party members who are supposed to be better off
will have less money than taxi drivers, and that with receipt of dollars from abroad few
will see any point to working at 100-peso-per-month government jobs).
302. See Government Decree No. 149 (May 5, 1994) (retroactive decree providing
that Cuban government will confiscate assets derived from "illegal sources," which con-
fiscations are to be made in administrative proceedings and will not be subject tojudi-
cial review); Cuba Crackdown Urged on Economic Crimes, MLAi HERALD, Aug. 2, 1993, at
6A.
303. Mimi Whitefield, Cuban Officials Predicting Decline in Economy Will Last Until
Early '94, MtAi HERAD,July 17, 1993, at 21A; Recuperacidn Econ6mica en Cuba Mds Dificil
que Nunca, Dsmluo LAs AMERICAS, Aug. 4, 1993, at 1-A.
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ism in Germany, Italy and France. Even before the fall of the
Berlin Wall, Castro had recognized and warned against the possi-
ble destabilizing consequences for the Third World of the fall of
communism: cuts in aid, destruction of the balance of power by
the reduced impact of the Soviet military, and national and eth-
nic strife stirred by the new freedom of expression.0 4 Cuba has
experienced many of these undesirable side effects of the end of
the Cold War, many exacerbated by its unique politically isolat-
ing posture. Above, this article presented the economic climate
of Castro's revolution and the successes achieved with respect to
second generation human rights, such as the right to work, to
education, and to health, and explored Cuba's economic posi-
tion at the end of the Cold War. This part focuses on the crisis
of legitimacy of the Cuban government by focusing on the
deplorable status of Cuba regarding first-generation human
rights.
The political and ideological deterioration of the govern-
ment threatens the legitimacy of Castro's regime, a regime
wholly lacking the consent of the governed and respect for the
opinion of the people."0 5 The challenge to the government's
legitimacy is grounded on the absence of political freedoms as
evidenced by its failure to follow the rule of law, the lack of per-
sonal security, and the absence of respect for and observance of
internationally protected rights, such as freedom of expression,
political participation, and equality of opportunity.
A. Failure to Follow the Rule of Law
The absence of the rule of law in Castro's regime can be
traced to the early days of his rule."0 6 It has been reported that
many persons accused of crimes against the revolution were exe-
304. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 101-02.
305. Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right ToDemocratic Governance, 86 AM.J. INT'L L.
46 (1992).
306. See, e.g., JORGE VALLS, TWENTY YEARS & FORTY DAYS/ LIFE IN A CUBAN PRISON
(1986) [hereinafter LIFE IN A CUBAN PRISON); see also Tightening the Grip: Human Rights
Abuses in Cuba, AMERICAS WATCH, Feb. 24, 1992, at 15-16 (for examples of ongoing lack
of concern for rule of law) [hereinafter Tightening]; 1993 CoUNTRY REPORTS, supra note
47, at 408-09 (explaining that "Cuba is a totalitarian state dominated by President Fidel
Castro, who is Chief of State, Head of Government, First Secretary of the Communist
Party, and Commander in Chief of the armed forces"; that government restricts basic
political and civil rights; that prisoners are frequently abused and subjected to physical
and psychological intimidation; and that notwithstanding technical existence of certain
1994]
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cuted, summarily or in hurried trials, without adequate proof of
guilt.1°7 The first of these were the trials of military personnel,
which reflected the "arbitrariness" of the process.308 For exam-
ple, after being tried and acquitted, prisoners were retried and
convicted without any new evidence or any new charges, but
merely on Castro's orders, and without the prisoners even being
present at their second trial. 0 9
It appears that the word of Castro, rather than the written
laws, is the true mandate. The above-described trials are one ex-
ample; the modification of existing "rules" provides another.
One illustrative instance occurred in 1985 when a housing law
was "tolled" and subsequently amended after Castro, in a speech,
questioned several of the law's provisions. 1° Similarly, at times
when Castro has wanted to get rid of large numbers of citizens,
such as during the Camarioca and Mariel exodus, he has unilat-
erally suspended or ignored the existing emigration laws. 11
guaranteed rights to prisoners, such rights "are often and capriciously withdrawn espe-
cially from political prisoners").
307. See Mrro, supra note 1, at 61. Professor Clark used anecdotal materials to
discuss the occurrences. He tells the story of a priest, Father Chabebe, who was called
late one night to attend the trial of four persons who were sentenced to death. At the
end of the trial he accompanied the prisoners to a desolate area where they were imme-
diately executed. A bulldozer had already dug a hole that would serve as a mass grave.
When Father Chabebe objected to the irregularity of the process, in particular the lack
of the right to appeal, he was informed that the proceedings would go on. Id. at 60-61.
After this dozens more arrived and were summarily executed. Father Chabebe, as well
as other priests, were there to administer last rites. Id.
308. See id. at 68. In particular, Professor Clark relates the trial of military pilots in
February and March of 1959 before a revolutionary tribunal. Shortly after Castro rose
to power, approximately 43 pilots, artillery personnel and mechanics were arbitrarily
arrested and accused of genocide. The government requested the death penalty for
the pilots. All of the accused were acquitted by the revolutionary tribunal, over which
Commandant F6lix Pena presided. Castro publicly rejected the verdict and ordered
that they be retried. While bar groups objected, the people did not demonstrate
against the order. At a second trial, a Castro loyalist presided. The government
presented no new evidence, and made no new charges; the accused were not present.
Over strong objections by aitorneys, the trial proceeded and the accused were con-
victed. Id.; see LIF IN A CUBAN PRISON, supra note 306, at 4-5 (recounting same trial).
See generally id. (personal account of torture and inhumane treatment of prisoners by
government and examples of lack of due process).
309. LIFE IN A CUBAN PRISON, supra note 306, at 4-5; see 1993 CouNTy REPORTS,
supra note 47, at 410 (stating that "[a]rbitrary arrest and detention are commonplace,"
that Cuban laws guaranteeing certain procedural protections "are routinely denied to
those detained on state security grounds," and that "Cuban law and trial practices do
not meet international standards for fair and impartial public trials").
310. Mrro, supra note 1, at 120.
311. Id. Immigration and emigration have been strictly controlled, yet the con-
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Moreover, as the above-described trials also show, there is
no independentjudiciary 12 When Castro seized power in 1959,
he suspended the 1940 Constitution,"'3 and in 1960 and 1961,
Castro dismissed members of the judiciary.114  Until 1973,
charges of all political offefises, particularly those of counter-rev-
olutionary offenses, were heard by revolutionary tribunals com-
prised of military members of the new government rather than
independent judges.3 15 At present, Article 122 of the Constitu-
tion provides that the courts are "subordinate only to the Na-
trols have been alleviated at Castro's urging and convenience. This was most recently
evidenced by the threatened massive exodus when Castro unilaterally decided not to
enforce laws forbidding illegal exit. Eies Lash Out at Havana "Blackmail", Mr~mi HER-
AmD, Aug. 6, 1994, at 1A. For a description of the Camarioca and Mariel emigrations,
see Mrro, supra note 1, at xxxii-xxxiii. Another example of Castro's unilateral action is
his change in immigration policy to allow exiles to return to visit in much greater num-
bers, hoping to obtain much-needed cash. However, the impending massive exodus,
driven by economic conditions, resulted in a Cuba-U.S. agreement in which the United
States sought assurances from Castro that he would tightly control exit from the island.
Aug. 19 Press Conference, supra note 137. Getting rid of large numbers of people
would, of course, alleviate the shortages of foodstuffs. See Castro Warns U.S., supra note
172, at 2 (recent report of Castro's threat to end all exit restrictions because of in-
creased attempts at illegal exit). The Clinton administration responded to the threat by
promising to prevent a mass exodus like the one experienced in 1980 during the Mariel
boatlift. Forget It, Fidel, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Aug. 8, 1994, at A14. Interestingly, the adminis-
tration failed to detail how it would prevent such an exodus, or how it would keep
Cubans out of the United States. The latter seems to be legally impossible as existing
law, an apparent remnant of the Cold War, permits Cubans to enter the United States
as refugees without quotas. See Cuban Adjustment Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1988). How-
ever, the recent threatened exodus spurred reversal of the longstanding U.S. policy of
welcoming Cubans who escape the island illegally. Now, any Cubans illegally seeking
entry to the United States will not be allowed to enter, and any picked up at sea will be
taken to safe havens. Aug. 19 Press Conference, supra note 137.
312. See JUAN CLARK ET AL., RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR CUBAN STUDIES, HuMAN
RIGHTS IN CUBA: AN EXPERIENTIAL PERSPECTIVE 30-34 (1991) [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CUBA]; HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA: THE NEED TO SUSTAIN THE PRESSURE 69-72
(1989) [hereinafter SusTAIN PRESSURE]; see also Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 105;
1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 410 ("Although the Constitution provides for
independent courts, it explicitly subordinates them to the National Assembly and the
Council of State, which is headed by Fidel Castro.").
313. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPOBLICA DE CUBA DE 1940 ["1940 CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CUBA"], in CONSTITUCIONES DE LA REPOBLCA DE CUBA (Academia de la
Historia de Cuba ed., 1952); Mrro, supra note 1, at 213. Of course, as the suspension
was by unilateral act rather than through constitutional procedure, the suspension itself
can be challenged for failing to follow the requisite process.
314. Mrro, supra note 1, at 213.
315. Id.; LIFE IN A CUBAN PRISON, supra note 306, at iv. Counter-revolutionary of-
fenses include both violent crime, such as terrorism and armed insurrection, and polit-
ical actions, such as distributing propaganda and attempting to flee the country. Id.; see
1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 410 (noting Penal Code's prohibition of
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tional Assembly of People's Power and the Council of State of
which Castro is President - hardly a neutral entity."3 1 6 In addi-
tion, Article 123 of the Constitution expressly provides that one
of the purposes of the judiciary is to educate citizens on social-
ism, a goal patently inconsistent with neutrality.117 Finally, the
laws pertaining to the organization of the judicial system plainly
provide that to be either a professional or lay judge, a person
must be "integrated" to the revolution."1 These conditions are
inconsistent with the right to an effective judicial remedy by
competent, independent, and impartial tribunals that is ex-
pressly articulated in the Universal Declaration.3 19
A gripping example of Cuba's lack of an independent judi-
ciary is the questionable trial and consequent execution of two
of Castro's top aides: Col. Antonio De La Guardia, one of
Cuba's top spies, and Div. Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, one of
the most decorated officers in Cuba, who had commanded Cu-
ban military operations in Venezuela, Ethiopia, Angola, Yemen,
and Nicaragua. 20 Col. De La Guardia and Gen. Ochoa are be-
lieved to have taken the fall as part of the government's cover-up
of corruption, including involvement in drug-trafficking. No
one believes Castro's claimed lack of knowledge about drug-traf-
ficking, and many maintain that he had for some time condoned
counter-revolutionary activity and the use of these sections against activists, even those
who simply favor "peaceful democratic change").
316. CUBAN CONST. art. 122, in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD,
supra note 79, at 131; SUSTAIN PRESSURE, supra note 312, at 70. Articles 72 and 73 of the
Cuban Constitution provide that the National Assembly elects the members of the
Council, whose President, Castro, also is the Head of State. See 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS,
supra note 47, at 408, 410.
317. CUBAN CONST. art. 123, in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD,
supra note 79, at 131; Mrro, supra note 1, at 217; HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA, supra note
277, at 30; SUSTAIN PRESSURE, supra note 312, at 70.
318. Mrro, supra note 1, at 217 (citing Articles 66 and 68 of Law of Organization of
Cuban Judicial System, Dec. 13, 1978, which require candidate's integration to revolu-
tion to hold position of professional or layjudge, respectively); HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA,
supra note 312, at 31; Tightening, supra note 306, at 3.
319. See Universal Declaration, supra note 12, arts. 8, 10, at 73; see also HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CUBA, supra note 312, at 24.
320. See OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 18, ch. 3 passim; see also Purcell, supra
note 192; Human Rights Activists Behind Bars in Cuba, AMERICAS WATCH, July 1989, at 1
[hereinafter Behind Bars] ("condemn[ing] the executions in light of the gross denials of
due process during the trial"); Robert Pear, Cuba Discloses a Drug Network of Top Officials,
N.Y.TIMEs,June 24, 1989 (reporting Cuba's acknowledgment that some of Castro's clos-
est aides were involved in smuggling drugs to United States).
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such activity. However, when it became apparent that the U.S.
was getting close to obtaining evidence about such involvement,
Castro preempted any accusation by staging the Ochoa and De
La Guardia trials.32' In addition, the trials sent a strong message
to the Cuban people and military, as well as the outside world,
that Castro "would not tolerate the 'new thinking' " that was
leading to democratic changes in the Soviet bloc.
322
These trials "served to reinforce the atmosphere of in-
creased repression in Cuba."3 23 The state used Article 115 of the
Penal Code, in which "disseminating false news against
international peace" is considered a crime against state security
punishable by imprisonment of one to four years, to punish sev-
eral reporters with whose reporting of the Ochoa trial the State
did not agree. 24
In tandem with the lack of an independent judiciary is the
lack of independent legal representation.325 Legal representa-
tives are bound to the government's ideology. The interests of
clients are subordinate to those of the state. 26 In fact, in order
to practice law, lawyers must belong to a state-controlled lawyers'
collective. 27 Moreover, the state attorney, pursuant to the Con-
stitution, is subordinate to the National Assembly, and thus, the
State Council.3 28 As Castro is the head of both of these bodies,
the state attorney is subordinate to Castro. 29 Indeed, in closing
321. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 128.
322. Id. at 129.
323. Behind Bars, supra note 320, at 1.
324. Ley No. 62 [Law No. 62], C.P. CUBA [CUBAN PENAL CODE] art. 115; Cuba: Jail-
ing the Human Rights Movement, AMERICAS WATCH, Mar. 1990, at 3 [hereinafter Jailing the
Movement].
325. 1993 CouNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 411; see Lir IN A CUBAN PRISON,
supra note 306, at 32-34 (providing personal account of trial and role played by sup-
posed defense counsel).
326. SUSTAIN PRESSURE, supra note 312, at 72-73.
327. Id. at 72; 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 411 (noting that lawyer's
"impartiality and independence are compromised by the absence of an independent
bar association").
328. See Mrro, supra note 1, at 217; HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA, supra note 312, at 30;
Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 105.
329. Mrro, supra note 1, at 121-30; Fact Sheet: Cuba supra note 83, at 105; 1993
CouNTRY REPORTS, supra note 20, at 408. Castro is the President of the Council of State
and the Council of Ministers, First Secretary of the Communist Party and Commander-
in Chief of the Armed forces. The 1976 Constitution provides that the Partido
Comunista de Cuba (PCC) (Cuban Communist Party) is the highest leading force of
the society with the Politburo as the center. Executive and Administrative Power lies in
1994]
76 FORDHAMI1NTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:15
the National Assembly session in December 1979, Castro stated
that the State was not going to provide defense attorneys so that
they could then dedicate themselves to defend "delinquents."33 °
There are even reports of instances where attorneys who de-
fended their clients in earnest wound up in jail themselves."3 '
Some Cuban laws, on their face, appear to violate the inter-
nationally-recognized right to be free from arbitrary arrest, de-
tention or exile." 2 For example, the 1971 anti-vagrancy law was
aimed at those who did not want to work for the government
and were self-employed."' 3 This law allows for sentences of up to
four years against those who are unemployed, or are simply ab-
sent from their government jobs.334 Likewise, the law on pre-
criminal dangerousness allows imprisonment if a person simply
is deemed capable of committing a crime.335
The lack of process in legislating, the total denial of legal
the Council of Ministers, whose president is Castro. Legislative authority lies with the
National Assembly, of which Castro is also president.
330. Mrro, supra note 1, at 217. "Nosotros no vamos a estar formando abogados
defensores para que despu~s se dediquen a defender delincuentes." Id.; see HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CUBA, supra note 312, at 31.
331. See Mrro, supra note 1, at 217-18 (giving examples of attorneys going to jail
for defending their clients); see also HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA, supra note 312, at 31-34;
Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 105 (noting that defense attorneys face severe disad-
vantages under Cubanjudicial system); SUSTAIN PRESSURE, supra note 312, at 72-74 (not-
ing that lawyers are not expected to defend interests of their clients vigorously).
332. See Universal Declaration, supra note 12, art. 9, at 73 (for statement of right);
1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 410 (for statement and examples of Cuba's
government's violations of such rights).333. Ley No. 1231 [Law No. 1231], LEY CONTRA LA VAGANCIA [ANTI-VAGRANCy LAW],
reprinted in Ian McColl Kennedy, Cuba's Ley Contra la Vagancia - The Law on Loafing, 20
UCLA L. REv. 1177 (1973).
334. HUMAN RIGrrs IN CUBA, supra note 312, at 27; Mrro, supra note 1, at 208. It is
claimed that the law was no longer given effect in the 1980's when unemployment levels
became unmanageable. Id.
335. CUBAN PENAL CODE arts. 72-90. HUMAN RIGTrrs IN CUBA, supra note 312, at 27
(emphasis added). This may include someone believed to be capable of attempting to
leave the country illegally. Id.; see Mrro, supra note 1, at 183, 267; SUSTAiN PRESSURE,
supra note 312, at 63-64 (noting that articles 72-90 of the Penal Code define conduct
considered dangerous, and provide for application of security measures to prevent
crimes by persons who behave in manner not in accord with "socialist morality;" indica-
tions of dangerousness include "habitual drunkenness, alcoholism, drug-addiction and
'anti-social behavior' [which includes] habitual disturbance of social co-existence
through violent or provocative acts, violation of the rights of others"); Cuba, AMERI AS
WATCH, Feb. 25, 1991, at 12 n.20; Cuba: Behind a Sporting Facade, Stepped-up Repression,
AMERICAS WATCH, Aug. 11, 1991, at 6 [hereinafter Facade]; 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra
note 47, at 410; Ariel Remos, Mas Encarcelamientos en Cuba por 'Peligrosidad, DrAuo LAS
AMERICAS, Nov. 11, 1993, at IA (reporting continued arrests for "dangerousness").
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representation of trials, and the non-existence of an independ-
ent judiciary all evidence the absence of the rule of law in Cuba.
The following discussion presents the lack of respect for interna-
tionally-protected first-generation human rights that further un-
derscores the illegitimacy of the Castro regime.
B. Denial of Internationally-Recognized Individual Rights
1. Political Participation
The lack of democracy or existence of the people's voice in
governing is increasingly evident beyond the formal legal pro-
cess. In Castro's now thirty-five years of rule, Cubans have yet to
have the opportunity to vote for Castro. Such history shows a
denial of the international right of the people to participate in
the government of their country and freely express their will by
way of a vote.336 The 1976 Constitution'17 created a new struc-
ture called "People's Power," in which persons directly elect del-
egates for the municipal Assemblies (who in turn elect the dele-
gates for the national and regional assemblies) .338 However, un-
til February 1994, direct elections were not permitted, and
before nomination, every candidate had to be screened by a
"candidacy commission" comprised of members of state mass or-
ganizations, thus ensuring that all candidates were party loyal-
ists.33
9
In the early 1990's, Cubans had reason to hope that some
changes towards democratization would be made. As part of
Castro's March 1990 call to the Party Congress, he launched a
one-year national poll on recommendations on economic and
political proposals. These proposals were to be put before the
Congress for possible adoption. 340 During this one-year period,
336. Universal Declaration, supra note 12, art. 21, at 75; see 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS,
supra note 47, at 414 ("Cubans have no legal right to change their government or to
advocate a change. The Constitution states that the only political organization allowed
is the Communist Party. A small group of leaders select members of its highest gov-
erning body - the Politburo and Central Committee.").
337. CUBAN CONST., in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD, supra note
79, at 100.
338. See CUBAN CONST. chs. VIII (Supreme Organs of People's Power), IX (Local
Organs of People's Power), XI (The Electoral System), in THE CONSTITIUTIONS OF THE
COMMUNIST WORLD, supra note 79, at 117-30, 133-34.
339. 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 414 (also explaining that only one
candidate per seat was allowed); Mrro, supra note 1, at 126-28.
340. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 302.
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about 3.5 million Cubans responded to the call and attended
meetings to express support for economic reforms, such as legal-
izing small private businesses and permitting laborers to work on
their own.34' The opinions expressed in the polls were telling.
Eighty-seven percent of those polled criticized the existing sys-
tem as repressive. While many citizens focused on problems of
day-to-day life, they also challenged the one-party system, the
centrally planned economy, lack of democratic elections, and
even Castro's one-person rule. 42
However, Cubans' hope that the 1992 Fourth Congress
would democratize the government were quickly dashed. The
July 1992 meeting of the General Assembly amended the 1976
Constitution to eliminate references to the former Soviet Union,
to outlaw religious discrimination, to permit foreign investment,
and to allow direct elections to the National Assembly, although
candidates must be approved by authorities. 343 However, the
adopted changes hardly moved Cuba towards true democratiza-
tion.
A few human rights groups in Cuba, inspired by the changes
in the Soviet bloc, called a press conference to make a seven-
point proposal to the Fourth Congress requesting free national
elections and recognition of human rights groups.3 44 The Com-
munist Party's Central Committee, however, was divided as to
what the Fourth Congress should accomplish. Some party mem-
bers were optimistic that the Fourth Congress would result in
political and economic reforms . 45 Reformers wanted to democ-
ratize the party and elections; some even drafted a plan that in-
cluded the creation of the position of Prime Minister that would
have forced Castro to relinquish some of his power. Reformers
341. Id. at 302. The move to privatize reflected the government's own experi-
ments with private enterprise in the tourism and biotechnology fields. Id. at 286, 294.
342. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 381. People demanded free farmers' mar-
kets, a multiparty system, and a full-fledged market economy. Id.
343. Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 105. Of course, the outlawing of religious
discrimination is a positive step that comports with the concept of religious freedom
embodied in Articles 2 and 18 of the Universal Declaration. Universal Declaration, supra
note 12, arts. 2, 18, at 72, 74.
344. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 379.
345. Id. at 302-03. Significantly, these groups largely have to work "underground."
Pedro Monreal, a communist party economist, believed that the government's involve-
ment with private industry in tourism and biotechnology "had set an unstoppable trend
toward greater economic freedoms." Id. at 303.
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also proposed the adoption of some of the proposals for change
made by the Cuban people including free elections, free farm-
ers' markets, legalization of private labor (plumbers etc.), and
greater openness in the media. 46 Old-guard hardliners, how-
ever, eschewed change, citing Cuba's deep economic crisis. 47
In the end, Castro rejected democratization, declared that the
one-party system would continue, and established that the island
would not adopt a market economy.
3 48
Thus, notwithstanding the hopeful expectations of the re-
formers, and of the people of Cuba, change was not to be. Ulti-
mately, the official draft resolutions for the Fourth Congress did
not mention reform. Castro proclaimed that the revolution
would never accept a multiparty system and that Cuba was al-
ready the most complete democracy in existence.349 The Fourth
Congress was not a platform to adopt a democratic process, but a
sham, a celebration of the "way we are."s5 ° For example, there
was no general discussion of a delegate's two-minute presenta-
tion raising the issue of free farmers' markets. Castro, however,
welcomed the comment as a demonstration of the democratic
nature of the process, and in a three-hour response simply dis-
missed the idea.35 '
Significantly, the results of the Fourth Congress's vote for
the party's top brass revealed that three delegates voted against
Castro's re-election, and four delegates voted against his
brother's re-election. This was the first time in over three de-
cades of Castro's rule that anyone had cast a vote against him.
3 5 2
The Congress also approved elections to the National As-
sembly by direct vote but left the details of the electoral laws to
be decided later. However, it was clear that these would not be
in the Western model.353 Ultimately, the electoral rules remain
unchanged, and only party candidates run unopposed.
346. Id. at 383-85.
347. Id. at 379.
348. Id. at 380.
349. Id. at 387-400.
350. Id. at 393.
351. Id. at 395.
352. Id. at 396.
353. Id. at 396-97.
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2. Personal Security; Freedoms of Expression, Association and
Assembly; Right of Privacy
The examples of the lack of a rule of law, illustrated by the
denial of the peoples' right to participate in the political process,
are ample grounds to challenge the legitimacy of Castro's gov-
ernment. However, the end of the Cold War and, effectively, the
end of most communist regimes, make it easier to question
Cuba's internal policies, as it no longer has a protective, politi-
cally-sympathetic bloc. Although Cuba is a signatory to the Uni-
versal Declaration,354 its human rights practices violate interna-
tionally-accepted standards.-- Thus, Cubans do not enjoy basic
human rights and freedoms 35 6 but rather exist in an environ-
ment of fear and oppression. 57 In fact, some Cuban laws di-
rectly contravene such rights as freedom of expression, associa-
tion, assembly and movement, privacy, and due process.
In early 1988, there were signs of improving conditions,
with Castro allowing some activity by a small emerging human
rights community and releasing some political prisoners.
354. Universal Declaration, supra note 12.
355. Jailing the Movement, supra note 324, at 2; Facade, supra note 335, at 2.
Cuba's human rights record has long been sharply at odds with internationally
accepted standards guaranteeing fundamental civil and political rights - free-
dom of expression and association, the right to privacy and to due process of
law .... Cubans are punished legally or extra-judicially, and sometimes cru-
elly, for publicly expressing dissenting opinions and for organizing civic or
political groups that are independent of the government and Communist
Party .... Cubans' daily lives are closely monitored and controlled by vast
surveillance networks of informants which operate in neighborhoods, work
centers and schools .... [and) Cubans' recourse in the courts is stymied by a
judicial system that is subordinate to the will of the government.
Id. at 2; see 1993 CouNRy REPomRs, supra note 47, at 409-16 (noting that Cuba violates
internationally-accepted standards of human rights).
356. See Castafieda, supra note 80, at 266 (noting that Cuba, while a signatory to
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, fails to respect social, political and economic
rights contained therein). For an extensive review of human rights violations in Cuba,
see HUMAN RGHTS IN CUBA, supra note 91. Former Ambassador Kirkpatrick noted that
the 1989 State Department Report on Human Rights recounted that the human rights
situation in Cuba had worsened in that year and that government repression had in-
creased. Kirkpatrick Address, supra note 212, at 4. The 1993 Report shows ongoing
repression. 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 408-16.
357. See OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 156, 235.
358. See, e.g., Tightening, supra note 306, at 3.
359. Cuba, supra note 335, at 2; 1993 CouRaY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 413 (not-
ing that some well known political prisoners have recently been allowed to leave; but
that others are coerced to leave).
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However, later the same year, during the visit of a delegation of
investigators sent by the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights (the "U.N. Commission"), a retrenchment of the toler-
ance shown a few months earlier surfaced.36 This regressionary
trend intensified against human rights activists and political dis-
sidents in 1991,61 and reportedly continues today. 62 In light of
such attitudes, the U.N. Commission has passed resolutions to
investigate the alleged human rights abuses, which the U.N.
viewed as unchanged from earlier years.8 63 Castro has refused to
obey the resolutions, and has refused to allow any more delega-
tions of investigators to visit. 64 In addition, visits to Cuban pris-
ons that started in 1988, pursuant to an agreement with the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross, were suspended in
1990.365
In fact, the monitoring of human rights is illegal in Cuba.366
On March 6, 1990, the U.N. Commission voted to ask the Cuban
government to comply with its pledge not to detain, repress or
otherwise mistreat Cuban human rights activists. 367 The resolu-
tion was co-sponsored by Czechoslovakia and Poland. Bulgaria
and Hungary voted with the United States, an unusual event
given that the Eastern bloc generally voted together and against
the United States in the past.368  The resolution on Cuba,
360. Cuba, supra note 335, at 2.
361. Tightening, supra note 306, at 1.
362. Raul Verrier, Cuba: Mas Terror, DtAmos LAS AMERICAS, Atig. 9, 1994, at IA
(reporting on punishment of dissidents after demonstration against Castro); Cynthia
Corzo, Rgimen Cubano Obliga a losDisidentes a AbandondarEl Pais, NuEvo HERALD, Sept.
7, 1994, at 10A (reporting that dissidents picked up at sea informed Coast Guard rescu-
ers that Castro was forcing dissidents to leave, and threatening incarceration of those
who did not; one person reported that she was given three days to leave, or face impris-
onment of seven to twenty years).
363. See 1993 COUNTRY REPoRs, supra note 47, at 409, 414.
364. Cuba, supra note 335, at 2-3; 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 409,
414.
365. Cuba, supra note 335, at 5 (noting that 1988 agreement permitted periodic
prison visits on ongoing basis, that visits took place inJune 1988 and May 1989, but that
no visits have taken place since then). The visits were intended to guard against mis-
treatment of political prisoners. Id. The prisoners are rumored to be badly treated and
tortured. Id. See generally LIFE IN A CUBAN PRISON, supra note 306 (recounting one
prisoner's stay in various Cuban prisons).
366. Tightening, supra note 306, at 3.
367. U.N. ESCOR, 46th Sess., 52nd mtg. at 109-110, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94
(1990).
368. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 219. The UNCHR passed a similar resolu-
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adopted in 1991, increased U.N. pressure on the island to re-
spect human rights, and called for the appointment of a special
representative for Cuba to pursue contacts with the people and
government of Cuba. 69 However, the Cuban representative im-
mediately announced that the U.N. special representative would
not be allowed into Cuba, and denounced the appointment as
"part of the U.S.'s 'aggressive policy towards Cuba' for which
'there is no justification'." T°
In February 1992, the U.N. Commission voted to approve a
resolution expressing "alarm at continuing reports of human
rights abuses [and concern about] numerous uncontradicted re-
ports of continued [human rights] violations."371 The U.N. Spe-
cial Rapporteur on Human Rights in Cuba told the U.N. Com-
mission that harassment, repression and imprisonment are the
Cuban government's tools of choice against dissidents and
human right activists, practices which did not diminish in the
last year. 3 72 The U.N. Commission approved a resolution con-
demning Cuba's systematic violation of human rights, in particu-
lar individuals' freedoms of speech and association.73 Some
prime examples of Cuba's denial of human rights follow.374
The Cuban government requires various identification and
record-keeping practices that interfere with individuals' privacy
rights in derogation of international norms.75 Since 1970, every
tion condemning human rights violations in Cuba in March 1994 by the "largest margin
ever." 1993 CouTR'v REPoRTs, supra note 47, at 414.
369. Facade, supra note 335, at 17; Tightening, supra note 306, at 19.
370. Facade, supra note 335, at 17 (quoting U.N. Names Rights Observer for Cuba; It
Rejects Him, WASH. Posr, July 3, 1991; Tightening, supra note 306, at 4. Similarly, after
the 1994 resolution the Cuban Ambassador said the resolution was a "political ven-
detta" and insisted that "there are no large-scale and flagrant human rights violations in
Cuba." 1993 CouN'mry REPoRTs, supra note 47, at 414; see supra note 368 (discussing
1994 UNCHR resolution).
371. U.N. ESCOR, 48th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4 (1992).
372. 1993 CouNTy REPoRrs, supra note 47, at 409-10, 414; Repression in Cuba En-
demic, U.N. Observers Say, MiAMi HERALD, Mar. 3, 1994, at 20A, see U.N. Scolds Cuba
(Again), MMi HERALD, Feb. 21, 1994, at 18A; Mimi Whitefield, U.N. report: About 6
Cubans Die Every Day Fleeing Island, Mi.mi HERALD, Feb. 17, 1994, at 24A.
373. See 1993 CousTR REPORTS, supra note 47, at 409; see also Castro Culpable,
Dw-auo LAS AMFRiCAS, Mar. 10, 1994, at 1k.
374. Not unexpectedly, the 1993 U.S. State Department Report on Human Rights
condemned Cuba for rights violations. See 1993 CouTR' REPORTS, supra note 47, at
408-16.
375. Universal Declaration, supra note 12, art. 12, at 73-74. "No one shall be sub-
jected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
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person sixteen years of age and older has been required to carry
a photo identification card which details not only work data for
each job the person has had, but also general information, such
as residential address and family information, the latter includ-
ing information on every marriage and names, birth-dates, and
I.D. number for each child.376 Moreover, the identification card
has a section for "special notes" which often include comments
of a political nature.
77
Similarly, students have a "cumulative scholastic record."3 78
This record follows a student from the first year of education
throughout his or her schooling, and includes far more than the
student's academic performance.3 79 For example, two of the cat-
egories on which students are evaluated are "socioeconomic con-
ditions,"3 0 and "ideological, political and moral education."38'
Finally, persons also have a "work record" which closely resem-
bles the scholastic record,8 2 in that it also tracks and evaluates
the "ideological integration" of the worker. 3
These requirements of a "work record," a scholastic record,
and a photo I.D. are not the only intrusions into internationally-
to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference or attacks." Id.
376. Mrro, supra note 1, at 208, illus. 40, 41; HuMAN RiGHTrs IN CUBA, supra note
312, at 37, 39-40.
377. Mrro, supra note 1, at 208. Allegations exist about this section being used to
show whether the individual was a political prisoner. Id.
378. See Mrro, supra note 1, at 209 ("expediente acumulativo del escolar"); see also
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA, supra note 312, at 37-38, 41-42. Of course, the right to educa-
tion is a positive achievement, in accord with the Universal Declaration, supra note 12,
art. 26, at 76.
379. Mrro, supra note 1, at 209.
380. See id. at illus. 42 ("condiciones socioeconomicas"). Such information is re-
quested in Chapter V and includes information on the household composition (parents
and siblings, including half-siblings), numbers of radios or television sets, condition of
the house, and ideological integration. Id. at illus. 42, 43.
381. See id. ("educaci6n ideol6gica, polftica y moral"). Such information is re-
quested in Chapter V and includes information on ideological-political behavior (com-
portamiento ideol6gico-polftico), which details membership in political or mass organi-
zation and level of participation therein, and ideological-moral behavior (com-
portamiento ideol6gico-moral), which details the student's solidarity and cooperation
as well as social communist practice. Id.
382. HuMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA, supra note 312, at 37. However, like the right to
education, the Castro regime can take credit for enforcing the right to work, which is
an internationally-recognized right. Universal Declaration, supra note 12, art. 23, at .75.
However, the work record is an unacceptable intrusion, as is any forced labor practice.
Id.
383. HuMAN RIGrrs IN CUBA, supra note 312, at 43.
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recognized personal freedoms that challenge the government's
legitimacy. In spite of Cuba's basic success at implementing the
internationally-accepted right to employment 8 4 and educa-
tion,385 Cubans also lack some economic freedoms in deroga-
tion of these rights. The government, and not the individual,
decides where and when people work, whether they get promo-
tions, and even whether someone can buy appliances at the
workplace credit union. 86 Some professions, such as law, are
reserved for persons who have the requisite ideological integra-
tion.387 Persons are expected to donate time to "voluntary work"
for mass organizations,3 8 8 and to go to the country to do agricul-
tural work.3 8 9 In fact, Article 228 of the Cuban Penal Code,
which refers to "illicit economic activities," makes it a crime to
engage in economic activities without a license. However, be-
cause of the present crisis in September 1993, Castro re-legalized
self-employment, which had been abolished in 1968, by allowing
people to apply for licenses to work in over 100 occupations. 90
Likewise, the Cuban government controls whether a person
384. Universal Declaration, supra note 12, art. 23, at 75.
385. 1d. art. 26, at 76.
386. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 143; HUMAN RiGHTs IN CUBA, supra note 312,
at 12 (noting that government permission is needed to change jobs; also noting prac-
tice of government sending young workers to work in Eastern European countries and
other Third World states).
387. HUMAN RIGHTS IN CuBA, supra note 312, at 77; Mimi Whitefield, No Easing of
the Ideological Line.in Cuba, MIAI HERALD, Sept. 7, 1994, at 15A (reporting that only
Cubans capable of defending revolutionary ideals are allowed to study at university
level).
388. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 309; Mrro, supra note 1, at 265. For analysis
of "voluntary labor" viewed as "forced labor" in violation of international norms, see
supra note 214.
389. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 269, 273-74; Mrro, supra note 1, at 264-66.
390. 1993 CouNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 416 (also noting, however, that self-
employment regulations exclude university graduates, employees in sectors that consti-
tute government priorities, and state employees whose work is "necessary"); Behind Bars,
supra note 320, at 5-6 (explaining crime of illicit economic activities, describing applica-
tion to person who was sentenced to one year in prison for working as photographer
without license, and noting that "[t]housands of Cubans offer unlicensed services such
as plumbing or electrical repair, sewing or manicures to neighbors who prefer not to
seek those services through the often inefficient government bureaucracy"); see supra
note 2 (regarding offering of unlicensed services). But see Foreign Investment Legislation
in Cuba, supra note 79 (noting that in most recent changes government has proposed
policy initiatives that will increase monthly registration fees established under Decree-
Law No. 141 (Sept. 8, 1993) that are paid by self-employed Cubans for privilege of
being self-employed).
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may study, as well as what he or she may study. 91 Significantly,
the state decides who goes to the university largely on political
integration, rather than on merit.39 2 High school graduates are
asked to list four career choices, but the government makes the
final employment decision based on the state's needs; this deci-
sion is not limited to an individual's listed options. 9 3
In challenging the legitimacy of the Cuban government on
the basis of its lack of economic freedoms, one must note that
from the outset, Castro's revolution was presented as an ideolog-
ical, moral one. 94 In this vein, the revolution promoted "an
ethic driven by self-sacrifice, social understanding of the laws of
history, and total fusion of the public good with the private
will."3 95 In theory, the goals were laudable; in practice, from a
human rights perspective, the results are unacceptable. For ex-
ample, the theory as translated into practice initially meant the
requiring of
a sixth day of work without compensation. Later, certain nu-
ances were added: willingness to perform shock troop work
whenever needed, unquestioning willingness to serve the re-
gime in whatever emergency military or paramilitary tasks
were required, and placing state above citizen in confronting
possible acts of sabotage. In short, through the Committees
for the Defense of the Revolution, a political component of
sacrifice was added to the earlier, less advanced, economic
varieties.39 6
Those who fail to establish their ideological integration or
who commit a counter-revolutionary act, which can range from
self-employment to human rights advocacy, are literally "re-
jected."9 ' This rejection or repudiation may take the form of a
public attack on the honor of the individual who has dissented,
391. HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA, supra note 312, at 89; see supra notes 384, 387 and
accompanying text (discussing limits to freedom of employment and education).
392. HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA, supra note 312, at 89; see supra notes 384, 387 and
accompanying text (discussing limits to freedom of employment and education).
393. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 143.
394. CONSCIENCE, supra note 44, at 70.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 70-71. Carried to an extreme, forced work could be deemed to consti-
tute a violation of the international prohibition against the right of persons not to be
held in servitude. See Universal Declaration, supra note 12, art. 4, at 73.
397. Mrro. supra note 1, at 210-12 ("acto de repudio"); HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA,
supra note 312, at 45; 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 409, 410.
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as well as other forms of harassment, both verbal and physical.39
The acts of repudiation, which have been used to harass and in-
timidate human rights activists, among others,399 violate the in-
ternational rights to be free from attacks to one's honor or repu-
tation400 and to freedom of thought4"' and expression.40 2
In addition, government surveillance effectively renders the
intemationally-protected right to privacy 0 non-existent. Block
committees for the defense of the revolution ("CDR") keep close
track of the neighbors in their jurisdiction.40 4 The committees
were originally created in 1960 to keep track of counter-revolu-
tionaries,40 5 and still exist today as a local-level entity that spies
on citizens and keeps track of their activities in order to stop
counter-revolutionary activities. Such continuous, institutional-
ized surveillance of citizens obviates their right to privacy.40 6
398. MITo, supra note 1, at 210-12; HuLAN RiGHTS IN CUBA, supra note 312, at 45;
1993 COuNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 409-10.
399. Cuba, supra note 335, at 3, 7-8 (describing acts of repudiation against human
rights activists including assault by mobs who hurled insults and shouted slogans,
vandalization of homes, surrounding of individuals who then are physically and verbally
abused); Tightening, supra note 306, at 13-14.
400. Universal Declaration, supra note 12, art. 12, at 73-74. "No one shall be sub-
jected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference or attacks." Id.
401. Id. art. 18, at 74. "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom,
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his reli-
gion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." Id.
402. Id. art. 19, at 74-75. "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and ex-
pression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of fron-
tiers." Id.
403. Id. art. 12, at 73-74; see supra notes 375-83 and accompanying text (giving
examples of other violations of individuals' privacy rights).
404. See Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 105 (noting that one way Ministry of
Interior ensures political and social conformity as well as internal security is use of CDR
and network of informers to maintain pervasive vigilance); 1993 CouNTRY REPORTS,
supra note 47, at 408-09, 411; SusrAN PRSURE, supra note 312, 59-63 (explaining that
CDRs "are responsible for observing and reporting to a variety of government ministries
and organizations the political and ideological conduct of residents of each block;
Cubans must receive the approval of their CDRs to obtain day care for their children, to
be admitted to university or to change jobs;" "through their vigilance, CDRs control the
behavior of those they monitor"); Tightening, supra note 306, at 3.
405. MITo, supra note 1, at 96.
406. HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA, supra note 312, at 37; Sustain Pressure, supra note
312, at 59-63 (noting that "the most systematically violated [right] in Cuba is the right of
privacy [because a]lmost every aspect of the lives of Cubans is subject to a pervasive
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More recently, in response to the public protests against the
economic deprivations, the government has further tightened its
hold over citizens' actions. The CDR now has organized "rapid
response brigades" or "rapid action detachments" which are
charged with stifling public shows of discontent.407 Rapid re-
sponse brigades crack down on demonstrations and other
human rights activities.4"'
However, it is not only recent economic conditions that
have led to repressive government action. Indeed, personal free-
doms have been curbed throughout Castro's rule. Law 54 and
Resolution 53 of 1986 limit citizens' internationally-accepted
right of free assembly and association.40 9 Cuban laws prohibit
the assembly of more than three persons, even in a private
home, which is punishable by imprisonment of up to three
months.410 Organizers of illicit or unrecognized groups can be
imprisoned up to nine months, and members of such groups
system of political surveillance so that Cubans are monitored in their neighborhoods, at
their places of work and their schools; [t]heir degree of 'ideological integration' is con-
stantly being recorded and their lives are shaped byjudgments about how their conduct
and their views conform to officially prescribed doctrines"); 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS,
supra note 47, at 408-09, 411 (noting that CDRs monitor daily lives of residents).
407. Facade, supra note 335, at 2 (noting that brigades are comprised of civilians
from neighborhood); Tightening, supra note 306, at 1, 2.
408. See OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 313; J. Goytisolo, A Journey To Cuba:
Shakened, Saddened, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 22, 1991, at IC, 4C (describing brigades' re-
sponse to human rights protest and brigades' response to attempt to film by non-Cuban
journalist visiting Cuba on Cuban visa which, along with U.S. citizenship, "meant noth-
ing"). After this encounter the journalist was followed everywhere by plain-clothes po-
lice. Id.; see Ana Santiago, Arrestada Dirigente Opositora Cubana, NuEvo HERALD, July 9,
1993, at 1A, 8A (reporting on activist history of Paula Valiente, including arrests and
encounters with rapid response brigades).
409. See Universal Declaration, supra note 12, art. 20, at 75. "Everyone has the right
to freedom of peaceful assembly and association .... No one may be compelled to
belong to an association." Id.; see Mrro, supra note 1, at 215.
410. CUBAN PENAL CODE arts. 208, 209; OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 314; Sus-
TAIN PRESSURE, supra note 312, at 25-26 (explaining that Articles 208 and 209 of current
penal code, which prohibit "illicit associations, gatherings and demonstrations ... pro-
vide[ ] no protection for the exercise of the internationally recognized right of freedom
of peaceful assembly and association;" under these articles "for belonging to an unregis-
tered association or participating in unauthorized gatherings or demonstrations one
could serve one to three months in prison; for leading an unregistered association, or
organizing unauthorized gatherings or demonstrations, three months to one year");
Behind Bars, supra note 320, at 4-5; 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 412. These
laws on their face violate the international right to peaceful assembly and association,
Universal Declaration, supra note 12, art. 20, at 75, and to privacy, Universal Declaration,
supra note 12, art.12, at 73-74.
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can be imprisoned for up to three months.41 ' The government
often uses these laws against human rights activists. 412 In fact, a
report by a respected human rights observer group states that
the government uses the "brigades" against
individuals with political and ideological problems ... [be-
cause the government] . . . cannot allow . .. people to go
around shouting slogans against the Revolution or socialism.
[The government has] to confront these manifestations and
these people. ... [And although the civilian groups] would
not use violence to stop the dissent but would attempt to use
persuasion... [i]f it comes to blows, we will not be the ones
who start.4
13
Like the rights to freedom of assembly and association, the
internationally-recognized right to freedom of expression is non-
existent in Cuba.41 4 On its face, the Cuban Constitution violates
these rights, as it provides that freedom of speech and the press
are recognized only in accordance with the goals of a socialist
society.415 Other laws also serve to chill free speech. For exam-
ple, Article 103 of the Penal Code creates the offense of enemy
propaganda.4 16 Pursuant to this article, it is illegal to produce,
distribute or possess oral, written or other propaganda against
the social order or the socialist state.417 Thus, there can be no
criticism of the revolution, the government, or its leaders. One
found guilty of violating this article can be imprisoned for exten-
411. CUBAN PENAL CODE art. 239; OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 314.
412. Cuba, supra note 335, at 9; 1993 COuNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 412 (not-
ing that authorities have never approved public meeting of human rights group).
413. Pascal Fletcher, Cuba Creates 'Rapid Action Groups' To Stop Public Dissent,
Reuters N. Am. Wire, July 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS File.
414. The right to this freedom exists in Article 19 of the UniversalDeclaration, supra
note 12, at 74-75, but is formally denied in Cuba. See SUSTAIN PRE.SSURE, supra note 312,
at 3, 7-21; Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 105 (noting lack of individual freedoms in
Cuba); 1993 CouNTrY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 411.
415. CUBAN CONST. arts. 52, 61, in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD,
supra note 79, at 114-16. Article 52 of the Cuban Constitution protects only speech and
press freedom that are in accord with the objectives of socialist society, and makes the
print and electronic media property of the state. Article 61 states that the freedoms
Cuban citizens have cannot be exercised against the goals of the socialist state. Id.; see
SUSTAIN PRE§sURE, supra note 312, at 7; Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 105 (noting
government and communist party control all electronic and print media).
416. CUBAN PENAL CODE art. 103.
417. CUBAN PENAL CODE art. 103. See SUSTAIN PRESSURE, supra note 312, at 10; id.
at 11-14 (providing examples of prosecutions on "enemy propaganda" grounds); 1993
COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 20, at 412.
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sive periods.418 The government regularly uses this article
against human rights activists.419
Other means of suppressing expression, also often used to
curb activities of human rights activists and others, are Articles
144 (contempt)4 20 and Articles 201 and 202 (public disorder).4 21
Similarly, Article 210 forbids clandestine printing and, while the
law is ostensibly aimed at protecting copyright, it is used to pun-
ish anyone who tries to publish materials that would not be pub-
lished by government printing services.4 2 2
The lack of freedom of expression is broadly institutional-
ized. Article 52 of the Constitution provides that all media are
state property.423 Thus, the government controls the press, ra-
dio, and television.424 In 1959, Cuba had 82 AM radio stations,
418. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA, supra note 312, at 65-66 (describing sentencing of
human rights activist Ariel Hidalgo for writing essay); SUSTAIN PaSSURE, supra note 312,
at 10-12 (describing trials of Ariel Hidalgo and Rafael Emilio Saumell Mufioz; explain-
ing range of sentences for offenses under this article).
419. Cuba, supra note 335, at 11, 18 (noting increase in enemy propaganda cases
reported in 1990 and giving examples of same); see 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note
47, at 412 (noting that dissidents are attacked and intimidated).
420. CUBAN PENAL CODE art. 144; see SUSTAIN PRESSURE, supra note 312, at 14-15
(noting that offense deals with "[a] nyone who 'threatens, slanders, defames, insults, in-
jures, in any way outrages or offends, orally or in writing, the dignity or honor of an
authority,'" and carries punishment of imprisonment from three months to one year
but goes to one to three years if offense is against Castro or other heads and members
of state government); see also Cuba, supra note 335, at 17, 18.
421. CUBAN PENAL CODE arts. 201-02; see SUSTAIN PREsSUR, supra note 312, at 15-
16 (explaining that although on their face these provisions are not offensive as they are
overtly aimed at provocation of panic in public place by verbal or physical threat, their
application includes suppression of "peaceful independent or unofficial associations;"
and giving examples of such troublesome applications).
422. CUBAN PENAL CODE art. 210; see SUSTAIN PRESSURE, supra note 312, at 16-18
(explaining that maximum sentence is one year and providing examples of use of law
againstJehovah's Witnesses); Behind Bars, supra note 320, at 2-4 (describing application
of the law to some human rights unofficial groups trying to promote independent activ-
ity); 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 412.
423. CUBAN CONST. art. 52, in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD,
supra note 79, at 114; see 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 412; SUSTAIN PRES-
SURE, supra note 312, at 18-24.
424. See 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 412 (explaining that media
"faithfully reflect government views and are used to indoctrinate the public"). The pro-
cess of taking over the press took approximately one and one-half years. For a descrip-
tion of this process, see Mrro, supra note 1, at 78 n.22. It began with Castro confiscating
newspapers formerly run by the ousted Batista regime and using them to disseminate
the new revolutionary party line. Thereafter, the new regime withdrew official adver-
tisements from independent papers, and there were fire-bombings of their offices.
Later, freedom of the press was further limited by the requirement that newspapers
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24 FM radio stations, and five television stations.425 By 1960, all
of these had been confiscated by the government.426 It is inter-
esting that this lack of freedom of the press was revisited at the
end of the Cold War. For example, perestroika and glasnost
aroused much interest in the Cuban people. To learn about
these changes, the people started to read Soviet newspapers and
magazines. However, in the summer of 1989, the government
banned the sale of Moscow News and Sputnik, thus totally denying
Cubans any access to publications from abroad. The Cuban gov-
ernment's official paper simply explained that the journals were
banned because they were 'Justifying bourgeois democracy as
the highest form of popular participation and with a fascination
for the American way of life."427 Even Canek Guevara, one of
Che's grandchildren, complains of the lack of such freedom, the
inability to "open your mouth. 42
8
This control of information reaches beyond the press, radio
and television to other cultural matters, the control of which is
similarly institutionalized. For example, the Constitution pro-
vides for free artistic expression, so long as it is not contrary to
the revolution. 429 These limitations patently fly in the face of the
Universal Declaration's protection of everyone's right freely to
participate in the cultural life of the community.430 Clearly, such
rights cannot be enjoyed when the government controls what
the people can read by strictly controlling what books and
magazines can be sold or carried in libraries.43' Interestingly,
there are reports of a so-called "yellow section" in the National
print "clarifications" with respect to any stories that were critical of the government.
Finally, as of May 1960, the government had confiscated and ultimately fully controlled
all newspapers. Id. at 77-81; see Fact Sheet: Cuba, supra note 83, at 105 (noting govern-
ment and communist party control all print and electronic media).
425. See Mrro, supra note 1, at 82.
426. Id.
427. Jailing the Movement, supra note 324, at 9; see Azicri, supra note 211, at 17.
428. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 268. Canek believes that the revolution is in
ruins, and calls his studies as a waste of time. Id. There are no paper or pens, and the
teachers lack interest. Moreover, there is no work upon graduation other than agricul-
ture. Id. at 268-69.
429. CUBAN CONST. art. 38(e), in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD,
supra note 79, at 110 ("there is a right to free artistic creation so long as its contents are
not contrary to the revolution") (translation by Author).
430. Universal Declaration, supra note 12, art. 27, at 76.
431. Mrro, supra note 1, at 221-24; 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 411
(noting that Cubans do not have right to receive publications from abroad).
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Library with approximately a 7,000 volume (and growing) collec-
tion that is accessible only to selectively designated persons with
a "yellow card. 4
3 2
Another right recognized by the Universal Declaration but
denied by the Cuban government is the right to freedom of
movement.43 3 Although there are no restrictions on domestic
travel, the government determines whether persons get permis-
sion to travel abroad.43 4 In fact, Article 216 of the Penal Code
makes it illegal to leave or attempt to leave the country without
complying with the local requirements, a crime that is punish-
able by one to three years imprisonment.435 Moreover, Article
217 makes it illegal to organize, promote, or incite an illegal exit,
an offense that is punishable by two to five years imprison-
ment.
436
It is noteworthy, however, that this is one area in which the
government has made some progress. In 1991, for example, the
government eased travel restrictions that had been in place for
years, which only permitted men over the age of 65 and women
over the age of 60 to travel abroad.437 The government now al-
lows persons over 20 years of age to apply for permission to
travel abroad, and the vast majority of persons who qualify for
visas or refugee status are allowed to leave, although the govern-
432. Mrro, supra note 1, at 222.
433. Universal Declaration, supra note 12, art. 13, at 74.
434. 1993 CouNrRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 413 (no legal restrictions on domes-
tic travel except for restricted zone near U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo); OPPEN-
HEIMER, supra note 229, at 143.
435. CUBAN PENAL CODE art. 216; see SUSTAIN PRESSURE, supra note 312, at 41. Iron-
ically, the recent threatened exodus resulted from Castro's unilateral decision not to
impede illegal exit.
436. CUBAN PENAL CODE art. 217; SUSTAIN PRESSURE, supra note 312, at 41-42. For
examples of government acts against those who seek to leave illegally, see supra note
274.
437. See Tightening, supra note 306, at 4. The restriction was gradually reduced and
ultimately the age limit was lowered to twenty years for men and women. Id. It is inter-
esting that many have interpreted this change as an attempt by the Cuban government
to relieve its economic pressures by creating the setting for a massive exodus. Id It
appears that the United States might believe this to be the tactic, as it declared shortly
after the reduction in age limit was announced that its interests section in Havana
would stop accepting new tourist visa applications until the back-log of pending applica-
tions was cleared. Id. at 4 n.4. This move has been interpreted by some as a way of
preventing a massive exodus. Id. But see Castro Warns U.S., supra note 172 (noting that
Castro blames United States for encouraging people to leave and has threatened to lift
all restrictions on exiting island, which could result in massive, unmanageable exodus).
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ment continues to deny permits when it wishes.4"' In addition,
there are reports that Castro is pressuring dissidents to leave,
and offering them freedom if they agree to leave the country.43 9
In an apparent search for dollars to support the struggling
economy, in his July 26, 1993 speech Castro announced the lib-
eralization of the policy of granting visas to exiles wishing to visit
the island.4 ° This move, like the embargo issue, has caused divi-
438. 1993 CouNTRv REPORTS, supra note 47, at 413 (also noting government's re-
fusal to allow certain persons to leave, such as "professionals who have tried to leave and
have since been banned from working in their occupational fields," or sensitive cases,
including Castro's own daughter, who recently escaped island in disguise).
439. See Ana Santiago, Activistas: Cuba Presiona a Disidentes Para Que Emigren,
NuEvo HERALD, July 24, 1993, at 4A (reporting on case of Sebastian Arcos Bergnes,
convicted of distributing enemy propaganda and sentenced to five years imprisonment;
Arcos' son in Miami stated that his father was visited constantly in prison, and is being
offered freedom if he agrees to leave country via Spain; in recent days Cuba has re-
leased from prison and/or allowed to leave Cuba other dissenters and activists, includ-
ing Mario Chanes de Armas, who went to Miami, Daniel Azpillaga, and Mara Elena
Cruz Varela; and noting that some believe Castro is taking these measures to get ap-
proval from states that are insisting on political reform as condition of providing eco-
nomic aid); see also Mara Elena Cruz Varela es Premiada en Holanda porPersecucidn en Cuba,
DLAmo LAs AMEuaCAs;June 18, 1993, at 1-A (reporting on detention and imprisonment
of poet because of her protest against regime; before her detention, her house was
invaded and she was forced to eat anti-government pamphlets she had written); see Ana
Santiago, Cuba Pressures Dissident to Leave, MIMI HERALD, July 24, 1993, at 21A (report-
ing on pressure on Arcos to leave, and early release of Cruz Varela, who announced
immediately after her release that "she was withdrawing from the human rights struggle
and would concentrate on her poetry"); 1993 CouNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 413.
440. Ana Santiago, Cuba da Pdimeras Visas en Nuevo Plan de Viajes, NuEvo HERALD,
Aug. 15, 1993, at IB, 3B. Since 1985 the Cuban government had limited such visas to
5,000 per year. Id. Experts have calculated that under the new policy up to 100,000
exiles could visit the island in the first year. Id. One of the points of criticism of the
new policy is its requirement that visitors who travel to the island must pay for lodging
whether or not they use it. Id. It must be noted, however, that visitors from the United
States are subject to the terms of the U.S. embargo, which limits spending to US$100
per day. Id. The price fixed by the government for lodging would result in violation of
the embargo limit. Id. The numbers of the exiles who can visit vary. See Castro Bids to
Shore Up Revolution, supra note 239, at IA, 16A (noting that visits from United States
could range from present 10,000 per year to 20,000 or 30,000 per year).
The changes include a five-fold increase in the numbers of visas to be granted to
exiles; no limitation by Cuba on the amount of dollars that the travelers can take into
Cuba (although the U.S. embargo limits spending to US$100 per day); permission to
visit for persons who left prior to 1970 and are using a U.S. passport; unlimited visas to
Cubans who left in the Mariel boatlift; visits allowed from a weekend to 30 days; exiles
to be treated in the same manner as other tourists, including having access to foreign-
ers' stores and being able to stay at the hotel of their choice; exiles no longer required
to exchange dollars for pesos; and no limit on the times an exile can visit Cuba. See Ana
Santiago, Exiles' Trips to Island are Likely to be Easier, MLAmi HERALD,July 28, 1993, at IA,
10A.
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sions in the Cuban-American community, where some argue that
they must help their families in the island, but others argue that
any money spent there, regardless on what it is spent, is effec-
tively assistance to the repressive regime.4 41 Moreover, like the
"dollarization" move, the lifting of travel restrictions is deemed
to be risky with the potential for creating social and political tur-
moil.4 4 2 For example, the last time exiles were allowed to travel
to Cuba, the difference in relative wealth seen by their families
in the island is believed to have resulted in a questioning of the
revolution that in turn triggered a massive exodus.443 On the
other hand, the liberalization has apparently been accompanied
with a tightening of the crackdown on those who seek to leave
without government permission.' 4"
The lack of freedoms and resources has led to the creation
of a black market, in which those with more means do better.44 5
The government tolerates this law-breaking. Under the law, one
who wants a bigger house must exchange property, without
money changing hands. In reality, to get the bigger house, one
must offer money to a potential seller.446 As described above,
there is also a black market for food and consumer goods." 7
441. See, e.g., Ron Howell, Castro's Travel Shift Splits Exiles, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Aug. 22,
1993, at 15.
442. Horacio Ruiz Pav6n, Advierten Desde La Habana: 'Hay Orden de Tirar a Matar'
["Warning from Havana: 'The orders are shoot to kill' "], DIRma LAS AMERICAS, July 7,
1993, at 1B, 2B [hereinafter Warning] (reporting that as island's economic status deteri-
orates, Castro fears exodus). Many believe that easing of travel restrictions is risky, as it
might spur anti-government sentiments and a desire to leave.
443. Castro Bids to Shore Up Revolution, supra note 239, at 16A; Pablo Alfonso, Cuba
Por Dentro, NuEvo HERALD, June 20, 1993, at 3A, Dollar Libre, supra note 293, at 2.
444. See Warning, supra note 442 (reporting that government has given orders to
shoot to kill anyone caught trying to leave country without government permission);
Survival Tactics, supra note 239, at Al; Christopher Marquis & Andres Oppenheimer,
Cuba Seeking Immigration Negotiations, MIAMI HERALD, July 9, 1993, at 1A, 16A; see also
Dan Keating, Contrabando de Cubanos Hacia los Cayos Trae a Pareja de Refugiados, NuEvo
HERALD, July 14, 1993, at IB (reporting on persons paying money for being taken to
United States); 3 Die as Cuba Intercepts Speedboat From the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1993;
Castro Warns U.S., supra note 172; 1993 CouNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at 413-14.
445. See Mrro, supra note 1, at 287-88. The principal suppliers of good to the
black market are independent farmers (food), workers in state farms (food), and high-
level government employees with access to goods or employees in charge of distribution
of state goods. Id.; see supra notes 282-98 and accompanying text (describing black
market and how it works in Cuba).
446. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 140.
447. See supra notes 282-98 and accompanying text (discussing black market and
problems it may cause); see also OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 142.
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Such lack of internationally guaranteed and recognized personal
freedoms, such as civil, political, social, economic and cultural
freedoms, certainly calls to question the legitimacy of the gov-
ernment under international standards. In the following sec-
tion, a review of the lack of equality of opportunity and treat-
ment challenges the government's legitimacy not only pursuant
to internationally-accepted norms, but also under the revolution-
ary philosophy itself.
C. Lack of Equality of Opportunity
1. The General Population
Castro's revolution was founded upon the concept of egali-
tarianism, a view that the people are owners of their own desti-
nies.448 In his address to the General Assembly on September
26, 1960, Castro clearly stated that one of the aims of the revolu-
tion was to eradicate inequality and discrimination.4 49 In the
1976 Cuban Constitution, equality was encoded into law.45°
Chapter V provides that "[a]ll citizens have equal rights and are
subject to equal obligations."45 ' These aspirational statements
concerning equality, later formally encoded in law, are noble
and perhaps have been realized insofar as one considers im-
provements in health, education, and welfare. Regrettably, the
reality is that the notion of equality is merely a myth.
448. See Mrro, supra note 1, at 434.
449. See Case of Cuba, supra note 20, at 91-92. Castro notes that one of the princi-
ples of the Cuban revolution is the condemnation of discrimination against blacks and
Indians and inequality and exploitation of women. Id. at 91. He declared "the right of
black and Indians to the 'full dignity of man;' the right of women to civil, social and
political equality." Id. at 92. Significantly, his cadre of close consultants is made up of
white men, while all women and black men whose destinies he supposedly liberated by
his grant of equality remain second class, at least as political participation is concerned.
Moreover, recent reports dealing with racism in the Cuban community, both in Cuba
and in exile, reveal that racism is alive and well in both. See Omar L. Montenegro,
Castro is a Calculating Racist - Here's Why, MIAMi HERALD, July 30, 1993, at 17A, Alfonso
Chardy, "Invisible Exiles:' Black Cubans in Miami Tom Between Two Cultures, MrAMi HER-
ALD, Aug. 8, 1993, at IA. For a report on black Cubans in Cuba, see Mimi Whitefield,
Blacks' Support for Castro Erodes Along with Economy, MuaMs HERALD, Aug. 9, 1993, at IA.
450. See CUBAN CONsT. art. 40, in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD,
supra note 79, at 111.
451. See id. ch. V, in THE CONSTrrUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD, supra note 79,
at 111-12. Significantly, the chapter provides for equal access to employment, services,
military rank, salary for equal work, education (primary through university), medical
assistance, housing, restaurants, transportation, beaches, and other public places. Id.
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Surveys of Cubans in 1971 and 1986 show that there are
"privileged groups" in Cuban society.452 The privilege can be
based on status, i.e., having high political or military rank453 or
being a foreign diplomat 454 or tourist,455 or having some connec-
tion, such as being a close family member,45 6 friend
45 7 or lover 458
of one who has the privileged status. Significantly, in a society
founded on concepts of equality, it is noteworthy that the preva-
lence of the citizenry's perception is that high-level government
functionaries enjoy privileged status.459 This privilege, in effect
government corruption, also presents a challenge to the legiti-
macy of the government.
Particular items available to the privileged are housing,460
health services, 46 1 rationed goods,4 62 education,46 3 national and
international travel, 4I and use of recreational facilities.46 5 The
special privileges, such as gasoline for cars, access to stores where
imported goods can be purchased, and trips abroad, exist for the
elite when average citizens do not have enough to eat.46 6 This
effects a crisis of legitimacy for the government, because such
practices contravene expectations of equity, particularly when
this two-tiered society exists in "a government whose origins are
rooted in social revolution."46 7
452. The studies refer to those conducted by Professor Clark and reported in his
book. Mrro, supra note 1, app. A (1971 questionnaire), app. B (1986 questionnaire).
Both questionnaires reflect a perception of privilege status by high-level government
personnel. See id. at 438-42. Privilege is defined by Professor Clark as having use of
goods or services to which citizens lack equal access or where citizen access is extremely
difficult even if the citizen had the economic means to obtain it. Id.
453. Id. at 444-61; Goytisolo, supra note 408 (noting that special privileges, such as
access to hotel tennis courts, coffee shops, and pools, as well as travel abroad and availa-
bility of cars, are reserved for Cuban officials and their families).
454. Mrro, supra note 1, at 509-11.
455. Id. at 510-11; OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 137, 418.
456. Mrro, supra note 1, at 443, 470-78; Goytisolo, supra note 408, at C1, C4.
457. See, e.g., Mrro, supra note 1, at 483, 487.
458. Id. at 503-06. Significantly, this notion of the institutionalization of the que-
rida, or mistress, of high-level officials flies in the face of notions of gender equality.
459. Id. at 439-42.
460. Id. at 461-68, 473.
461. Id. at 478-82.
462. Id. at 483-89.
463. Id. at 471-73.
464. Id. at 497-503.
465. Id. at 489-97; Goytisolo, supra note 408, at C1, C4.
466. Blows, supra note 251, at A6.
467. Marifelli P6rez-Stable, Towards A Market Economy In Cuba? Social and Political
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A different class of privileged is that of foreigners residing
in Cuba.46 Pursuant to their status, they are able to buy goods,
not generally available to Cubans, in special stores. 469 This ac-
cess to goods also lets them participate in the black market econ-
omy where the goods in shortage are sold at many times their
original prices.47 ° Such access places foreigners in a position of
privilege vis d vis Cuban citizens, an irony in the context of a
government that derided foreigners' advantages over citizens
and by constitutional provision gave citizens equal access to,
among other things, beaches and restaurants.4
One of the biggest challenges to the government's legiti-
macy lies in the system of apartheid it has now created between
tourists and Cuban citizens, a privilege that has effectively turned
revolutionary philosophy on its head.472 Thirty years ago, Castro
rejected capitalism in part by closing down tourism. In this time
of economic crisis, however, he has decided that the tourism in-
dustry is vital to the island's economic survival. Thus, he has re-
versed his prior policy and has commenced a campaign to revi-
talize Cuba as a tourist spot. 7 Thus, the greatest irony of this
move is that one of the first steps of the revolution had been to
abolish the hotels and casinos that were deemed to represent
privileges for foreigners that the Cuban people could not afford
to enjoy. Indeed, the Cuban's right to free access to public ser-
vice establishments was part of the communist regime's 1976
Constitution.
By 1991, however, in order to further the tourist industry,
foreign entities were allowed to buy a 49% share of new hotels
and to run them on their own for the first time since they were
seized by Castro shortly after he took power.47 4 Significantly, this
Considerations, at 27, 32, in CUBA IN TRANSITION, supra note 80; see Goytisolo, supra note
408, at C1, C4.
468. See Mrro, supra note 1, at 509-14.
469. See id. at 441.
470. See id. at 439, 441.
471. See CUBAN CONSTITUION, art V, in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST
WORLD, supra note 79, at 111-12 (providing for equal access to, inter alia, restaurants
and other public service establishments as well as to beaches).
472. See Mrro, supra note 1, at 510-11; OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 137, 418.
473. Cuba Hearings, supra note 135 (Maingot statement, at 8-10).
474. Agustin de Goytisolo & Jose M. Hernandez, Law-Decree No. 50 is Basis For In-
vestment, CUBANEWS, Sept. 1993, at 4; OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 286. The
amended laws give investors legal protection. They exempt foreign investors from pay-
ment of income taxes for their first ten years in Cuba, and foreign investors do not have
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allowance of participation by foreigners in private enterprise is
the diametric opposite of the direction in which Castro led the
Cuban people. Castro's 1986 rectification campaign eradicated
what little private enterprise had been allowed in the country.475
The tragedy is that these nice new hotels, restaurants, and caba-
rets are out of bounds for Cubans; they are exclusively for tour-
ists, providing a nightmarish flashback to the pre-Castro days
that Castro strenuously rejected. Effectively, these policies form
a system of apartheid.476
This separate and unequal system is taken seriously. At a
four-star hotel, management reportedly warns tourists, in writ-
ing, against allowing Cubans into the hotel.477 One cannot even
enter the tourist-only restaurants unless one pays in dollars, a
currency which until recently was illegal for Cubans to possess.
Significantly, the new "dollarization" of the economy will not
solve this apartheid situation, because Cubans with dollars were
not even allowed into the foreign-only stores.478 In fact, the dol-
larization of the economy might result in another layer of
apartheid: dollar-holding Cubans versus non-dollar-holding
Cubans. 479
One effect of this systemic inequality is the creation of a Cu-
ban "workers' aristocracy,"4"' in which the best and the brightest
flock to work for the foreign entities because they pay higher
salaries than anyone else. More important, these jobs give
to pay customs duties for imports of hotel construction materials, furniture, and food.
Id. Labor laws that guaranteed job stability are not applicable, with foreign hotel man-
agers being allowed to lay off workers at will. Id. at 287; see Foreign Investment Legislation
in Cuba, supra note 79.
475. See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text (describing "rectification").
The social consequences of rectification are quite interesting. Products previously un-
available are now imported exclusively for tourists, providing an interesting education
to young hotel workers who, until tourism, did not even know what apples, pears, and
grapes were. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 287.
476. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 137; Puertas de Hoteles en La Habana Separan
Dos Mundos Diferentes, NuEvo HERALD, May 15, 1993, at 1A.
477. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 418.
478. Ni Con Ddlares Pueden Comprar los Cubanos en Tiendas de Extranjeros, DLAIuo LAS
AMERIcAs, July 31, 1993, at 1-A, 1 1-A.
479. See supra notes 241, 242, 248-50, 299-301 and accompanying text (discussing
dollarization and liberalized travel and explaining possible social and political conse-
quences); Enrique Llaca, El Dtlar Creard Dos Clases de Cubanos en Cuba Te Queda Poco
Fidel, DPAmo LAS AMERICAS, Aug. 1, 1993, at 10-A. The apartheid of dollar-holding vs.
non-dollar holding Cubans could end in a racial dichotomy.
480. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 293.
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Cubans access to foreigners who can get goods in the foreign-
only stores that are unavailable through the ration system. Fi-
nally, the dollar tips these workers receive cannot be underval-
ued, as they provide access to the coveted hard currency and
that to which it gives access; the government looks the other way
and lets them keep it.481
Another consequence of the move to attract tourism is the
resurgence of prostitution, another one of Cuba's evils that Cas-
tro claimed his rule had eliminated."8 2 However, it appears that
the sex trade is to gain access to clothes,483 a decent meal, sham-
poo, or even a house.484 Recent reports reveal that the govern-
ment has recognized the reappearance of prostitution but
judges it to be youth going morally astray rather than actions
arising out of economic need. 8 5 Sadly, the practice has at-
tracted such young girls that Canada is reported to be consider-
ing criminalizing sex with minors outside of Canada.4
8 6
2. Women in Cuba: A Myth of Equality
48 7
As it is possible to chart progress in health, education and
welfare by looking at the status of women,488 so, too, the equal
opportunity of citizens can be scrutinized by examining women's
status in Cuban society. In this area, regrettably, Cuba does not
fare as well as it did on the health, education, and welfare indica-
tors.4
89
Castro's revolution was founded on the concept of egalitari-
481. Id. at 293-94.
482. Id. at 418.
483. See, e.g., Vernon Silver, All Cash Is Not Created Equal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1993,
§ 9, at 3 (reporting Benetton store in Cuba that will be open only to tourists and diplo-
mats).
484. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 151-52.
485. Cuban Paper Tackles Taboo: Prostitution, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 24, 1994, at 8A.
486. Ariel Remos, Prostituci6n de Nifias en Cuba Alarma a Abogados Canadienses,
DLAuo LAS AMERICAS, Feb. 20, 1994, at 1A.
487. See Berta Esperanza Hernd.ndez Truyol, Women in Castro's Cuba: A Myth of
Equality, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THIRD WORLD WOMEN ch. 73 (Nelly P. Stromquist ed.,
forthcoming) (discussing separate account of status of women in Cuba).
488. See supra notes 56-78 and accompanying text (noting women's advancements
in health, education, and welfare).
489. It is noteworthy that the pre- and post-revolutionary Cuban society has been
consistent with respect to women in one critical aspect: the laws and constitutional
provisions affecting women and protecting women's rights always have been among the
most progressively-worded in the world.
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anism. In fact, in his address to the General Assembly on Sep-
tember 26, 1960, Castro clearly stated that one of the aims of the
revolution was to eradicate inequality and discrimination, specif-
ically noting that one of the principles of the Cuban revolution
was the condemnation of discrimination against blacks and Indi-
ans, and inequality and exploitation of women. 490 Castro desig-
nated this move toward equality for women as a revolution
within a revolution. The 1976 Constitution encoded this right to
equality into law, with Chapter Five expressly providing that "all
citizens have equal rights and are subject to equal duties."49'
However, in reality, neither women nor blacks have achieved
equality. Although both groups have made some gains, they
both largely have been excluded from the power structure.492
Indeed, at a 1974 Federation of Cuban Women ("FMC") Con-
gress, Castro recognized that women's equality was not yet a real-
ity;493 a reality that is still non-existent two decades later.
In addition to this constitutional requirement of equality,
three noteworthy legal changes were effected to fully integrate
women in the work force, and lift their "double burden" of work-
ing outside the home while also bearing housekeeping and chil-
drearing obligations. While these changes did alleviate the con-
dition of women, regrettably they did so by way of state-sup-
ported programs and policies that reinforce and perpetuate
traditional gender roles. Indeed, although women benefitted
from the family-related policies introduced in the 1970s, these
policies have as their foundation the traditional roles women
play in the family structure.
First, the 1974 Maternity Law494 offered women who were
490. Case of Cuba, supra note 20, at 90-91.
491. See CUBAN CONST. art. 40, in THE CONsTrrUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD,
supra note 79, at 111.
492. See STRUGGLE, supra note 22, at xxi; 1993 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 47, at
414 (reporting that leadership positions in government are dominated by white men;
that there are only three women in 25-member Politburo; and that although "blacks
and mulattoes make up over half of the population, they comprise only 4 of the 25
Politburo members and only 15% of over 200 members of the Central Committee").
493. See Cuba: Job Shortage Threatens Women's Advance, Latin America Regional Re-
ports: Caribbean, Mar. 28, 1990, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS File (not-
ing speech by Castro indicating that women stood to lose jobs as economy tightened);
see also Cuba: All Power to the People, Latin America, Apr. 25, 1975, available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, ARCNWS File (noting 1974 FMC Congress' deliberations of new Cuban
Family Code).
494. Ley No. 1263, de la Maternidad de la Trabajadora (1974), reprinted in MINIs-
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part of the paid labor force 18 weeks paid maternity leave, six
weeks prior to delivery and 12 weeks after delivery, paid days off
for doctors' visits, an optional nine-month unpaid leave for new
mothers, and a six-month unpaid leave for women with children
under age 16 to attend to family matters.495 In addition, if a wo-
man's child had special needs and required more care, the
mother was guaranteed an additional non-paid leave of absence
of up to one year, with her same position and pay waiting for her
upon her return to work. Mothers who were part of the paid
labor force also were granted one hour per day with pay to nurse
and care for their infants. As noted in the discussion on
health,496 there is guaranteed medical care during pregnancy,
child birth, and the post-natal period for the mother and the
newborn child. The FMC, a state-supported organization, assists
in delivering health services by keeping track of pregnant wo-
men and newborns, organizing cervical cancer screening, or-
ganizing vaccination programs for home-makers, and holding
sex education and reproductive freedom education sessions for
women,497 all traditional gender-role related activities. Thus,
beneficial as the 1974 Maternity Law may be for women and chil-
dren, it is at the expense of entrenching existing gender roles.
The same pattern of different treatment based on gender
exists in other family issues. The second example is the 1975
Family Code ("Family Code"), which was enacted to stipulate a
new equality between men and women in marriage.4 98 The Fam-
ily Code identified the right of each marital partner to pursue a
career and required both to share household duties and child
TERIO DEJusTICIA, LA MUJER EN CUBA SocIAusrA [MINISTRY OFJUSTICE (CUBA), THE WO-
MAN IN SOCIAuIST CUBA] (1977) [hereinafter 1974 Maternity Law].
495. Id.; Lois M. Smith & Alfred Padula, The Cuban Family in the 1980s, in STRu-
GLE, supra note 22, at 179 (reporting on comments made by Isabel Larguya, Argentin-
ean citizen, andJohn Dumolin, U.S. citizen, both residents of Cuba since early 1960's).
496. See supra notes 23-78 and accompanying text.
497. Sarah M. Santana, Whither Cuban Medicine? Challenges for the Next Generation, in
STRUGGLE, supra note 22, at 251, 255. The Federation is a large organization that fo-
cuses on women. It works at the neighborhood level as well as the national level, and is
represented in municipalities and provinces. Women are mobilized through the Feder-
ation for the performance of certain tasks. In 1977 the Federation was believed to have
approximately 2,127,000 members representing about 80% of the female population
over the age of 14. Mrro, supra note 1, at 133, 133 n.8.
498. FAMILY CODE, Law No. 1289, translated in CENTER FOR CUBAN STUDIES, CUBAN
FAMILY CODE (1975).
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care. 499 This right was even incorporated into the Cuban mar-
riage ceremony and is read by judges performing civil marriages.
Yet a study conducted three years after the adoption of the Fam-
ily Code revealed that working women's share of domestic
chores was eight times that of working men.500 Thus, legal
changes notwithstanding, women's disproportionate share of the
burden of family and household obligations has not been eased.
The third major legal reform aimed at facilitating women's
equal participation in career and family matters, and one for
which the FMC provided a major impetus, was the establishment
of child care facilities or "children's circles."50 These coopera-
tives accept children from forty-five days of age, an age corre-
sponding to the end of the paid maternity leave, until six years of
age, when the children are ready to begin school. The child can
stay for the duration of the average workday, from approxi-
mately 6:30 A.M. to approximately 6:30 P.M., or for the entire
week until Saturday afternoon. The children are given three
meals a day, two snacks, a bath, a nap, and both learning and
play time every day. Originally, there was a sliding-scale fee in
accordance with the family income. In 1967, all child care facili-
ties became free, but in 1977, the sliding-scale was reinstated.
Like the Family Code and Maternity Law provisions, however,
these facilities do little to achieve equality of the sexes or to
break the sex role stereotyping molds. Thus, the equality no-
tions promoted by the revolution, though partly realized in light
of the improvements in health, education and welfare, as well as
through some of the policies aimed at easing women's "double
burden" discussed above, remain merely aspirational.
Beyond these three laws other family-related economic poli-
cies entrench gender inequality, as well as cultural and social
perceptions of, and expectations from, parents and workers
based on gender. For example, after a divorce, jointly owned
assets are sold and evenly distributed.0 2 Similarly, by law, pri-
mary custody is awarded to mothers, and child support payments
499. Id. arts. 24-28; Smith & Padula, supra note 495, at 179.
500. Smith & Padula, supra note 495, at 179.
501. Diana M. Riveira, Women's Legal Advancements In Cuba 19-20 (1989) (un-
published M. thesis, University of Miami) [hereinafter Riveira Thesis]; DEBRA EvENSON,
REvoLuToN IN THE BALANCE 116 n.23 (1994).
502. Id. at 181.
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are based on need and the father's income. °
Moreover, there is no paternity leave; in fact, fathers, by law,
are required to work. 04 In Cuba, where work is not only a right,
but also a duty,505 women with small children, but not similarly
situated men, are excluded from this obligation to work. 0 6 As
these laws and state policies show, and as will be further shown
below, the Cuban reality is that sex equality is a myth.
Non-Cuban nationals have commented, with respect to the
status of women, that in the 1980's, "many theoretical aspects
seem to have been left behind in the transformations brought
about by the construction of [Cuban] Socialism."50 7 They note,
among other things, that the collectivization of domestic labor
has not been effected and that women still are raised with "femi-
nine" traits. The revolutionary messages regarding equality
often have been, at best, inconsistent. For example, the revolu-
tion shuns "housewives" who are seen as "unintegrated" persons
who will raise unintegrated children.5"8 Similarly, it has pro-
vided that women, just like men, should work outside the home.
Yet in other instances, the revolution has reinforced traditional
domestic arrangements by paying for honeymoons.
In view of these contradictory messages, the Cuban govern-
ment has failed to provide the means to relieve women of their
double duty as wives and mothers." 9 While the state emphasizes
the need for men's equal participation in housework and child
care, men are viewed by the state as inherently unreliable regard-
ing family responsibilities. 1 0
Thus, on the one hand, Castro's regime has provided that
women should work outside the home in order not to deprive
the state of "productive" labor and to further women's emanci-
pation.11 Indeed, Castro aimed at ending discrimination
503. Smith & Padula, supra note 495, at 181. The state support for enforcement of
child support payments from delinquent fathers is to avoid "the denigration of the wo-
men and their children." Id. (citing GRANmA, Jan. 12, 1986, at 7).
504. Smith & Padula, supra note 495, at 179.
505. Mrro, supra note 1, at 264 (noting that every citizen who is of age to work and
able to do so must work).
506. Id.
507. Smith & Padula, supra note 495, at 177.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id. at 177-78.
511. Id. at 177.
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against women in the work force. Castro, throughout his rule,
has successfully increased the number of women in the work
force, while broadening the positions they may hold.512 Women
now hold many jobs that had been performed exclusively by
men: they are now cane cutters, citrus fruit packers, auto
mechanics, dentists, doctors, engineers, and traffic police.
51 3
On the other hand, government policies consistently rein-
force traditional gender roles and place primary family care bur-
dens on women. In the midst of revolutionary changes, women
have not been represented in many areas because women con-
tinue subject to the traditional role expectations, except that
they now also work outside of the home all day. Studies show
the onus this places on women: women working in the paid la-
bor force had an average of only 2 hours and 59 minutes of free
time a day, spending 6 hours and 29 minutes at their job, and
then 4 hours and 4 minutes in domestic chores. This presents a
great contrast to men's schedules that reflect that, on the aver-
age, they spent 7 hours and 48 minutes working at their jobs,
and then only 32 minutes on housework.
514
To be sure, the state has attempted to promote women's
"productive" employment. However, the state's facilitation has
consisted of creating state surrogates for women's tasks con-
nected to their roles as wives and mothers rather than reconsti-
tuting the gendered expectations or redistributing domestic ob-
ligations. For instance, the state made day care services, workers'
cafeterias and low cost fast food restaurants and laundromats
available. 1 5 In addition, the state has accommodated gender-
role expectations in myriad ways. For example, the state gives
women workers, but not their male counterparts, special shop-
ping privileges to speed up purchase of groceries; only women
are allowed to stay in hospitals to assist and provide company to
sick relatives; when children become ill at state child-care facili-
512. PPREZ-STABLE, supra note 5, at 139-42. In fact, in his first address to the na-
tion Castro noted the need to end discrimination against women's participation in the
labor force. Shortly thereafter, the Labor Ministry started to enforce labor legislation
disfavoring women, and enacted new regulations regarding rights of pregnant women
to retain theirjobs. Id.
513. Susan Kaufman Purcell, Modernizing Women for a Modern Society: The Cuban
Case, in FEMALE AND MALE IN LATIN AMERICA 266 (Ann Pescatello ed., 1975).
514. Riveira Thesis, supra note 501, at 34-35.
515. Smith & Padula, supra note 495, at 178.
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ties mothers, not fathers, are called.516 Thus, while the state has
made changes in the work force to encourage women's partici-
pation, the reforms are grounded upon the acceptance of tradi-
tional women's roles. Interestingly, the state's justification for
the differential treatment and expectations is that men are irre-
sponsible, untrustworthy, and would abuse privileges.517
Still other aspects of the labor situation for women in Cuba
are telling. Cuba, as a socialist state, guarantees employment to
every citizen who wants to work.51 With this guarantee, the state
controls the size of the labor force by policy proclamations." 9
Some of these proclamations are strong evidence that true sex
equality is but an aspirational goal.
One of the ways that Cuba has manipulated the size of the
labor force is "by granting or removing economic and other in-
centives for female labor force participation or by changing the
regulations under which women are allowed to work."52° Wo-
men are considered a supply of labor when there are
shortages.52 ' However, when the state found it necessary, it took
measures to discourage female employment, including classify-
ing some jobs as male only.5 22 Indeed, as late as 1984, the gov-
ernment even imposed quotas on education by limiting the
number of women admitted to medical school.523
516. Id. at 179, 183, 186.
517. Id. at 179 (citing GRANMA, Mar. 7, 1985, at 1).
518. Sergio Diaz-Briquets, The Cuban Labor Force in 1981 and Beyond, in CUBAN
ECONOMY, supra note 18, at 99 [hereinafter Cuban Labor].
519. Cuban Labor, supra note 518, at 102. Examples of state policies that affect the
labor participation include "enforcement of existing school attendance laws and the
expansion of the national education system .... relaxation of retirement requirement
for older workers, . . . [and c]ontracting or expanding the size of the armed and
paramilitary forces." Id.
520. Id. at 102.
521. Id. at 102. Diaz-Briquets relates that a good example in Cuba was during the
"agricultural push of the late 1960s... [when w] omen were.., called to replace male
urban workers' that had gone to labor in the fields, and also to directly contribute their
input to the sugar harvest." Id.
522. Id. at 102-03. Thus, government regulations have limited women's access to
certain jobs. Some of these restrictions are facially explained as aimed at protecting
women's health. However, they are, in reality, pretextual and aimed at resolving em-
ployment problems.
523. PtREz-STABLE, supra note 5, at 137-38. The explanation for these quotas was
two-fold and based on the critical role played by civilian medical assistance in Cuba's
foreign policy, with both rationales grounded on sexist notions of the proper role of
women in the family structure and in society as a whole. The government explained its
quota as follows: first, because of women's greater family responsibilities, it would be
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Interestingly, the FMC objected to the government-imposed
work restrictions as violative of principles of equality. Neverthe-
less, today there are still somejob categories that are off limits to
women. However, the list of jobs from which women are ex-
cluded today includes only approximately 25 categories whereas
in the 1970's it included about 300 categories.
Effectively, thus, as was true with the quota imposed on wo-
men entering medical school, the so-called rights women enjoy
are no more than a state supported reinforcement and perpetua-
tion of traditional gender roles. This stereotyping includes the
notion that presumes work outside the home is more important
for men, a notion that finds support in and is facilitated by state
policies. In its 1990 Congress, the FMC still reported obstacles
to achieving gender equality of the double burden of work and
home.5 24 The FMC also recognized the continued discrimina-
tion in job promotions, the lack of women's progress regarding
promotions to leadership positions, and the significantly lower
earnings of women as compared to men, even when women
were better educated.
Indeed, female participation in the labor force follows tradi-
tional patterns. For example, the most common occupational
group for women is in the classification of "other intellectual ac-
tivities," a classification that includes clerical and secretarial
jobs. 25 The percentage of women is also high in the garment
and service industries, 2 as well as in teaching and research,
"suggesting that females continue to be concentrated in tradi-
tional women's occupations, such as primary school teaching
and nursing. '527 Women, however, also make up the majority in
some "non-traditional female" fields such as medicine5 28 and in-
difficult for them to travel overseas for extended periods to deliver medical assistance;
second, male doctors were needed to deliver medical assistance because the countries
to which the assistance was given had not recognized, as Cuba had, the changing role of
women in society. Id. Thus, the notion of gender equality ceded to other governmen-
tal policies. In carrying out its quota policy, the government did not even allow women
to decide for themselves whether (a) to travel, and (b) to tolerate sexist attitudes. Id.
The FMC, the state mass organization ostensibly charged with promoting and ensuring
gender equality, did not challenge the quota. Id.
524. Id. at 168-69.
525. Cuban Labor, supra note 518, at 107.
526. Id. at 109.
527. Id. at 107.
528. Santana, supra note 497, at 253.
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creasingly in law.5 29 In fact, women constitute 56% of all work-
ing professionals, and more women than men are doctors and
lawyers.5 30 Significantly, one last indicia of gender difference is
noteworthy in the labor force: retirement age is different for
men (60) and women (55).
Women also lag far behind in the political power structure.
Although their representation in parliament has increased sub-
stantially,5 2 it was not until 1986 that a woman became a full
member of the Politburo.5"' Indeed, after Castro's April 1994
reorganization of the Cuban government, only one woman, Rosa
Elena Sime6n Negrin, who was appointed Minister of Science,
Technology and Environment, held a significant official post.534
Women are virtually invisible in the
more powerful and prestigious occupational levels in revolu-
tionary Cuba. Although one out of every three workers is a
woman, less than one in five directors of state, political and
economic organizations is female. This female under-repre-
sentation in the pinnacles of political and economic power
... remains puzzling if one is to accept the official rhetoric
calling for equality between the sexes.5 35
Thus, as with employment and family issues, women are
marginalized in politics. Certainly they are represented in the
political structure, but only at the lower echelons, rendering
even this increased representation less than "equal."
Similarly, women are treated differently under the criminal
laws. For example, women and men charged with violating cer-
529. Debra Evenson, The Changing Role of Law in Revolutionary Cuba, in STRUGGLE,
supra note 22, at 63.
530. Robert W. Benson, An Island on the Way to Ectopia, on Human Rights, Cuba's
Record Compares Well to Mexico and Others, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, at 5.
531. Cuban Labor, supra note 518, at 103-04.
532. STRUGGLE, supra note 22, at xxi (noting that substantial increase has taken
place since 1986, explaining that "whereas in 1975 [women] represented 13.2% of
[Communist Party] membership, by 1986 this had increased to 21.5% ... [and w]ithin
the influential central committee women made up 18.8% of its membership").
533. Azicri, supra note 211, at 12. This was also the first time a black man became
a full member of the Politburo. Id.
534. Cuba's New Lineup, supra note 78, at 12; see supra note 78 (citing figures before
reorganization showing that women have never held any significant presence in high
levels of government during Castro's rule).
535. Cuban Labor, supra note 518, at 109. Similarly, women are under-repre-
sented in industrial groupings, including agriculture and manufacturing, the leading
activities for males, as well as construction and transportation. Id. at 109-10.
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tain articles of the 1979 Penal Code receive different
sentences. 53 6 Women who are convicted receive sentences totwenty years; men who are convicted receive sentences to thirty
years.537
These examples show that today's Cuban society is far from
being one that views or treats men and women as true equals.
Indeed, it is ironic that the way Castro in 1960 addressed the
issue of discrimination could be seen as foretelling of things to
come. He seemed to view racial discrimination against blacks
and Indians, probably men, as different from gender discrimina-
tion. He implied as much when he said that one of the princi-
ples of the Cuban revolution is the condemnation of discrimina-
tion against blacks and Indians and inequality and exploitation
of women.53 8 Castro declared "the right of blacks and indians to
the 'full dignity of man;' the right of women to civil, social and
political equality."55 9 It is noteworthy that whatever the desirable
"dignity of man" is, women do not receive it. Rather, they ap-
pear to be worthy of some lesser level of equality. This sense of a
less equal "equality" for women, for blacks, indeed for Cubans as
opposed to non-Cuban tourists and diplomats, as well as for non-
"privileged" Cuban masses as opposed to the "privileged" high
ranking officials and their families and friends, challenges the
egalitarian ideal upon which the revolution was founded.
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the status of Cuba, both in se and as a compar-
ison of pre- and post-revolution successes and failures, is a daunt-
ing task virtually insulated from empirical quantification, let
alone calm and honest political discussion. The mere mention
of Cuba transforms even-tempered citizens to unbending ideolo-
gists. The data available is infused with ideology. This author's
attempt at neutral analysis often was marred by the political
credo of analysts. Nonetheless, this adventure in fact-finding re-
vealed that both Castro's supporters and detractors are simulta-
536. CUBAN PENAL CODE arts. 119 (acts against heads and diplomatic representa-
tives of foreign states), 132-36 (other acts against security of State), 249 (acts that affect
right of extraterritoriality).
537. SusTAIN PREssuRE, supra note 312, at 55.
538. Case of Cuba, supra note 20, at 91.
539. Id. at 92 (emphasis added).
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neously right and wrong to praise/condemn what in their partic-
ular political perspectives are the successes/failures of the re-
gime.
Laudable advances in attaining second-generation human
rights, such as the rights to work, health, education, and welfare,
undoubtedly have taken place in Cuba during the Castro re-
gime. These, however, are often carried out in a fashion that
ignores first-generation rights, such as the right to privacy, and
currently are threatened by the recent economic crunch the is-
land is suffering as the sole socialist survivor in this part of the
world. This commitment to communism is isolating the island
as the world has moved from an ideology/military-based model
to an economic interest model. Without the doctrinal umbilical
tie that provided economic support, the island finds itself out in
left field and all alone while playing defense, and consistently
striking out when in the offense.
Currently, Cuba lacks the necessary resources to obtain the
,hard cash it needs to buy the requisite supplies to run the coun-
try and feed its people. The economic situation is so severe that
Castro has had to bite the bullet and effect some promising eco-
nomic changes, albeit some that are direct reversals of policies
he put in place as centerpieces of his revolution. Salient among
these policy reversals that have resulted from the need for eco-
nomic survival are the development of tourism, relaxation of
travel restrictions for Cubans in the island to travel abroad, alle-
viation of prohibitions against Cuban exiles visiting the island,
allowance of private foreign ownership, most recently including
Cuban exiles, dollarization of the economy, and authorization to
engage some private enterprise.
Shocking steps have been taken to raise hard currency.
One is the selling of Cuban industries that had been seized by
Castro's revolutionary government to free the state from de-
pending on foreign trade.5 40 Another is the new regulations re-
garding prices, subsidies, and taxes.54' For the first time since
the revolution, Cuba will start charging for some goods and serv-
ices such as sporting and cultural events, transportation, and
540. Rafil Verrier, Castro Pone en Venta Casi Todas las Empresas de Cuba, DiAmo LAs
AMERICAS, Jan. 6, 1994, at I-A; Pablo Alfonso, Cuba Pone Industrias a la Venta, NuEvo
HERALD, Jan. 5, 1994, at 1A.
541. Foreign Investment Legislation in Cuba, supra note 79, at 16.
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water. 5 42 Moreover, the Cuban government is eliminating price
subsidies and will begin taxing Cuban residents for remittances
of convertible currencies received from abroad. 43 Finally, a new
convertible peso will be issued that, some speculate, the govern-
ment will require the Cuban people to exchange for freely con-
vertible currencies they might hold.544 Most recently, Castro has
undertaken a massive reorganization of the government to ac-
commodate these necessary changes.
545
There have also been favorable changes with respect to
human rights. For example, the liberation of political prisoners
is a move in the right direction. However, the continued perse-
cution of gays and lesbians5 46 and the isolation of HIV-positive
persons and AIDS patients is not.
Moreover, reports of other governmental actions that bring
about greater repression cause grave concern. Myriad accounts
suggest that Castro is taking a tough stance against the increas-
ingly vocal anti-Castro movement, one that is mainly in direct
response to and in protest of the dire conditions that exist in the
island.547 There are accounts of laws being passed to restrict
public protests against food and energy shortages.548 In any
event, there is no palpable move to abide by the rule of law; to
permit direct political participation; or to respect the interna-
tionally-protected freedoms of speech, assembly, or association,
to list a few rights flagrantly ignored by the government.
In addition, while the liberalization of the economy to per-
mit foreign investment may be deemed a positive move towards
democratization, similar liberalization of the internal economy is
called for. Thus, Castro's announcement of a crackdown on
economic crimes, which include what simply can be defined as a
542. Id.
543. Id.
544. Id. at 15.
545. Rafil Verrier, Importantes Cambios en la Estructura del Gobierno Cubano, DLARIo
LAS AMERICAS, Apr. 24, 1994, at 1-A.
546. See REINALDO ARENAs, BEFoRE NIGr FALLs (1993) (describing persecution of
gays, lesbians, and HIV-positive persons in Cuba).
547. Castro Warns U.S., supra note 172; Doralisa Pilarte, Cubans Are Losing Their
Fear, Awe of Once All-Powerful State, MLAMI HERALD, Dec. 27, 1993, at 1A, Ariel Remos,
Desafia Una Multitud en Cuba a Polidas en un Concierto Popular, DIMuo LAS AMERICAS, Apr.
16, 1994 (relating group crashing concert that was by invitation only).
548. Mimi Whitefield, Cuba to Consider Vandalism of State Property as Sabotage, MiM
HERALD, Sept. 14, 1993, at 8A.
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private economy, is contraindicated. That farmers' markets have
again been legalized is a positive step. Similarly, Castro's latest
decree extending the range of materials and consumer goods
that can be sold freely is another move in the right direction.549
The range of private enterprises that are permitted to exist
should be completely opened, however, as these enterprises
would provide necessary goods and services as well as employ-
ment to the Cuban people.
The easing of travel restrictions both into and out of the
island also is a positive move. Significantly, this is not a move
without possibly dangerous consequences to the regime. The in-
flux of exiles, for example, carries with it an information flow
that previously proved damaging to the government. The 1980
liberalization of travel triggered the Mariel exodus, when many
isolated island Cubans heard about the good life on the other
side from their exiled brothers and sisters, and concluded they
wanted to go where the grass was (at least believed to be)
greener. The present opening of doors could have the same ef-
fect, and result in a large exodus of discontented masses who are
existing in a "zero option" economy, experiencing hunger from
food shortages, possible epidemics from food shortages or per-
haps from scarcity of medical supplies, and regular daily black-
outs from lack of fuel and power to run industry and homes.
In August 1994, a great irony surfaced regarding Castro's
tight control of the borders. Presumably because of mounting
economic ills that have resulted in massive shortages of goods
and food, Castro unilaterally changed Cuba's policy of closely
monitoring the illegal exit of many who were willing to risk their
lives in rickety, homemade, makeshift rafts for the possibility of
landing in the United States. Once Cubans learned they could
leave without interference from Castro, they took to the seas by
the thousands, and headed for the Florida shores. President
Clinton of the United States, fearing such a massive exodus
would be a replay of Mariel, reversed the almost three-decade
old policy of welcoming Cubans who reached U.S. shores with
open arms.550 Instead, they were turned back to Cuban shores
549. Tim Golden, Cuba Takes Another Step in Opening Up Its Economic System, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 1994, at A7.
550. Steven Greenhouse, U.S., in New Policy, Intends to Detain Cuban Immigrants, N.Y.
TiMES, Aug. 19, 1994, at Al (noting that Clinton Administration announced it would
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by a ship blockade or picked up and taken to "safe-havens,"
mostly Guantanamo Bay, and refused entry. The end result
would have been funny if not so tragic; by a U.S.-Cuba agree-
ment, Castro gets to reinstitute his repressive, oppressive policy
of monitoring Cuba's shores. This irony has not been lost. The
Wall Street Journal insightfully reported:
The unthinkable choice was that the U.S. should be on
this occasion as George Washington described it in 1783, a
land whose 'bosom is open to receive the persecuted and op-
pressed of all nations.'...
All trumpeting aside, we lost. The Castro regime won. It
agreed only to prevent people from leaving Cuba, exactly as it
was doing six weeks ago and for 30 years before that. This was
done not as a favor to the U.S., but because such repression is
an important ideological and practical component of a sys-
tem that seeks to exert total control over the lives of its sub-
jects. 51
In this context, it is imperative that the terms of the U.S.-Cuba
agreement to allow 25,000-30,000 persons to immigrate legally
needs to be put into effect with expediency.
Another recent event, the change in law to allow persons
legally to possess convertible currency, is a positive step,
although not one without possible repercussions. This favorable
move, however, is clouded by Castro's prohibition against even
dollar-holding Cubans from shopping at hard-currency foreign-
ers-only stores.
It is impossible to conclude without mention of the em-
bargo and the ongoing debate it has engendered.55 2 First, this
author views the ongoing embargo debate in the United States
detain for indefinite period Cubans arriving in United States, reversing policy of free
entry for Cuban refugees).
551. GroverJoseph Rees, Clinton's Iron Curtain, WALL ST.J., Sept. 14, 1994, at A18.
552. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing arguments in support
of ending the embargo and of continuing the embargo); see also Steven Greenhouse,
New Calls to Lift Embargo On Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1994, at 4; Mimi Whitefield, State
Department Says Cuba Embargo Still the Best PoliCy, MIAMI HEI.D, Mar. 13, 1994, at 21A;
Key U.S. Allies at U.N. Vote Against Cuba Embargo, MiAMi HERALD, Nov. 4, 1993, at 22A
(noting that for second year in row, Cuban-sponsored resolution repudiating U.S. em-
bargo was passed, and that support for resolution "increased dramatically" in 1993); see
supra note 40 (referring to U.N. General Assembly resolutions). Some recent reports
even suggest that the United States is not enforcing the embargo. See Christopher Mar-
quis, Some Say U.S. Ignoring Cuba Embargo Violators, MLAMI HERALD, Apr. 8, 1994, at 18A
[hereinafter U.S. Ignoring Embargo].
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as a smoke-screen. The embargo is, in a word, irrelevant to the
discourse. It has been in place for over thirty years and has
achieved little. Certainly, during the Cold War pugilism, with
the superpower aid Cuba received from the Soviet bloc, the em-
bargo was like swatting an elephant with an eyelash. Today, with
the economic crisis, it is more like swatting a fly with a Buick.
To be sure, lifting the embargo would permit U.S. invest-
ments that could help the Cuban economy by pouring in hard
cash. But on the other hand, this country can, and increasingly
has, used economics as a means to promote policy. At this junc-
ture, it seems just as likely that trading with Cuba will accelerate
its road toward democracy, as opposed to not trading with the
island ensuring the same result. The former stance, at least,
holds out the hope of a U.S. presence which can seek to educate
and promote notions of free enterprise as well as personal rights
and freedom. And while the extraterritorial aspects of the em-
bargo have been universally condemned, 553 this and other as-
pects of the embargo are the sovereign prerogative of the United
States.
However, notwithstanding the sovereign policy prerogatives,
the specific actions of the United States, in insisting on the em-
bargo, contravene any consistent policy pronouncements. It is at
least inconsistent to impose an economic embargo on Cuba for
political, i.e., pre Cold-War demonization of Communism and
condemnation of human rights abuses, when the U.S. just (a)
declared that as a matter of policy it will sever economic issues
from human rights concerns, at least with respect to trade with
communist China, (b) renewed trade with Vietnam, and (c)
commenced talks with North Korea.
Still, the U.S. embargo is, and should be, of no moment
with respect to at least some economic recovery. Cuba is free to
trade, and increasingly has traded, with other states. On the
other hand, Cuba's lack of the cash to trade, even with willing
partners, will continue to impede large levels of foreign trade.
In this light, it is noteworthy that Cuba would not have the cash
553. See supra note 130 (discussing U.N. General Assembly resolution condemning
the embargo). Some reports indicate that large multinational corporations are avoid-
ing the embargo's restrictions by using foreign subsidiaries to trade. See also Evaden el
Embargo deEE.U. a Cuba con Filiales Fordneas, DIARIo LAS AMERICAS, Dec. 28,1993, at IA;
U.S. Ignoring Embargo, supra note 552, at 18A.
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to deal with the United States either. In this respect, the argu-
ment of some who favor the lifting of the embargo on the condi-
tion that Cuba remain unable to obtain financing from interna-
tional sources, such as the International Monetary Fund, is un-
settling.554 Lifting the embargo, but foreclosing access to
money, i.e., financing sources, that would give Cuba the actual
means to engage in trade is, at best, a position "full of sound and
fury, signifying nothing.
555
Cuba's need to trade is so great that notwithstanding its so-
cialist credo, it has opened its borders to foreigners who are now
permitted to own businesses. Thus any .U.S. involvement with
Cuba on the trade front would be an opportunity to impose con-
ditions to promote a "democracy and human rights" agenda in a
much more efficacious manner than a total absence ever could.
On the other hand, the "humanitarianism" argument, urg-
ing the lifting of the embargo so that humanitarian aid can be
supplied, is misplaced. The embargo, as it stands, permits the
humanitarian aid, food and medical supplies, that proponents
use as an argument for ending the embargo. Even the recently
tightened restrictions put in place in anticipation of a massive
exodus still allow for humanitarian aid. In fact, the embargo
also permits increased communications, with their attendant
risks to the regime, and a means for the Cuban government to
share in the revenues. Significantly, various U.S. communica-
tions companies have taken advantage of this change.5 56 To be
sure, to enhance communications it will be necessary to modern-
ize the technology, a single underwater cable, that presently pro-
vides access to the island's phone system.
Thus, it is the issues behind the embargo debate that are
important, not the embargo itself. It is worth exploring these
issues. First, with respect to humanitarian assistance, it should
be offered freely and generously to the island. It is at best in-
comprehensible, and at worst disingenuous, to sit idly by when
neighbors are starving and simple medical assistance is unavaila-
ble, and then condemn others' human rights abuses. However,
554. David Asman, The Embargo Must Be Lifted, Comments delivered at Fordham
University School of Law, Panel on "The Cuban Crisis" (Oct. 18, 1994).
555. WiLLLAm SHAESPEARE, MACBETH act V, sc. V.
556. See Foreign Investment Legislation in Cuba, supra note 79, at 16. The U.S. admin-
istration has under review whether to license U.S. carriers to provide telecommunica-
tion services between the United States and Cuba.
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in light of the established privilege hierarchy that exists in Cuba,
and in order to ensure a fair distribution of goods, any such
assistance should be based upon having a third party, such as the
International Red Cross, the OAS or the U.N., oversee the distri-
bution of aid.
Second, with respect to human rights, it is necessary to rec-
ognize the progress as well as the deficiencies in Cuba. Again, in
order to evaluate the situation fairly, human rights observers
should be allowed onto the island to evaluate and report on the
current human rights situation, concerning prisoners, human
rights activists, as well as general conditions regarding everyday
existence. It is imperative that minimum international standards
be met with respect to treatment of prisoners, and that guaran-
tees of equality, free speech and association be implemented. In
regard to equality, one must note that the egalitarian notions
upon which the government was founded are still, at best, aspira-
tional. As this Article has shown, all women, regardless of race,
and black (and indian) men are far from the center of power in
the government. In fact, these groups suffer from gross under-
representation in the higher echelons of power. Moreover, in
spite of the recent moves towards democratization, the status of
all Cuban people is institutionalized as a second class citizenry
vis d vis foreigners as well as vis d vis the privileged Cuban gov-
ernment dignitaries. Furthermore, the current trend toward lib-
eralization threatens to create yet another underclass of Cubans,
those who do not have access to dollars. Because the Cuban ex-
iles have been predominantly white, there is a real fear that this
new underclass will effect and further not only social but also
racial stratification.
Similarly, the international guarantees of freedom of speech
and association need to be instituted. The laws on the books
prohibiting more than three persons to gather, even in a private
home, must be changed. Human rights activists must be allowed
to gather and speak freely. Watchdog brigades intended to curb
such activities must be called off. Presses must be allowed to roll.
Prisoners should enjoy internationally-accepted standards dur-
ing their incarceration. Government restrictions on Cubans'
travel outside the island should end or, at least, be less restrictive
and government attacks against those seeking to flee should
cease.
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Third, the economic changes that have commenced should
continue and be broadened. All workers with salable skills, not
just those the government chooses, should be allowed to offer
their services to the public, subject only, for example, to reason-
able government regulation such as licensing regulations for
medical doctors. Close attention must be paid to the manner in
which further economic changes are implemented so that an ec-
onomically deprived underclass does not become the by-product
of attempted progress.
Fourth, regarding health, education and welfare, the mag-
nificent progress achieved must be praised and zealously
guarded. In fact, the United States can probably learn valuable
lessons from the Cuban health system. Also, it should also be
considered that there is some international responsibility to en-
sure that such progress be preserved and that individuals not suf-
fer in this post-Cold War standoff. This is of particular impor-
tance, as there exists ample evidence that the current economic
crisis has had a tragic effect on the health care system, which is
unable to obtain necessary medicine, including household
painkillers, or even offer antiseptic conditions in hospitals.
Finally, and perhaps as a conflation of the above factors, the
legitimacy of the regime is a critical issue. The most blatant evi-
dence of the government's illegitimacy is found in the three-
tiered apartheid system (Cubans vs. foreigners; Cubans at high
level of government vs. Cuban masses; dollar-holding Cubans vs.
non-dollar-holding Cubans) and the lack of peoples' participa-
tion in the government. This structure, like the other human
rights infractions, racial and gender inequities, imbalanced par-
ticipation in the work force and in the government and, indeed,
the lack of a democratic elective process, establish that the gov-
ernmental powers are not derived from the consent of the gov-
erned, nor does the government enjoy the respect of the gov-
erned. The aim of any external international pressure should be
focused upon these ills.
Some critical concepts, however, must be foremost in
Cuba's process of transition to legitimacy. First, we should learn
from global post-Cold War events. In designing the new model,
and the changes to include in it, lessons learned in the former
Soviet Union's, Eastern Europe's, and Latin America's change
process must be applied in order to avoid imposition of solutions
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that do not fit Cuba's particular circumstances. In restructuring
a society, the society that is to undergo restructuring and its
members must be kept in mind as the primary actors.
It does not work, as we have seen in Eastern Europe, for
example, simply to superimpose a market economy on a former
socialist state. The economic, socio-political, and cultural foun-
dations of the society must be taken into account. Otherwise,
any attempt at change simply results in trying to fit square pegs
in round holes. Important, then, in a transition is to listen to the
people, their experiences, their wishes and goals. Thus, the new
system must include input not only from western societies and
the newly democratic states, but also from other agricultural so-
cieties and, perhaps most importantly, from the Cuban people
themselves. It is the Cuban people who live on the island who
must be the prime architects of a reconstructed social/political/
economic order. Only this will ensure a model that can work in
light of their particular health, education, economic, social, cul-
tural, and governance aspirations.
Indeed, in this respect, not only authors of change within
the government and teachers of theory in the universities must
be consulted but also the entrepreneurs, those who have been
running the thriving underground economy from which Castro
is seeking to divert dollars. It should not be ignored that for
years, with the historic shortages and rationing of goods and
services, a thriving black market economy has existed that has
permitted Cubans to "resolver," or make do, in the face of scar-
city. The participants in this underground economy are a won-
derful, if "hidden," source of information in the privatization
process; they have been successful entrepreneurs in the most re-
strictive of circumstances, a government-controlled society.
They understand the culture in which private industry is to exist,
so that they may help build the above-ground one.
Other assets should be utilized as well. For one, the OAS
worked well in rejecting Cuba from the community of American
states once. It appears to be willing to take a strong stance
against the illegitimacy of the government, recently condemning
the government for being antidemocratic, totalitarian, and lack-
ing the rule of law.55 As such, it can now be critically important
557. Ariel Remos, Ilegtima la 'Legalidad Socialista' en Cuba, Dedara la Comisi6n de la
OEA, DAuo LAS AMERICAS, Feb. 22, 1994, at 3-A; Gerardo Reyes, Future OAS Leader
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in reincorporating the isolated island with its geographic neigh-
bors. This could serve as a wonderful bridge not only in the
political democratization process, where the recent experiences
of Chile and Nicaragua can prove invaluable, but also to bridge
the cultural and economic gaps. In exchange, Cuba can share
its formulae for progress in health, welfare, and education with
this hemisphere. Finally, it is important to point out that while
the international community works hard to change what did not
work in the Castro years, it must work equally as hard to keep
what has worked.
In closing, a brief narrative related by Andres Oppen-
heimer, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, about an experience
he had in one of his visits to Cuba while researching his recent
book about Castro, is quite telling. One of the privileges en-
joyed by tourists is that they do not have to wait in line for any-
thing, as opposed to the Cubans who must queue up for every-
thing. Gas is scarce, gas lines are long, but tourists do not have
to endure them. One hot day, Mr. Oppenheimer decided to test
his tourist privilege and proceeded directly to the front of a long
gas line. As he pulled up to the pump a Cuban woman, who
obviously had been waiting for a long time, walked up to him,
visibly upset. She asked out loud what had become of the coun-
try. She started telling the people standing around, those who
had been patiently waiting their long-awaited turn at the gas
pumps, that the country no longer belonged to Cubans but that
it belonged to foreigners. Oppenheimer told her that he was
informed that the law provided that, as a visitor, he could go to
the front of the line. She responded, "That's not our law, sir,
that's their law! ... The law de los que mandan... Of those who
rule ... !"55
This Article proposes that for any true change and progress
los que mandan must be the Cuban people. This is what Castro
set out to do in his revolution. By empowering the Cuban peo-
ple, Cuba may fully participate as a member of the international
community and enjoy the fruits of democratization that ended
the Cold War and created a new world order.
Promises Not to Let Cuba Become a Member, Mas Canosa Says, MIami HERALD, Apr. 8, 1994,
at 18A.
558. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 229, at 292.
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